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ABSTRACT 
 This research investigates the current state and ability of homestation training 
infrastructure (TADSS, networks, and facilities) and framework for training (scenarios, 
databases, and training support packages) to support a Live Virtual Constructive – Integrating 
Architecture (LVC-IA) delivered Integrated Training Environment (ITE).  As combat operations 
in Central and Southwest Asia come to a close the Army is faced with extreme post-conflict 
budget cuts and force reductions.  Continued evolution of Army training methodology is required 
to overcome limited resources and maintain force readiness in the anticipated “era of persistent 
conflict”.  A LVC-IA delivered ITE promises to be the next step in the evolution of training.  
Interoperation of live, virtual, and constructive simulations in a persistent and consistent manner 
can collectively train brigade and below units on combined arms tasks in a resource constrained 
homestation environment.  However, LVC-IA cannot act alone in establishing the ITE.  Prior to 
the fielding of LVC-IA, local installations must already possess a training infrastructure that 
optimizes training resources as well as a framework for training that meets Operational 
Adaptability training requirements.  To measure the perceived state and ability of homestation 
training infrastructure and framework for training to support a LVC-IA delivered ITE, a survey 
was conducted of homestation training community members at the 18 Army installations 
scheduled for LVC-IA fielding.  Additionally, perceptions regarding the role of LVC-IA in 
establishing the ITE and emerging resources, useful in the development of local framework for 
training were sought.  Findings, conclusions, limitations, lessons learned, and recommendations 
for future research are presented.  
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CHAPTER ONE: MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
Introduction 
 On February 13, 2012, the President of the United States released the Fiscal Year 2013 
Budget of the U.S. Government (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2012).  
“The budget would provide $525 billion for the Defense Department’s base budget which is a 
1.1 percent reduction from what Congress approved for Fiscal Year 2012.” (Rudowski, 2012).  
Highlights of the budget include, “Downsize the Army to 490,000 (down 72,000) by 2017”, 
“Request two new base closure rounds”, and “delay development of the Army’s Ground Combat 
Vehicle” (Rudowski, 2012).  Downsizing the U.S. Army after the conclusion of major combat in 
Iraq and Afghanistan has begun. 
In the last century, the Army has downsized at the conclusion of major combat and left us 
ill prepared for what has proven to be inevitable subsequent combat.   After World War I, World 
War II, the Viet Nam War, and the Cold War, the U.S. Army downsized (Shortal, 1998).  Prior 
to 1991, all initial combat of major conflicts subsequent to downsizing, resulted in defeat or a 
costly win for the U. S. Army (Scales, 1994).  This pattern of poor first performances was broken 
at the start of the Gulf War, during the Battle of 73 Easting, when the 2
nd
 Armored Cavalry 
Regiment completely destroyed two armored divisions of Iraqi Republican Guard with practiced 
expertise (Gorman, 1992a).  At the start of the Gulf War the U.S. Army was entering its second 
year of post Cold War drawdown with significant reductions to both force size and training 
resources, yet its first contact with the enemy resulted in an overwhelming victory.  This pattern 
of success in initial combat has since continued in Afghanistan and Iraq.  U.S. Army Special 
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Operations was successful in orchestrating a Northern Alliance victory while elements of the 10
th
 
Mountain and 101
st
 Airborne Divisions defeated over 1000 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the 
Shahi-Kot Valley during Operation Anaconda (Naylor, 2005).   The 3
rd
 Infantry, 82
nd
 Airborne, 
and 101
st
 Airborne Divisions were extremely successful during the invasion of Iraq with their 20 
day drive to Baghdad and decisive defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Keegan, 2005). 
The Army chief of staff, General Raymond T. Odierno is charged with managing the 
current downsizing of the U.S. Army so the initial combat of the next unknown war can be a 
success.  Can lessons be learned and strategies developed from the past to help General Odierno 
prepare the U.S. Army to achieve success in the initial combat of the next war?  On February 24, 
2012 during the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare Winter Symposium 
and Exposition, General Odierno provided insight into his evolving strategy:   
“We will adjust the process where active duty and reserve component units advance 
through a reset phase, a training phase and an available phase and prioritize their training and 
planning in support of a specific combatant command and mission sets,” (AUSA News, 2012). 
Clearly General Odierno is using a decentralized approach to associate resources with 
combatant command and mission sets.  Can research into past successes and failure identify 
lessons learned and strategies that may assist General Odierno in preparing the U.S. Army for 
success in the future next initial combat?  Can differences between success and failure help 
answer such questions as: Why was the outcome of the first battle of the Gulf War so different 
from the outcome of previous inaugural engagements?  One supposition presented during 
congressional testimony by Major General H.R. McMaster, a lead Troop Commander and 
participant of the 1991 battle, is that 73 Easting represents the outcome of a positive change in 
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peacetime training methodology (McMaster, 1992).  Is MG McMaster correct in his hypothesis?  
If so, what was the turning point in methodology and how did it contribute to the sustainment of 
warfighting proficiency despite the constrained training resources of a post Cold War 
drawdown?  Has training continued to evolve in the 21
st
 century?  Will the future Army be able 
to maintain a force capable of defeating a persistent threat in a complex and uncertain 
environment, despite the impending drawdown?   
 The Purpose of this chapter is to illuminate potential pitfalls to effective training typical 
of Army downsizing efforts prior to the end of the Cold War.  Lessons from past force 
drawdown that degraded the ability to win the first battle with acceptable losses must be 
identified.  By studying the Army training objectives and policies found in these lessons, they 
can be understood in the context of developing effective training strategies for future force 
reductions.    
 An illustrative case study approach as recommended by Yin (2009) will be used to 
examine the impact of post World War II downsizing on the Army’s ability to sustain training 
proficiency sufficient for first battle success at the onset of the Korean War.  This single case has 
been chosen for its comprehensive effect on Army training and readiness which is 
representational of force downsizing in the last century.  The poignant lessons learned from Task 
Force Smith at the Battle of Osan illustrate among other things the consequences of failing to 
maintain competency in warfighting tasks.   
 Clearly the defeat of Task Force Smith cannot entirely be put on the failure to maintain 
competency in warfighting tasks.  For example, Brigadier General Esposito clearly attributes 
Task Force Smith’s lack of success to the U.S. Army’s inability to develop and provide 
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commanders with state-of-the-art tactical weapons when he states, “Lacking effective antitank 
weapons, it [Task force Smith] was overrun after a hard fight.” (1959, Map 3 Korean War).   
Esposito continues to emphasize the point of this research, which is collective, combined arms 
training:  “As other elements of the 24th Division became available, its commander, Maj. Gen. 
William F. Dean, committed them in a series of delaying actions – sometimes heroic, usually 
desperate, and always confused.  In the stand at Taejon, Dean was captured”.  Major General 
Dean was not effective in synchronizing the differing arms and elements of his command into a 
cohesive team. 
 More recently, Retired General Paul F. Gorman, a consultant for the Institute for Defense 
Analysis, summarized the importance of collective, combined arms training. “No branch of 
service is likely to succeed in combat unaided… The foundation of teamwork is a shared concept 
of how the team functions.  A combatant unit is a team of teams, and all unit training should aim 
ultimately at combined arms teamwork” (Gorman, 1992b, pp. IV-3 – IV-4). 
 The combined arms concept synchronizes the application of several complementing 
combat arms to achieve effects on the enemy that are greater than if each arm acted 
independently (FM 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations, 2008).  As a basic example, the 
infantry may coordinate for supporting artillery fires during an attack on an enemy position.  The 
artillery fires suppress the distant enemy position, providing the infantry with unhindered 
movement to their objective.  Combined arms integration is not limited to combat arms branches 
such as infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation, but also includes support, logistic, and 
maintenance branches that sustain the force.  
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 Effective integration of differing combat arms on the battlefield requires well rehearsed 
arrangement of actions in both time and space (FM 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations, 
2008).  Collective training places all of the branches of the Army in a common training 
environment where relationships, procedures and communication necessary for combined arms 
synchronization can be established and perfected.  For an infantry battalion commander to 
become skilled in artillery supported maneuver of his companies, he needs to practice this 
coordinated fire and maneuver with the artillery battery that will support him in combat.   
 Collective training is not effective unless it faithfully replicates the relationships and 
conditions expected in actual combat.  This is commonly referred to in Army training doctrine as 
“train as you will fight” (FM 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations, 2008).  Force structure 
and size, as well as command and support relationships should reflect wartime, rather than 
peacetime organization.  Weapon systems, vehicles, and equipment used in training should be 
the same that will be used in combat.  Mission essential tasks to be trained should be determined 
by the assessed threat and capabilities of contemporary adversaries.  The scenario that drives the 
training along with a thinking and adaptive Opposing Force (OPFOR) should present the 
combined arms force with a problem set representative of the contemporary operating 
environment.   
 The scope and direction of this case study question is focused on post World War II 
obstacles to training that limited the Army’s ability to conduct collective, combined arms 
training at a level sufficient to win the first battle.   Other issues such as suitable equipment, 
effective tactical operations, and overwhelming odds in battle although considered, will not be 
the primary focus of this research.  The initial case study question developed to guide this 
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illustration is:  How did post World War II Army downsizing create training obstacles that 
prevented Army units, deployed to Korea, from achieving victory at the first battle of Osan?   
A First Battle Lost: Task Force Smith at the Battle of Osan 
 On 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) of 90,000 soldiers and 150 
tanks invaded the Republic of Korea.  The South Koreans had been sufficiently trained by 
American advisers, but were poorly equipped and could not stop the Soviet equipped North 
Koreans.  The closest U.S. Army ground forces capable of intervening were the four under 
strength VIII Army divisions posted in Japan on occupation duty (Shortal, 1998). 
 Fearing that the entire Korean peninsula would fall to communism, General MacArthur, 
commander of the Far East Command, sent message number C56942 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
“If authorized, it is my intention immediately to move a U.S. regimental combat team to the 
reinforcement of the vital area discussed (Han river line and the Seoul-Suwon corridor) and to 
provide for a possible build up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early 
counter-offensive” (Collins, 1964, p. 20).  Shortly thereafter, General Walton Walker, the 
commander of VIII Army, received a warning order to deploy one Regimental Combat Team 
(two battalions) and a division headquarters to Pusan by air.  Walker alerted the 24
th
 Infantry 
Division and preparations for combat started immediately.  However, limited C-54 cargo aircraft 
only permitted the rapid deployment of less than a battalion.  This shortage of aircraft would be 
the impetus for formation of Task Force Smith.   
 LTC Brad Smith’s 1/21 Infantry was chosen to form Task Force Smith as they were the 
only battalion that had conducted rapid deployment drills (Garret, 2000).  Aircraft restrictions 
would limit the size of Task Force Smith to 450 men, but his number was reduced to 406 men to 
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accommodate the essential equipment that would be needed to conduct combat operations 
immediately upon arrival.  Task Force Smith deployed with two of its three under strength rifle 
companies and half of its headquarters company.  It was reinforced by two 4.2 in mortars and 
two 75 mm recoilless rifles from the battalion’s heavy weapons company as well as a battery of 
six howitzers from the 52
nd
 Artillery Battalion.  Wartime strength for an Infantry Battalion was 
860, but Task Force Smith had been reduced to almost half that (Blair, 1987, pp. 94-95).  Prior to 
departing Itazuke Air Base in Japan, Major General Dean, the 24
th
 ID commander, issued LTC 
Smith the only tactical orders that he would receive, “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon.  
We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can.  Block the main road as far 
north as possible… Sorry I can't give you more information—that's all I've got.  Good luck, and 
God bless you and your men!” (Alexander, 2003, p. 55). 
 On 5 July 1950, Task Force Smith fought a delaying action from blocking positions in the 
vicinity of Osan, just south of the capital city of Seoul.  In this first battle of the Korean War, 
Task Force Smith would not perform as a well rehearsed and highly efficient “team of teams”.  
Despite courageous efforts, LTC Smith was not able to synchronize the differing combat arms of 
his task force to achieve significant effect on the numerically superior NKPA armor regiment 
and infantry division that they faced that day.     
 The first shots were fired by the howitzer battery when 33 tanks of the leading NKPA 
armor regiment were within one mile of task force positions.  However, the high explosive, non-
armor piercing shells that they were firing did little to slow the advancing tanks.  High Explosive 
Anti Tank (HEAT) rounds are the only artillery munitions capable of destroying main battle 
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tanks with modern armor, but the battery only possessed six of them.  These six HEAT rounds 
represented one third of the total supply in the division (Blair, 1987).   
 Smith had been told that he would have close air support from the Air Force (Blair, 
1987), but he had never practiced air-ground integration.  It is doubtful that anyone in the task 
force was adept in radio procedures required to establish contact with and control a sortie.  It was 
lack of coordination and procedure that caused the Air Force to accidentally strafe the task force 
as it arrived in Taejon by rail (Garrett, 2000).  If standard coordinating procedures had been 
established, the Air Force would have been aware of friendly unit frontline trace and might not 
have mistaken Task Force Smith for an enemy element.  Even if coordination with the Air Force 
was possible, rain and limited visibility on 5 July had grounded all aircraft (Blair, 2000).   
 The NKPA armor column continued to close with Task Force Smith, enjoying 
unhindered freedom of movement as antitank (AT) mines had not been incorporated into the 
defensive plan.  The mines had been left on the airfield in Itazuke, as they would have had to 
leave behind additional men to create space for them on the aircraft (Garrett, 2000).  Lack of a 
disrupting obstacle plan could have been remedied to some degree if Smith had been provided 
with a task force armor capability.  Armor would have provided parity against the tank-heavy 
NKPA.  However, the tank component of the battle proven infantry-armor team had almost 
ceased to exist due to peacetime budgets.  The small amount of armor that existed would have 
deployed by sea, not arriving in time to support the task force. 
 At 700 yards, Smith ordered the 75 mm recoilless rifles to engage, but many of these 
rounds appeared to bounce off of the NKPA tanks.  When the column was abreast of defensive 
positions, 2.36 in “Bazooka” teams engaged with similar nominal effect (Blair, 1987).  The 2.36 
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in rocket launcher and 75 mm recoilless rifle had been effective against tanks during World War 
II, but tank armor had improved since 1945, making these weapons obsolete against the Soviet 
supplied T-34 tanks (Garrett, 2000). 
 The NKPA regiment advanced right through all task force blocking positions, firing as 
they went, but not becoming decisively engaged.  After expending all six HEAT rounds, the 
artillery battery had only destroyed four T-34 tanks.  The remaining 29 continued their drive 
south towards Osan, stopping only to push the two destroyed tanks off of the highway.  Smith 
had lost 20 men killed or wounded, one howitzer and most of the task force’s wheeled vehicles 
(Flint, 1986). 
 An hour after the armor regiment had penetrated task force defensive positions, a 
following NKPA infantry division led by three tanks came into view along the highway.  The 
large convoy of trucks followed by a six mile long column of dismounted infantry stretched on 
for six miles.  Smith waited until the advancing column was within 1,000 yards before he 
ordered all mortar and direct-fire weapon systems to engage.  This heavy volume of fire 
prevented a frontal NKPA assault, but the three lead tanks were able to establish a base of fire 
allowing the enemy infantry to maneuver to the flanks.  Smith was unable to employ artillery 
fires to prevent double envelopment because communication with the artillery battery was lost.  
The radios had failed early in the day and T-34 tanks from the first engagement had rolled over 
and severed communications wire.  Task Force Smith was running low on ammunition and about 
to be encircled, while more than half of the NKPA infantry division had yet to be committed.  
With no way to reach back to the division headquarters that had since arrived in Taejon, there 
was no hope of reinforcement, emergency resupply, or casualty evacuation (Flint, 1986).   
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 Seven hours after the battle started, LTC Smith gave the order to withdrawal.  Still under 
intense enemy pressure, the task force would have to withdrawal successively, by company.  
Smith stayed with B Company to continue delaying the NKPA while C Company moved south 
to the next defendable piece of terrain.  Once set, C Company would delay while B Company 
moved.  There was not an effective form of communication or established technique to control 
maneuver between the two companies.   C Company had not even completed one bound before 
B Company was overrun and the withdrawal turned into a rout.  Discipline was lost as soldiers 
dropped their weapons and left the dead and wounded behind.  The scattered TF eventually made 
its way south to the 24
th
 ID’s newly established main defensive line (Flint, 1986).  Forty percent 
of the TF had been killed wounded or captured (Millett, 2010) and the North Korean advance 
was only delayed seven hours (Fehrenback, 1963). 
 With less than a battalion’s worth of assets and no support from his higher division 
headquarters, Smith was sent to do a job intended for a regimental combat team.  Instead of 16 
rifle companies, an entire artillery battalion, and a tank company, Smith deployed with two 
companies, one battery of artillery, and zero armor.  Without a division to reach back to, Smith 
was deprived of combat support and combat service support.  No engineer assets were available 
to emplace obstacles and mines.  No signal personnel could be called on to fix and maintain 
communications.  Medical and Logistics units were not available to evacuate casualties and 
conduct resupply.  SFC Loren Chambers’ frustrated call for fire support during the Battle of 
Osan illustrates the crippling impact of inadequate combined arms structure.  Chambers had 
requested 60 mm mortar support and the exchange follows (Toland, 1991, p. 81): 
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Fire Support Officer: “Won't reach that far.” 
Chambers: “How about some 8l!” 
Fire Support Officer: “We don't have any.” 
Chambers: “Hell, for Christ's sake, throw in some 4.2's!” 
Fire Support Officer: “We're out of that too.” 
Chambers: “How about the artillery?” 
Fire Support Officer: “No communications.” 
Chambers: “How about the Air Force?” 
Fire Support Officer: “We don't know where they are.” 
Chambers: “Then damn it, call the Navy.” 
Fire Support Officer: “They can't reach this far.” 
 
 An inadequate combined arms team and LTC Smith’s inability to synchronize its 
elements are not a result of limited cargo aircraft space and unskilled tactical leadership, but 
rather symptoms of a much larger problem.  LTC Smith and his task force utilized the training 
and resources that the post World War II Army had provided to put forward the greatest effort 
possible.  However, force downsizing presented significant obstacles to the training and 
resources available to maintain readiness.  
As seen from the above Task Force Smith case, the concepts of collective, combined 
arms training and “train as you will fight” are basic measures of evaluation for success in future 
initial combat.  Initially at least six identified downsizing issues may be drawn from Task Force 
Smith and the greater Korea War case studies.  These downsizing issues may help categorize 
identified lessons learned into topic areas and help develop strategies for success in initial 
combat of future war.  The following six topic categorizations are discussed below to illustrate 
how they contributed to the failure of U.S. Army ground combat units at the beginning of the 
Korean War:  
  - Identification of Threats and the National Strategy  
- Force Plan not Aligned with Foreign Policy Objectives 
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  - Equipment Procurement and Modernization  
                         -Meeting Personnel Retention Goals 
  - Mission Creep 
  -Allocation of Training Resources 
Identification of Threats and the National Strategy 
 World War II is full of allied preparations to fight using the wrong strategy, wrong 
tactics, or wrong technology.  The French strategically built the Maginot Line as an improvement 
on trench warfare but were defeated by mobile warfare strategy (Kaufmann, 2007).  Army 
General Short tactically lined aircraft on runways prior to December 7 in order to protect them 
better from saboteurs, but lost them on the ground to tactically ship borne enemy aircraft (Borch 
& Martinez, 2004).  In 1939, Polish cavalry valiant attacked German tank formations just to be 
mowed down by machine guns (Zaloga, 2002).  The list could go on.  
Following World War II, the Truman administration was faced with the dilemma of 
devising a national strategy that was appropriate for the changed international environment, 
while at the same time balancing the federal budget.  The quickest path to fiscal health was 
through reduction in defense spending which did not seem feasible considering the increasingly 
aggressive posture of the Soviets.  However, a monopoly on offensive nuclear capability would 
be the rationalization of a strategy where the United States could both fulfill its international 
responsibilities and reduce the defense budget.   
 General Carl Spaatz, commander of the Army Air Corps, and a growing number 
Congressmen believed that air superiority coupled with possession of strategic nuclear weapons 
would be enough to check Soviet expansionism and negate the need for a large standing Army 
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(Epley, 1999).  While Spaatz’ view was obviously biased, many politicians bought into it, as 
maintaining long-range bomber groups to deliver nuclear bombs was much cheaper than training 
and sustaining a large army.  As long-range bombers initially lacked intercontinental range, a 
small ground component would still be required to seize and secure intermediate airfields from 
which aircraft could be launched (Weigley, 1973).  A small army would also be required for 
occupation and policing once the Air Corps had accomplished its objectives.  The small, interwar 
Army was already playing its role in this new strategy by occupying Japan and Germany.  
However, the question still remained as to whether a 10 division army would be able to win the 
wars that the Air Corps failed to deter.  
 The parallels between the post Korean War notion that Air power and a smaller army 
would be the answer to future conflict and today’s belief that UAV’s and a smaller army will be 
in the answer for future conflict cannot be missed.  Air power in the form of nuclear weapons 
was believed to be the deterrent if not solution for future conflict then and air power in the form 
of UAV’s are again believed to be the deterrent if not solution for future conflict now.  Retired 
Major General Scales believes a strategy that emphasizes air and naval power while reducing the 
ground component is a mistake the government is in danger of repeating:  “Here’s what the 
lessons of the past 70 years really teach us: We cannot pick our enemies; our enemies will pick 
us.  They will, as they have always done in the past, cede to us dominance in the air, on sea and 
in space because they do not have the ability to fight us there.  Our enemies have observed us 
closely in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they have learned the lessons taught by Mao Zedong, Ho 
Chi Minh and Saddam Hussein: America’s greatest vulnerability is dead Americans.  So our 
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future enemy will seek to fight us on the ground, where we have traditionally been poorly 
prepared” (Scales, 2012). 
 Thus closer examination of the assumptions and beliefs that created pre Korean War 
National Strategy requires future discussion.  When more closely examining underlying 
assumptions and beliefs, the advice found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is applicable:  “If you 
know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  If you 
know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you 
know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” (Sun Tzu, n.d./1910). 
 Five months prior to the Korean War, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a 
speech to the National Press Club that described America’s “defensive perimeter” in Asia with 
no mention of the Republic of Korea. Critics of the Truman administration purported that this 
omission was intentional and meant to indicate that the Truman Doctrine did not apply to South 
Korea (Matray, 2002). This perception was perpetuated by the withdrawal of all U.S. military 
presence in South Korea by 1949 while four divisions were maintained in Japan (Blair, 1987).  
Republican opponents believed that Acheson’s speech emboldened China and the Soviet Union 
to support the North Korean invasion.  Three days after the NKPA invaded the Republic of 
Korea, Republican Senator Robert Taft commented on Acheson’s speech. “He [Acheson] said in 
definite language that the United States must and shall maintain armed forces in Japan, Okinawa 
and the Philippines, but that there were limits to effective United States assistance.  He 
[Acheson] distinctly stated that beyond the line laid down we could not assure the rest of the Far 
East against attack…  is it any wonder that the Korean Communists took us at the word of 
Secretary Acheson?” (Taft, 1950).  Whether intentional or not, the Truman Administration’s 
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actions sent mixed signals to the Soviet Bloc which was interested in expanding influence in 
Asia. 
Further, having used nuclear weapons during World War II, it was believed within the 
United States that we would use nuclear weapons if we needed them thus further justifying a 
small army.  Yet once the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons the underlying assumptions 
that enabled our use of nuclear weapons during World War II had changed.  Our opponent had 
nuclear weapons.  Conditions were similar to inhibition on the use of gas warfare during World 
War II.  Widespread use could lead to destruction of mankind, which neither side wanted.  Thus 
when General MacArthur asked permission to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War, 
doctrine had only recently understood the limitation on nuclear war (National Security Council, 
1950) and Truman could not chance the risk of total nuclear war and therefore would not use 
nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 2008). 
Clearly the actions and guidance of both the President and the Secretary of State were not 
in touch with their own beliefs and those of potential opponents.  As a result, U.S. Army force 
structure was not aligned with real world requirements.  General George C. Marshall believed 
that rapid force generating potential found in Universal Military Training (UMT) was the 
answer.  Marshall had been responsible for the accelerated mobilization of the Army just prior to 
World War II and understood the difficulty of building a capable force from the ground up 
(Ambrose, 1986).  If approved by Congress, UMT would have required all men to receive 
military training upon graduation from high school.  This provided a substantial pool of trained 
reservists that could be mobilized rapidly if deterrence failed. 
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 Endorsement of the “forces in being”, provided by UMT, can be found in contemporary 
Army assessments.  A 1947 Army Ground Forces study indicated that the opening attacks of the 
next “total war” would be from the air and that a large Army Air Corps would be the main effort.  
The Air Corps would buy time for the small regular army which would organize the populace 
and mobilize the UMT reserves to repel a ground attack.  It was assumed that the Air Corps 
would attrite the ground attack, leaving little for the rapidly generated reserve force to do (Epley, 
1999, p. 15).   The theory of UMT provided justification for the small standing army that was 
consumed by occupation and had little time to sustain warfighting skills. UMT was championed 
by both Truman and Marshall, but Congress never approved it.  This created a gap in Army 
plans, making the Army Air Corps a potential single point of failure.  However, most 
congressmen blindly bought into the idea that air superiority had made ground forces obsolete 
and did not want to spend money on maintaining a reserve force that they believed would never 
be utilized (Ambrose, 1986).   
 In recognition of the Army Air Corps’ primary strategic role, the National Security Act of 
1947, created the U.S. Air Force, making it an independent service separate from the Army 
(Weigley, 1973).  Although this change occurred at the strategic level, echelons above maneuver 
battalions, the impact it had on the combined arms concept quickly trickled down.  In keeping 
with the new strategy, Air Force procurement and training focused on large bombers and 
strategic level objectives.  Little was devoted to tactical close air support of the ground 
component and the art of air-ground integration was soon lost.  The shift to a strategic bombing 
focus was the source of Task Force Smith’s limited C-54 airlift assets during deployment and 
unreliable close air support during combat.  Airlift and tactical support of ground forces were 
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given the lowest priority by an Air Force preoccupied with its new central role in the national 
strategy (Blair, 1987).  Moreover, by relegating the Army to a contingency role, the importance 
of maintaining a combined arms capability within the ground component was de-emphasized and 
the funding to support it was reduced.  Congress and its constituents were not willing to increase 
defense spending to fund the development and production of B-36 and then B-52 intercontinental 
bombers, so it was done at the expense of Army and Navy budgets (Weigley, 1973).   
 In 1950, the strategy of air superiority and nuclear deterrence was put to the test when 
Communist North Korea invaded the Republic of South Korea.  However, the Air Force was 
unable to fulfill its promises of airborne victory without ground combat.  One year earlier, the 
Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic weapon, ending the American monopoly on 
nuclear weapons.  Additionally, the Basic War Department Plan had been based on total war 
occurring in the Continental United States.  Korea was a limited war, occurring thousands of 
miles away and use of nuclear weapons to deter the invasion would have been viewed 
internationally as inappropriate and disproportionate.  National Security Council Report 68 
(NSC-68), written two months before the Korean War, indicated that the Soviets were aware of 
our unwillingness to use nuclear deterrence in limited war.  “It [Soviet Union] also puts a 
premium on piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our unwillingness to engage in 
atomic war unless we are directly attacked” (National Security Council, 1950, p. 4).  It would 
now fall on the Army, whose combined arms capability had atrophied, to stop the North Korean 
invasion. 
 Creation of a separate Air Force, to play the primary role in national strategy, represented 
a departure from the combined arms concept.  The strategy of nuclear deterrence relied solely on 
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the air component, and made the ground component a contingency force that would only be 
called upon if air superiority failed to win the day.  It was assumed that the next war would not 
be fought by a team of teams that synchronized the various elements of combat power to achieve 
a greater effect on the enemy.  In The Armed Services and American Strategy, Stephen Ambrose 
(1986) illustrates how flawed this strategy that abandoned the combined arms concept was. 
“Korea was a classic infantryman’s and artilleryman’s war.  The air support the soldiers needed 
and finally got was not big bombers on strategic missions (which were forbidden for political as 
well as economic reasons-there were no true strategic targets in North Korea or China), but 
close-in fighter and helicopter support” (p. 310).  
Force Plan not aligned with Foreign Policy Objectives 
 In the three years following World War II, the Army went from an 89 division force of 
8.29 million soldiers to a 10 division force of 554,000 soldiers (Shortal, 1998).  Initial force 
reduction following the defeat of Germany in May of 1945 was limited and cautious, as a 
protracted fight with Japan was expected.  By 1 September of 1945, the day before Japan’s 
capitulation, the Army had only discharged 270,000 soldiers.  The unanticipated surrender of 
Japan on 2 September accelerated Army downsizing to an irresponsible rate.  Nine months after 
V-J Day, the Army had been reduced in strength to 1.89 million (Sparrow, 195, p. 265).  The 
final force level set by Congress in 1947 was for a peacetime army of 600,000 (Thompson, 2002, 
p. 33).  A pre-war mind set, in which the peacetime Army’s role was limited to homeland 
defense, was utilized to determine this number.  However, America had emerged from the war as 
a world leader and the new international landscape had driven changes in U.S. foreign policy.  
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This required an army large enough to exert influence beyond the borders of the continental 
United States.  
 In 1947, eight of ten Army divisions were consumed by occupation duty in Germany and 
Japan, leaving two divisions of the strategic reserve as the only uncommitted force that could be 
called upon to answer the increasing threat of Communist expansionism (Epley, 1999).  Failure 
to integrate force reduction plans with emerging national policies resulted in an Army that was 
not capable of supporting the country in its new international role.  In 1950, George C. Marshall 
recounted the frustration that the inadequate size of the Army had caused him during his tenure 
as Secretary of State.  “I was being pressed constantly… to give the Russians hell… I was 
getting the same appeal in relation to the Far East and China… At the time, my facilities for 
giving them hell-and I am a soldier and know something about the ability to give hell-was 1 1/3
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divisions over the entire United States.  That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody 
with over 260 [divisions] and you have 1 1/3
rd” (Sparrow, 1951, pp. 282-283).  Despite this lack 
of ability to “give hell”, foreign policy such as the Truman Doctrine continued to make promises 
that the Army could not keep. 
 The Army’s ability to enforce American foreign policy was tested when Communist 
North Korea invaded The Republic of Korea.  The primary mission of the one and one-third 
divisions that Marshall referred to was to act as a rapidly deployable ready reserve.  However, 
this strategic reserve was not sufficiently trained or manned to react to such a crisis.  As early as 
1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall noted that the strategic reserve was so under 
strength that it could only accomplish collective company and battalion training by consolidating 
all its personnel into a single battalion (Epley, 1999).  Recognizing the unpreparedness of the 
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strategic reserve and the significant logistical issues of deploying a force from the Continental 
United States, the VIII Army, on occupation duty in Japan, was chosen to stop the North Korean 
advance.  While the VIII Army’s proximity to Korea made it an easy choice, the peacetime 
structure within its four divisions had not supported the collective combined arms training 
required to remain proficient in warfighting tasks.     
 The 24
th
 ID’s modified structure is typical for this era of downsizing.  Each of the ten 
divisions had an authorized wartime strength of 17,716 men, however cuts in defense spending 
required the Army to issue a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment that limited the 
peacetime authorization of divisions to 12,759 (Epley, 1999, p. 22).  To remain within these new 
authorizations, each of 24
th
 ID’s three regiments was forced to deactivate one of its three 
maneuver battalions.  Additionally, the division’s four field artillery battalions were required to 
go from three to two firing batteries each, and the number of antitank guns within the division 
was reduced from 109 to 9.  Most damaging to the 24 ID was the deactivation of each regiment’s 
tank company, that totaled 24 Sherman or Pershing tanks per company, and the division’s tank 
battalion, totaling 72 Sherman or Pershing tanks.  VIII Army divisions were permitted to retain 
only one company of old Chaffee light tanks that were never used in training as they were 
considered obsolete (Flint, 1986, p. 269).    
 The armor-infantry team had proven its worth in the combined arms fight during World 
War II and was recognized as the primary combined arms relationship.  General George Patton 
commented on the importance of the armor-infantry team after failing to form one during the 
Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941.  “We still fail to use every weapon every time… Each time we 
fight with only one weapon when we could make use of several weapons, we are not winning a 
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battle, we are making fools of ourselves”.   Patton had not used infantry to clear antitank guns 
forward of his armored cavalry regiment’s advance and suffered the consequences (Gorman, 
1992b, p. II-19).  The lessons learned during the Louisiana Maneuvers led to a division task 
organization that facilitated the combined arms concept. 
 By 1950, combined arms relationships that had taken countless pre war maneuver 
exercises to realize and five costly years of combat to perfect, had been completely dismantled.  
Infantry and armor battalions were the key maneuver elements for a division of this era, yet these 
two units constituted the largest reductions as directed by the Modified Table of Organization 
and Equipment.  It would have been difficult for the 24
th
 ID to conduct collective training of 
armor-infantry teams in each of its six remaining infantry battalions with an armor capability 
limited to one company of 24 obsolete tanks. Combined arms training cannot occur if the 
mutually supporting arms within the division cannot train collectively in the same exercise.  
 It was assumed that there would be ample forewarning of the next war giving the Army 
plenty of time to transition back to and train with a wartime Table of Organization and 
Equipment (Robertson, 1985).  As it turned out, there was not sufficient warning to rebuild a 
combined arms war fighting capability.  On 29 June 1950, 1/21 Infantry was conducting 
occupation duty in Japan under a peacetime task organization.  Six days later, Task Force Smith 
was fighting a NKPA armor force under the same modified table of organization that had 
stripped away all tank support and one third of supporting artillery fires.   
Equipment Procurement and Modernization 
 From 1945 to 1950, U.S. Army procurement programs were non-existent.  The abrupt 
end of the war caused most procurement contracts to be cancelled as there was no longer a war 
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effort for the military-industrial complex to feed.  Procurement includes continued purchase of 
standard legacy equipment as well as the purchase and fielding of new equipment.  Purchase of 
older equipment and replacement parts ensures maintenance of damaged or worn out gear.  The 
fielding of new equipment ensures that the force remains modern and technically relevant in 
comparison to its adversaries (Epley, 1999).   
 At the end of World War II, the Army possessed enough weapons, equipment, and 
vehicles to equip 89 divisions.  A massive surplus of equipment was created when the Army was 
reduced to 10 divisions.  Under the austerity budgets of Truman, Congress was not motivated to 
procure more weapons when such a large stockpile of serviceable equipment existed.  This in 
combination with a strategy that favored the air component caused the diversion of Army 
procurement funds to subsidize the foreign aid programs of the Marshall Plan.  Army 
procurement funds paid for reconstruction programs such as the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, the International Refugee Organization, and the Government and Relief in 
Occupied Areas Organization.  These organizations utilized Army procurement funds to buy 
food and fertilizer (Shortal, 1998, p. 2).  Without the ability to conduct procurement, Army 
equipment deteriorated and the U.S. Army lost the technological edge it had enjoyed during the 
war.  
 Army maintenance personnel resorted to cannibalization of discarded equipment as there 
was not a reliable supply of replacement parts.  By 1947 most remaining spare parts had been 
scrounged and the Army was left with 370,000 unserviceable vehicles.  By 1950 one in four 
tanks was inoperable (Shortal, 1998, p. 2).  All VIII Army divisions possessed worn out 
equipment from World War II that had surpassed its useful lifespan.  Thirty caliber machine guns 
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did not have spare barrels or tripods.  Baseplates, bipods, and sights were missing from 81 mm 
mortar systems.  Radios, 57 mm recoilless rifles, and 90 mm antitank guns were nonexistent 
(Flint, 1986, p. 274).  In the combined arms concept, maneuver requires fully operational 
supporting-role weapon systems of the kind that VIII Army was lacking.  More importantly, the 
ability to synchronize of fire and maneuver elements is degraded when radios are not available.  
Lack of procurement deprived the 24
th
 ID of the tools required to train for and conduct combined 
arms warfare.  
 Unless money is spent to incorporate the newest technologies into military equipment, 
the force stands to lose the advantage of technical overmatch or equipment superiority.  In 1945, 
General Eisenhower illustrated the importance of modernization in a letter to Bernard Baruch, 
the chairman of the War Industries Board. “Developments of modern warfare tend to emphasize 
the necessity of more and more technical knowledge for an ever increasing number of men. This 
requires intensive and extensive training in the use of elaborate and expensive 
equipment” (Eisenhower, 1945, p. 736).  However, insufficient procurement funds prevented 
modernization of Army equipment.  In 1948, Eisenhower complained that the Army was 
deficient in modern weapons and in danger of losing the technological overmatch it had enjoyed 
during the last war (Epley, 1999).   
 Failure to modernize had the most profound effect on armor and antitank capabilities.  
The 2.36 in rocket launcher had been the primary antitank weapon for infantry during World 
War II.  Improvements in the armor of main battle tanks towards the end of the war made the 
Army’s main antitank capability obsolete.   An improved 3.5 in rocket launcher, capable of 
penetrating modern armor  had been developed at the end of the war, but was discontinued when 
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procurement was defunded (Shortal, 1998).  These same advancements in battlefield technology 
required the Army to develop a modern replacement for the M4 Sherman whose now lighter 
armor and smaller 75 mm main gun had become obsolete towards the end of the war.  The M26 
Pershing’s thicker armor and larger 90 mm main gun were designed to defeat modern German 
tanks such as the Tiger and Panther (Hunnicutt, 1996).  However, production of the Pershing 
ceased in 1946 along with procurement funding.  Since the deletion of 24
th
 ID’s regimental tank 
companies and tank battalion, under the modified Table of Organization and Equipment, all 
Pershings sat derelict in warehouses for want of repair parts and maintenance.  The division 
chose to equip its one authorized tank company with light Chaffee tanks because the poor roads 
and bridges in Japan would not support the much heavier M26.  If modern AT weapons and 
armor had been provided to Task Force Smith, the Battle of Osan’s outcome may have been 
different.  When provided to Army units later in the war, the 3.5 in rocket launcher and the 90 
mm main gun of the M26 easily penetrated the armor of the T-34 tank.  The Pershing even 
provided overmatch as the T-34 had a difficult time penetrating its thicker armor, while an 
HVAP (High Velocity Armor Piercing) round fired from the M26’s main gun would pass 
completely through the hull of a T-34 (Zaloga, 2010). 
 Guided missile and atomic energy programs were the only two areas that continued to 
receive procurement and modernization funding.  This is not surprising, considering the newly 
adopted national strategy of nuclear deterrence (Epley, 1999).  In his book, This Kind of War 
T.F. Fehrenbach describes procurement priorities of the late 1940s.  "The Army had designed the 
3.5 in Bazooka, which would penetrate the T-34 [tank].  But happy to design them it hadn't 
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thought to place them in the hands of the troops.  There hadn't been enough money for long 
range bombers, nuclear bombs and bazookas too…” (Fehrenbach, 1963, pp. 96-97).  
 
Meeting Personnel Retention Goals 
 The Army had difficulty throughout the interwar period maintaining adequate personnel 
strength within its divisions.  The primary focus of retention after the war was to maintain a force 
large enough to handle occupation of Germany and Japan despite the demobilization induced 
hemorrhaging of manpower that was occurring at a rate of 25,000 per day (Thompson, 2002, p. 
30).  The draft, which was extended until 1947, in combination with the Advanced Service 
Rating (ASR) point system offset the exodus and ensured that force level minimums were 
maintained.  The ASR point system determined eligibility for discharge by awarding points for: 
time in service, time overseas, combat awards, and number of dependent children under the age 
of 18.  An enlisted soldier needed a total of 85 points to qualify for discharge (Sparrow, 1951).  
While this point system was designed to ensure that those who had fought longest and hardest 
would be discharged first, it was met with stiff resistance from a war weary America. 
 Public outcry to “bring the boys home” and violent protests of deployed soldiers 
challenged the controls that the Army placed on demobilization.  The Army found itself at odds 
with a Congress that was starting to give in to the demands of their constituents.   In an address 
to Congress on 15 January 1946, General Eisenhower attempt to calm the nation and make the 
case for a slower rate of demobilization.  “Men were kept in service to police occupied 
territories, to rid them of the vestiges of fascism, programs such as denaziification; to guard and 
maintain surplus property; to maintain lines of supply and communication; to service Army 
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installations; to maintain a PX and postal service system, as well as countless other tasks . . . if 
demobilization schedules are maintained the United States will run out of Army” (Thompson, 
2002, p. 32).  In July 1946, Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower approved a transition from the ASR 
point discharge system to a two year length of service discharge system.  Under this new system, 
all current and future draftees would be discharged after two years of service (Epley, 1999).  
Soldiers who had not accumulated the required 85 points, but had two years of service could now 
go home.  While this satisfied public opinion and maintained some control of force reduction 
rates, short terms of enlistment would disrupt training cycles and unit continuity. 
 In 1947, the Selective Service Act of 1940 expired, effectively ending the draft and 
turning the Army into an all volunteer force.  Without the draft, force strength was reliant on 
volunteer enlistments that were falling 10,000 below monthly recruitment goals (Epley, 1999).  
Even with a modified table of organization that reduced the personnel requirements per division 
by 30%, the post war Army remained unable to fill the ranks (Shortal, 1998, p. 3).   
 In an attempt to improve enlistment rates, the Army hired civilian advertising executives 
to design a recruiting campaign centered on patriotism and service to country.  No effort was 
made to attract recruits with monetary incentives as there was no room in the budget to support 
this and Congress was unlikely to support additional funding.  Military pay at the time was 
considerably lower when compared to the civilian sector and inflation was high.  These two 
factors in combination with lack of financial incentives to enlist ensured that only the lowest 
quality candidates for military service were attracted (Epley, 1999).  The military now had 
qualitative as well as quantitative personnel problems.   
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 Between 1948 and 1949, the focus of the eight divisions in Germany and Japan shifted 
from the occupation mission to transforming themselves back into a war fighting force.  The 
Berlin blockade and communist takeover of Czechoslovakia and China during this timeframe 
encouraged the transition.  To assist the Army, the two year draft was reinstated, but division 
personnel authorizations were still limited by the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 
(Blair, 1987).  
 The cumulative effect of the five-year personnel retention struggle could be seen in the 
VIII Army on the eve of the Korean War.  All four of VIII Army’s divisions on occupation duty 
in Japan were 1,000 soldiers short of the reduced personnel authorizations.  These shortages 
further reduced the strength of each of the divisions to approximately 37% below wartime 
strength (Blair, 1987, p. 48).  In 1949, B Company was the only company within 1/12 Infantry 
that had enough soldiers to conduct any meaningful training.  The under strength A and C 
Companies typically merged with B Company so their soldiers could train.  With the exception 
of a few platoon and company exercises, training rarely occurred above the individual or squad 
level (Flint, 1986).  1/21IN had never conducted battalion maneuver by company, which may 
have been a contributing factor to loss of control during the withdrawal from Osan.  Without last 
minute augmentation, the 24
th
 ID would only be able to field 62 % of its organic infantry 
firepower (Blair, 1987, p. 48). 
 In an attempt to preserve precious combat power, while remaining within reduced 
authorizations, the divisions trimmed the “fat” of support and logistics units that did not have a 
direct combat role.  This proved to an unwise practice as an infantry division cannot continue to 
fight unless it is sustained by the very units that were eliminated (Flint, 1986, p. 269).  Task 
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Force Smith would pay the price for this “fat trimming” that left it with no mechanism to 
conduct resupply or evacuate casualties during the battle of Osan.  Deletion of these support 
units meant that they would not be part of collective exercises, where sustainment relationships 
are established and resupply techniques are ironed out.  While they are not a considered a combat 
arm, support units are still a necessary and vital part of the combined arms concept.   
 Eisenhower’s transition to the two year length of service discharge system for all draftees 
in 1946 had unintended and enduring consequences.  The demand for replacements in the 
overseas divisions coupled with a limited two year enlistment caused the abbreviation of basic 
and initial recruit training from 16 to 8 weeks.  When poorly trained replacements arrived at their 
units, they had to be retrained on individual tasks before they could participate in collective 
training (Epley, 1999).  This may not have been a big deal when the focus was on occupation and 
tasks were of an administrative nature.  However, it proved to be a serious time drain when 
transformation back into a fighting force became the main effort.  Two year enlistments also 
caused constant turnover in the ranks.  By the time a soldier was trained to proficiency, his 
enlistment ended and an untrained soldier took his place.  It is difficult to train an effective 
combined arms team when the members of the team are constantly changing.   Secretary of the 
Army Kenneth C. Royall noted that, “The enormous turn-over of personnel, made effective unit 
training virtually impossible” (Epley, 19, p. 19).  
 Efforts to turn the divisions into cohesive combined arms teams were further derailed by 
the induction of low quality recruits and draftees.  Failure to offer financial incentives that were 
proportional to the civilian sector during the single year without a draft attracted the least 
qualified recruits.  Upon resumption of selective service in 1948, military pay remained low and 
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perpetuated the poor attitude and motivation common among soldiers.  In 1949 54 % of VIII 
Army soldiers, 48 % of 24
th
 ID soldiers, and 55 % of soldiers in the 21
st
 Infantry scored in the 
lowest two aptitude levels of class IV and V on the Army General Classification Test.  The 
majority of these soldiers were pulled from collective unit training to complete compulsory 
literacy programs (Davies, 1992, pp. 62-63). 
 The 24
th
 ID would not fight in Korea with the same team that it had conducted limited 
training with in Japan.  In an attempt to bring the strength of the 24
th 
ID closer to wartime 
authorizations, 2,108 noncommissioned officers and 2,615 soldiers were drawn from across VIII 
Army’s other three divisions and reassigned to the 24th just prior to their deployment (Blair, 
1987, p. 89).  These 4,722 new members of the division were integrated into the battalions and 
sent to Korea without the benefit of a collective exercise to establish and work out familiar 
combined arms relationships.  A portion of these men would join Task Force Smith six days 
before the battle of Osan. 
Mission Creep 
 The initial objectives of occupation in Japan and Germany were: demilitarization, 
democratization, and economic reform (Congressional Research Service, 2006).  Accomplishing 
these objectives would be an expensive endeavor, and the American people were not willing to 
pay the bill.  Since V-J Day, President Truman had been under enormous domestic pressure to 
demobilize, bring the troops home, cut taxes and strengthen the U.S. economy.  To relieve this 
pressure, the Truman administration insisted on a balancing the post war budget and reducing the 
$250 billion deficit without increasing taxes (Blair, 1987).  It was determined that the cheapest 
way to accomplish U.S. security objectives in Europe and Asia would be through international 
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cooperation (Leffler, 1992).  By cooperating with Britain, France, and Russia, the United States 
could accomplish its objectives without assuming all of the financial responsibility.   
 While the United States was suspicious of the Soviet system of socialism, the Soviets had 
been an important ally during the war and were not initially viewed as a threat.   There were no 
misgivings about assigning occupational responsibility of East Germany and North Korea to the 
Soviet Union.  In 1946, suspicion of the Soviet Union began to grow when they would not 
support creation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which would speed 
reconstruction through economic reform.   George F. Keenan, the Deputy of Mission at the U.S. 
Embassy in Moscow, provided an explanation for the Soviet’s behavior in an 8,000 word 
telegram to the Department of State (Leffler, 1992).  Keenan’s “long telegram” indicated that the 
Soviets saw capitalism as a threat to the ideals of socialism and therefore could not envision a 
peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union in a capitalist world.  The Soviets would take every 
advantage to expand socialism in the world by taking advantage of unstable regions and turning 
them into satellite states.  The Soviets did not accomplish this through military force, but by 
taking advantage of the power vacuum often found in faltering countries and filling it with 
controllable Marxist allies.  Keenan recommended a diplomatic strategy of containment where 
diplomacy and economic aid was used to prevent power vacuums.  He did not believe that it 
would require “any general military conflict” (Kennan, 1967, pp. 354–356).  By 1946, many 
Eastern and Central European countries had already become satellites of the Soviet Union. 
 In 1947, Great Britain was no longer capable of offering financial and military aid to the 
socially and economically unstable countries of Greece & Turkey, leaving them vulnerable to 
Soviet expansionism.  If these two Eastern Mediterranean countries became satellites, the Soviet 
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Union would gain control of the strategically important Turkish Straits and inhibit the flow of 
resources to the West.  Using Keenan’s strategy of containment, Truman set forth the doctrine 
that bears his name by pledging military and economic support to Greece and Turkey, as well as 
any other country threatened by communism (Leffler, 1992).   
 The Truman Doctrine marked the start of occupation mission creep which subordinated 
Army training and readiness to the reconstruction of Europe and Asia.  When Truman pledged 
financial and military aid to all, the cooperative spirit of reconstruction was lost and the U.S. 
became the chief bill payer.  The objectives of occupation had grown from basic reconstruction 
to containing the spread of communism.  Making the war torn economic and socio-political 
fabric of Europe and Asia strong enough to reject socialism would cost considerably more 
money.  The fiscally conservative Truman imposed unusually low defense budget ceilings that 
would not support the new objectives of his doctrine and sustainment of wartime fighting 
capability simultaneously.  Army leadership was forced to make a choice.  In a July 1947 
memorandum, Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen wrote, “In the necessary delicate 
apportioning of our available resources, the time element permits emphasis on strengthening the 
economic dikes against Soviet communism rather than upon preparing for a possible eventual, 
but not yet inevitable war” (Leffler, 1992, pg. 149). 
 Petersen’s remarks also make reference to a widely held belief that the Soviet Union was 
economically incapable of large scale armed aggression.  The Soviets spread communism by 
preying on internal instability, not through overt military action.  Walter Bedell Smith, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Eisenhower’s former chief of staff, estimated that it would 
be ten to fifteen years before the Soviets were capable of military action (Leffler, 1992).  Army 
32 
 
Intelligence attributed the Kremlin’s ability to wage a sustained war against the U.S. to “lack of a 
sufficiently powerful economic system, of mass destruction weapons, of a long range bomber 
force, and of a deep sea Navy” (Leffler, 1992, pg. 149).  Since Soviet aggression was not 
anticipated, most strategic plans were labeled as mere conjecture and war fighting focus was 
quickly exchanged for a peacetime mentality.  
 The impact of this peacetime attitude can be found in contemporary training policies.  
Army Ground Forces Training Memorandum No. 1, dated May 1947, prohibited live-fire 
exercises.  The reasoning was that live-fire exercises had been designed for wartime training and 
that during peacetime, soldier safety was of primary importance.  Live-fire training exercises 
were not reinstated until 1950 (Epley, 1999).  Combined arms training is not very effective 
without live ammunition.  Upon assuming the position of Army Chief of Staff from Eisenhower 
in 1948, General Omar Bradley voiced his disappointment in the lack of war fighting focus, “The 
Army had almost no combat effectiveness.  Ike had left me an administrative rather than a 
military force.  Half of the 552,000 officers and men were overseas on occupation duty, serving 
as policemen or clerks.  The other half were in the States performing various administrative 
chores.  Actually the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag” (Bradley, 1983, p. 
474).  
 In carrying out the aims of the Truman Doctrine in Europe, the Marshall Plan consumed 
the Army budget.  It is estimated that $13 billion dollars in aid was paid to Western European 
from 1948 to 1951, in hopes that stable economies would strengthen democracy and prevent 
communist takeover (Milward, 1984, p.46).  In keeping with the national strategy of nuclear 
deterrence, funding for the newly established Air Force remained untouched.  The Marshall Plan 
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would be funded by diverting the budget of an Army that air superiority and nuclear monopoly 
had made obsolete.   This left very little money to provide training resources or materiel needed 
to maintain vehicles, weapons, and equipment that enabled training for combat.  Even though the 
Marshall Plan did not fund reconstruction of Japan, its impact on the four divisions there was 
equally disruptive to training and readiness as the VIII Army relied on the same budget that 
European foreign aid consumed. 
 In 1949, the fall of China to Communism caused General MacArthur to issue a training 
directive relieving the VIII Army in Japan of many of their administrative occupational duties so 
its divisions could concentrate on transformation back into a war fighting force (Davies, 1992).  
General George Walker, the commander of VIII Army immediately implemented a training plan 
that would develop a combined arms team of infantry, armor, and artillery at the company and 
battalion level.  In a stair-step, gated approach, collective training at the company level would 
start immediately and progress up through the division echelon by the end of the year.  All 
training was expected to be completed by December 1950 (Flint, 1986).  However, Japan was a 
small country of dense population that did not have the large tracts of land required to support 
combined arms maneuver.  Limited training terrain prevented the 21
st
 Infantry Regiment from 
conducting collective live fire training with artillery and armor.  The 52
nd
 Artillery Battalion was 
only permitted to live fire once a year to qualify its crews (Flint, 1986).  The 21
st
 Infantry’s 
executive officer, Major Charles Mudgett, believed that the regiment was “unprepared for war” 
as it had never maneuvered as a unit (Blair, 1987, p. 93).  It is unclear how Walker got around 
Training Memorandum No. 1, which prohibited live-fire exercises, as no evidence of special 
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dispensation was found.  Walker’s training plan briefed well, but it could not be effectively 
executed.   
 Army training records show on paper that all of the battalions of the 24
th
 ID had 
completed their collective training according to Walker’s plan (Appleman, 1961).  However, 
there is indication that these records are not accurate.  In a 1992 interview, retired Brigadier 
General Brad Smith, the commander of Task Force Smith, could not recall any collective 
combined arms live fire exercises for the entire year he commanded his battalion in Japan.  The 
only battalion level training that he could remember was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) that 
only required participation of the battalion commander and his staff.  In the same interview 
Smith indicates that there was a lack of urgency in shifting from occupation to a war fighting 
focus.  "You couldn't get any proper training.  I don't think anybody felt there was any need for 
it” (Davies, 1992, pp. 18, 25). 
 While MacArthur’s training directive was a positive step towards reversing occupation 
mission creep impact on training, it came too late.  The Army would need more time to shake off 
the deep seated peacetime mentality that occupation mission creep had instilled.  North Korea 
invaded the Republic of South Korea six months prior to the completion of Walker’s training 
plan.  The damage that had been done to Army training and readiness could not be amended 
overnight.  In War in Peacetime, Former Army Chief of Staff, retired General Lawton Collins 
makes a similar assessment.  “In my subsequent inspection visits to the troops it was evident that 
the recent emphasis on training, inaugurated by General Walton H. Walker, the commander of 
the Eighth Army in Japan, had reached only the battalion level and had not overcome the 
inevitable slackness that results from occupation duty.  On my return to Washington I reported to 
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Secretary of the Army Frank Pace that given time, deficiencies in combat readiness could be 
corrected.  Now it appeared there would not be time” (Collins, 1964, p. 6). 
Allocation of Training Resources 
 The imbalanced national strategy of deterrence, occupation mission creep of the Truman 
Doctrine and Marshall Plan, as well as President Truman’s austere defense budgets were 
contributing factors that led to misallocation of training resources from 1945 to 1950.  These 
three factors shaped the idea that it was wiser to expend limited resources on preventing combat 
rather than training an army to be successful in it.  A post war monopoly on nuclear weapons and 
achievement of air superiority permitted adoption of a “least cost” national strategy that kept 
adversaries in check and made a resource intense ground component unnecessary.  The Army 
now viewed as obsolete, provided cheap labor and easy resources for execution of the Marshall 
Plan which would prevent future war by offering democracy and capitalism as an alternative to 
communism.  Desire to reduce the national deficit that had been incurred during the war and 
balance the federal budget resulted in reduction of defense budgets, further constraining 
available resources.  Senior Army leadership of the inter war era were aware of and supported 
diversion of Army training resources, as can be seen in a 1948 statement from General 
Eisenhower.  “Dollars currently allotted to the Army are not military dollars, pure and simple, to 
be employed for the construction of defenses or the increase of our war potential… the budget of 
the Army and its numerical strength are devoted largely to the consequences of victory—to the 
opportunity afforded by victory to build a peaceful way of life in two areas of the world… 
Occupation is both worthy and necessary, but it must be seen as preventative rather than positive 
security” (Epley, 1999, p. 16). 
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 In 1949, the economically conservative Truman administration, concerned with the 
previous year’s increased acts of Soviet aggression, approved defense spending increases.  This 
augmentation would be short lived as a sinking GDP and out of control inflation later that year 
would cause the president to back pedal.  Recently appointed Secretary of Defense, Louis 
Johnson was a proponent of the cost saving qualities of an Air Force dependant national strategy 
and eager to support Truman’s cautious defense budget.  Johnson was determined to save the 
government $1 billion by cutting wasteful and redundant programs.  Unfortunately, Johnson 
viewed the ground component as wasteful and redundant.  The Army budget was cut from $ 6.02 
billion in 1949 to $ 4.27 billion in 1950.  Under Johnson’s plan, field training exercises, 
procurement, and ordnance functions suffered further cuts (Epley, 1999, p. 23).  Since the 
majority of resources required for training lie within these three areas of reduction, the impact on 
training was immense.  MacArthur had officially made training and readiness the primary 
mission in Japan, but the Army did not provide him with the resources required. 
 As has been previously discussed, despite General Walton Walker’s plan to conduct 
collective live fire training up through the division echelon, there was not enough maneuver 
terrain in Japan to support it.  Land is a training resource that must be managed as carefully as 
ammunition and equipment.  In 1949, when the Army was enjoying a brief period of increased 
funding, Walker had established a new combined arms training area near Mount Fuji that would 
support division level maneuver.  This provided the much needed training environment that 
would allow combined arms teams to establish and perfect working relationships.  The collective 
practical experience that this range provided was commented on by Lieutenant Starkey of the 
27
th
 Infantry Regiment.  “We had our first real tactical training and field firing at Fuji…We 
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didn’t talk about ‘grazing fire,’ we actually did it (Ent, 1996, p. 11).  Less than a year later, 
Secretary of Defense Johnson’s reduction of field training funds would end the good work that 
was being done at Mount Fuji.  Movement of entire battalions’ worth of men, weapons, 
equipment, and vehicles to the centrally located training area would require money that the Army 
no longer had.  This would explain why retired Brigadier General Smith could not recall any 
collective training exercises, as the 24
th
 ID was posted to the distant northern island of Hokkaido.  
 The budget of 1950 further reduced the Army’s procurement budget which had already 
been misused to fund the Marshall Plan.  Instead of facilitating training, incomplete and non 
functioning weapon systems collected dust in arms rooms and dilapidated vehicles continued to 
deteriorate in inactive motor pools.  The operations officer for the 34
th
 Infantry, which was also 
part of the 24
th
 ID, described the regiment’s equipment as a “national disgrace”.  He stated that 
“between 25 and 50 percent of our small arms were unserviceable”.  The 34th was missing two-
thirds of its authorized vehicles and the majority of the soldiers were wearing tennis shoes as 
boots had become unavailable (Blair, 1987, p. 92).  Task Force Smith’s equipment was in such 
poor shape, it was required to draw equipment from its sister battalion, 3/21
st
 Infantry, to cobble 
together a mission capable set.  Some battalions were not augmented with equipment and 
deployed to combat without key weapons systems.  K Company of 3/21Infantry arrived in Korea 
with two useless 81 mm mortars that were missing their bipods and sights.  They were also 
missing all 75 mm recoilless rifles, 90 mm antitank guns, and the majority of their radios (Flint, 
1986).  It was impossible for these battalions to adhere to the tenet of “train as you will fight”, as 
most didn’t have complete sets of equipment until a few days before engaging in combat.  
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 To support the Marshall Plan’s demand for fertilizer and the revival of European 
agriculture, most Army depots stopped making munitions and started producing nitrogenous 
fertilizer (Epley, 1999, p. 26).  The Army possessed a large stockpile of World War II surplus 
munitions that could be utilized while production was interrupted.  However, failure to retain 
skilled ordnance technicians during the drawdown left no one to properly store, maintain, and 
inspect the aging surplus.  Ammunition that had not been properly stored and protected from the 
elements corroded at a faster rate and fewer quality control inspections let defective ammunition 
remain in circulation (Sparrow, 1951).  The use of defective munitions diminishes the 
effectiveness and lethality of weapon systems.  When weapon systems fail to operate properly in 
training, soldiers lose confidence in their ability to perform during actual combat.  Recognition 
of faulty ammunition and obsolete systems such as the 2.36 in rocket launcher caused disuse in 
training, further detracting from the combined arms concept. The 34th Infantry operations 
officer, who was responsible for training management, described the 2.36 in rocket launcher as 
“worthless” and said that 81 mm and 4.2 in mortar ammunition “was so old and corroded” that 
“eight out of ten shells fired failed to explode”.  He also noted that the artillery had not been 
provided with armor piercing HEAT rounds (Blair, 1987, p. 92). 
 Proper training management requires constant oversight and assessment to make sure that 
training objectives are being accomplished.  The Department of the Army had not provided 
training oversight to the divisions on occupation duty in Japan since 1945.  They were not aware 
of the training resource issues in Japan both during and after occupation.  This lack of training 
management was not realized until 1949, when the Army Director of Organization and Training 
mentioned it in a memorandum.  “General Bradley in a memorandum to General Collins dated 
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16 February 1949, stated that there has been no plan, since termination of hostilities [end of 
World War II], which the Department of the Army inspects training of overseas units.  The 
changing conditions, in addition to the reorganization of occupation troops in combat type units, 
warrants a deeper interest by the Department of the Army [in determining the] training status of 
these units” (Davies, 1992, pg. 19).  The first inspection of training in Japan did not occur until 
October 1949.  Had training inspections occurred prior to this memorandum, senior Army 
leadership would have been aware of VIII Army’s inability to resource combined arms training.  
Foreknowledge of obstacles to training would have proven useful in making a case against Louis 
Johnson’s destructive budgetary plans that misallocated training resources.    
Summary 
 Strategic surprise as was seen by the French, Polish, and United States Armed Forces 
during World War II as well as in the more fully amplified Korean case study cited above can 
have devastating results on the security of the nations involved.  Because of depth of resources 
and depth of defenses, the United States has in the past absorbed initial losses, learned from 
mistakes, discovered advantages, and after recovery gone on to victory or in the case of Korea, 
mutual stalemate.  Strategy surprise is of course two way.  The United States quickly brought 
World War II to an end with introduction of the atomic bomb.  President Eisenhower brought the 
Korean War to an end through an armistice said to have come about through the strategic 
surprise and threat of tactical nuclear weapons fired by cannons.  The nuance on nuclear 
weapons delivered by cannon instead of strategic bombs delivered by planes convinced the 
Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean leaders that President Eisenhower would use them tactically.  
At that time, use of tactical nuclear weapons would not precipitate global war.  Clearly nuances 
40 
 
on the friendly or enemy use of weaponry are critical to the possible strategies and scenarios 
friendly forces may consider.   
 One lesson of the Korean War was reliance on one or two encompassing strategies 
exposed the United States to certain initial defeat through dimensions or nuances of war not 
anticipated.  As seen in the Korean War case study above, the one or two encompassing 
strategies absorb resources, focus of leadership attention, and deprive secondary or even tertiary 
military fronts the resources and focus that they needed to successfully fulfill their missions 
should they be called upon.  Since the Korean War, the United States developed not only nuclear 
deterrent in multiple dimensions but also created defense in depth with a series of the military 
alliances both by treaty such as NATO but also alliances of mutual interest such as seen in 
Desert Storm.  
 The uncertainty of nature and scale of future war, whether it be some form of nuclear, 
biological, chemical, cyber, unconventional, and/or conventional conflict, places a great burden 
on the armed forces of this nation to be prepared for them all.  Since Desert Storm, proponents 
such as BG McMaster assert simulation has proven its worth in preparing Army ground forces 
for battle.  Yet simulation itself is just another means of conducting training exercises.  As 
indicated above, if one trains for defense of the Maginot Line, then one is training for the wrong 
war, even if done in simulation.  Defeat will be certain.  Hence the importance of the robust, 
current, and even imaginative simulation training support packages containing a wide spectrum 
of scenarios applicable to potential future eventualities cannot be under stated.  If due to resource 
limitations, traditional training must be limited, then simulation appears to offer potential 
solutions.  Even if simulation scenarios and training support packages are available, then they 
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must be used to keep the level of expertise high.  One need only look at the airline industry and 
the fatal errors made in Air France flight 447 for a case in point.  After decades of simulation, 
pilots are regularly trained in multiple scenarios.  Yet absent training in speed sensor 
malfunction, the co-pilot incorrectly lifted the A330’s nose inducing a stall, which AF447 never 
recovered from resulting in the deaths of all 228 on board (Milmo & Willisher, 2011).     
 As seen in the World Trade Center attack, the potential loss of life in the initial conflict of 
war can be far greater.  Preparedness is critical for success.  Simulation offers a potential 
solution, but the nature of implement simulation so that future simulation scenarios are available 
and trained for is the challenge of this research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: TRAINING METHODOLOGY REVIEW & 
IDENTIFICATION OF NEED FOR RESEARCH 
Introduction 
 Did the painful lessons learned at the onset of the Korean War spark a revolution in 
peacetime training that achieved a steady state in combined arms capability, sustaining the 
Army’s ability to achieve first battle success?  Retired Major General Robert Scales, director of 
the Desert Storm Special Studies Group, believes that the Battle of 73 Easting and the swift 
victory of the Gulf War were not the result of an abrupt revolution, but rather an evolution that 
began at the end of the Vietnam War.  “A visionary cohort of soldiers who stayed with the 
institution during the difficult years following the war in Vietnam was responsible for launching 
the Army on its path to reform… The Army that met Saddam Hussein was fundamentally 
different from the Army that emerged from the jungles of Vietnam” (Scales, 1994, p. 36).  
General Barry McCaffrey who commanded the 24
th
 Infantry Division during the Gulf War shares 
this sentiment.  When asked by the Senate Armed Services Committee how the Army had 
managed to win the ground war in 100 days, McCaffrey replied, “This war didn’t take 100 hours 
to win, it took 15 years” (Scales, 1994, p. 35).     Generals Abrams and DePuy would form the 
nucleus of the “visionary cohort” following Vietnam, advancing the collective and combined 
arms training methods that ultimately led to the resounding success of the first Gulf War.   
 There would be little Army reform in the first half of the Cold War.  Quite surprisingly, 
the hard lessons learned by Task Force Smith and the 24
th
 ID in 1950 seem to have been lost as 
the Army continued to grapple with issues reminiscent of the post World War II era.  The failure 
of nuclear deterrence and the resulting three years of costly ground combat in Korea did not 
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convince policy makers of the importance of maintaining an adequately trained and resourced 
standing Army.   
 Eisenhower’s New Look strategy continued to emphasize reliance on nuclear weaponry 
to deter Eastern Bloc threats for the remainder of the 1950s.  The Air Force continued to enjoy 
its central role in this continued strategy of nuclear deterrence, but was now supplemented with 
tactical nuclear weapons.   The mid 1950s saw the fielding of tactical nuclear weapons at the 
brigade and battalion level such as the M-29 Davey Crockett, Honest John free flight rocket, and 
numerous nuclear artillery munitions that could be delivered via conventional artillery pieces 
(Van Ee, 1986). Nuclear capability that was prepositioned in theater carried more weight and 
represented a more immediate threat than strategic nuclear weapons delivered by the Air Force.  
Although these new weapon systems were never used in combat, Eisenhower had successfully 
brought hostilities in Korea to an end by suggesting that nuclear capability would be employed if 
armistice talks in Panmunjom did not progress (Blair, 1987).  
 President Kennedy, and later President Johnson even more so, turned from the “mutual 
assured destruction strategy” of Eisenhower toward a more flexible “counterforce strategy”.  
That modification of strategy eventually resulted in the United States becoming deeply involved 
in a large ground war in Viet Nam (Weigley, 1973).  The Paradox of Vietnam proved to be a low 
point for the Army.  Public and political support for the U.S. military’s oldest institution was lost 
as it fought a costly counterinsurgency, where the tactical war was won, but the strategic war was 
lost (Cooling, 1986).  The political and psychological repercussions that followed the 1968 Tet 
Offensive as well as unfortunate events such as My Lai and Kent State caused a significant loss 
of confidence in the Army that bred apathy within the institution.  Civil unrest and undermining 
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of the Army itself were unexpected, unplanned for side effects of a ground war arising from 
implementation of a “counter force strategy” in Viet Nam.  Many disillusioned officers and 
NCOs with traditional experience chose to depart the service leaving the Army with the 
challenge of building on new ideas and raising an Army that fit that new mold (Scales, 1994).  
One politically acceptable idea was the new “all-volunteer Army” concept, which tended to 
attract the least qualified, and lack of leadership perpetuated the low morale, indiscipline, drug 
use, racial tension,  and crime that plagued the ranks (Moskos, 1979).  Army doctrine, training, 
and equipping evolved during the years spent fighting a counterinsurgency in Vietnam and in 
lower priority theaters such as state-side, Korea and Europe readiness suffered (Shortal, 1998). 
The Effect of Vietnam on Doctrine, Training, and Equipping 
 In Vietnam as in most insurgencies, the enemy aims to influence the populace to gain 
legitimacy instead of advancing a tangible front line or seizing an objective (Cooling, 1986).  
General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
(MACV) analyzed the initial battle of Ia Drang Valley to solidify a strategy for American forces.  
Ia Drang, which was the first battle between the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the U. S. 
Army, was an expensive victory that cost the 1
st
 Cavalry Division 233 killed, 262 wounded, and 
4 missing (Moore, 1965).  Despite the high casualty rate, the NVA had suffered much more with 
a kill ratio of twelve to one.  It would be this favorable kill ratio that would lead to a strategy of 
“attrition” in which “they would bleed the enemy to death over the long haul” (Galloway, 2010).  
Attrition depends on the employment of overwhelming firepower to wear the enemy down over 
an extended period of time.  Prior to Vietnam, the U.S. Army emphasized the World War II 
European model of combat involving the terrain based strategy of maneuver.  Maneuver is 
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defined as the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination 
with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the 
mission (FM 3-0 Operations, 2008).  Although many Army commanders were able to wage 
successful counterinsurgencies by visualizing the enemy’s objectives beyond terrain, attrition 
remained the overarching strategy.  Both attrition and counterinsurgency made limited use of the 
large scale maneuver reminiscent of World War II and Korea.  After a decade of combat on the 
non-contiguous battlefield of Vietnam, the Army had become unskilled and ill-equipped for 
conventional major combat operations in linear battle space.  While the U.S. Army had been 
preoccupied with low-intensity conflict in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union had continued to 
prepare for the anticipated conventional war on the plains of Central Europe where the ground 
component would play the decisive role maneuvering at echelons above brigade (Summers, 
1986).    
 Due to the Army’s record of heavy losses in initial battles, it has historically been 
difficult to collectively train and deploy combat units as a cohort.  The collective nature of 
mobilization training is threatened when individual replacements are pulled out to replenish units 
already deployed in theater.  While strained, the massive and total mobilization efforts common 
of American wars through the end of World War II served to protect the integrity of these 
training cohorts. The ability to collectively train mobilizing units was lost towards the end of 
World War II (Wiley, 1948).  The conflicts of limited warfare such as Korea and Vietnam did 
not enjoy the benefit and resources of total national effort.  During conflicts involving total 
mobilization, conscripts underwent individual training at mobilization centers before being 
assigned to the unit that they would deploy with.  It was the job of the officers and NCOs of a 
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recently formed division, brigade, or battalion to bring these individual soldiers together as a 
team by training collectively as a unit before deployment (Gorman, 1995).  Absence of cohort 
training and mobilization was further exacerbated during the Vietnam War when the Army 
adopted 12 month combat tours.  This new deployment model did not rotate the collective unit, 
but rather the individual.  The conscript received training on individual soldier skills and then 
was sent off to fill an empty slot in an already deployed unit.  The 12 month tour was a way to 
continually feed the divisions in Vietnam with replacements without having to rotate them out of 
theater.  Lack of any meaningful collective training and continual personnel turnover caused unit 
cohesiveness and effectiveness to suffer.  Inexperienced replacements, often viewed as a 
liability, were provided with on the job training and expected to adapt to combat and the way 
their unit operated quickly.  By the time a soldier had gained proficiency through experience, his 
12 month tour would be over (Kaplan, 1987).  Retired General P.F. Gorman, a brigade 
commander in Vietnam, writes of the effect that the 12 month tour and lack of collective training 
had on the Army: “From the start of troop deployments in Vietnam, the Army concentrated on 
training individual replacements and essayed relatively little unit training.  As a consequence, in 
the latter years of that conflict, the pre-war cadres of experienced sergeants being used up, 
infantry platoons came to be composed almost entirely of youths of similar age and inexperience 
- lieutenants, sergeants, privates - hurriedly stamped out in replacement training centers and 
flown directly as individuals into combat (1995).” 
 The Army’s equipment problem was especially dire, as Vietnam had been a huge drain 
on Army materiel. Modernization and procurement funds had been diverted to support efforts in 
Southeast Asia, so as was the case after World War II, replacement parts were not available and 
47 
 
equipment was becoming technologically stale.  Lack of modernization funds led to the 
termination of procurement programs for the MBT (Main Battle Tank) 70 in 1971 and the new 
Cheyenne Advanced Attack Helicopter in 1972 (Herbert, 1988).  Weapons and equipment were 
being cannibalized in Europe to maintain a fully operational capability in Vietnam and towards 
the end of the war, Nixon’s “Vietnamization” saw large amounts of material transferred to the 
South Vietnamese Army.  Even though it seemed that the U.S. Army had nothing more to give, 
additional weapons and vehicles were provided to Israel to support the 1973 Yom Kippur War 
effort (Shortal, 1998).  Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Forces had upgraded their 
main battle tanks from T-54s and T-55s to T-62s and T-72s.  Five additional tank divisions had 
been created since 1965 and combined arms capability had been increased in Soviet motorized 
rifle divisions by providing them with tanks.  Modern armored personnel carriers for infantry and 
self propelled artillery added still more to their offensive capabilities.  Soviet intent to use 
conventional ground forces became evident when forces were repositioned to installations closer 
to Western Europe where they could be rapidly maneuvered if major combat operations ensued 
(Herbert, 1988).  Just as the United States had intervened logistically on the side of Israel in the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviets intervened on the side of Egypt and Syria.    
Yom Kippur War- The Turning Point 
 The 1973 Arab Israeli or Yom Kippur War served as the primary turning point in force 
readiness and training methodology.  This Middle Eastern conflict was evidence that future 
warfare would be of a conventional, non-nuclear nature.  The U.S. Army was aware of this trend 
prior to this 1973 war.  Since 1969, the annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) 
exercise had been conducted in Germany to rehearse OPLAN 4102, the defense of Western 
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Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact Invasion (Arkin, 2005).  However, the Yom Kippur 
War would introduce a “new lethality” that would distinguish future conventional ground combat 
from the experience of World War II.  Egyptian and Syrian forces had utilized Soviet supplied 
Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), improved main tank guns, and cutting edge electronic fire 
control systems to inflict heavy losses on the Israeli Army.  Total number of tanks and artillery 
lost on both sides during the three week conflict exceeded U.S. Army, Europe’s total inventory 
of tanks and artillery at the time (Herbert, 1988).  Senior Army leadership, such as Army Chief 
of Staff Creighton Abrams, expected the U.S. equipped Israelis to decisively defeat their Arab 
enemies as they had in the Six Day war of 1967. However, they came very close to losing the 
war to the Soviet trained and equipped armies of Egypt and Syria (Shortal, 1998). The 1973 
Arab-Israeli War illustrated how far the U.S. Army had fallen behind in battlefield technology 
and developments. 
 Abrams tasked General William DePuy, the commander of the newly formed Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), to gather lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War.  By 
better understanding what had occurred in this latest conflict, that represented the future of 
warfare, changes in doctrine, training, and equipping could be made that would enable the 
smaller “all volunteer force” to overcome the new lethality of the battlefield.  The Army’s 
experience in limited warfare had taught it that there would be little or no time to prepare for the 
next war which would more than likely be fought by divisions and brigades.  TRADOC would 
have to find ways to train the Army more effectively during peacetime to achieve and maintain a 
level of proficiency that would ensure first battle success in the next conflict (Dunnigan & Nofi, 
1999).   
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 The first and most obvious lesson learned from the Yom Kippur War was the importance 
of modernization and maintaining a technological edge.  Ten years in Vietnam and an emphasis 
on limited war had caused the U.S. Army to fall a generation behind in battlefield and weapon 
system developments.  Soviet provided vehicles and weapon systems captured from the Arab 
forces revealed capabilities in range, precision, and protection that exceeded current U.S. Army 
capabilities.  Comparison of the American supplied M60 Patton Tank and the T-62 Soviet Tank 
display the gap in technology.  The M60 is a first generation main battle tank that was developed 
shortly after Korea and its 105 mm main gun and homogeneous armor are typical of most main 
battle tanks of the late 1950s.  The T-62 was the product of a modernization program that had 
continued to progress.  Designed to defeat first generation tanks like the M60, the T-62 included 
advancements such as: composite armor, night vision, and a larger 115 mm smoothbore main 
gun (Perrett, 1987).  Technology is a force multiplier.  If the much smaller U.S. Army hoped to 
overcome the quantitative advantage that the Soviets enjoyed, there was no question that the 
current gap in weapons technology would have to be closed.   
 The second lesson was the significance of leadership and training.  Superior leadership 
and training had enabled the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to adapt the way they were fighting to 
overcome initial tactical setbacks and the equipment overmatch of the Arabs. The most 
significant setback encountered by the Israelis was caused by tank killing teams of Egyptian 
infantry armed with AT-3 Sagger ATGMs.  Part of the new lethality of the battlefield, these 
ATGM teams would lie in ambush or overwatch of advancing Arab forces from the cover and 
concealment of terrain to engage Israeli armor up to 2,000 kilometers away.  The IDF, who 
traditionally moved in large armor formations along natural lines of drift, made for easy targets.  
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Realizing this new threat, the IDF modified their mounted movement techniques and selected 
routes that made better use of terrain.  Movement was coordinated with artillery suppression of 
likely enemy ATGM positions and IDF infantry was used to form ATGM overwatch teams as 
well as clear and secure key terrain ahead of an armor movement.  After these modifications 
were made, the IDF were able to gain the initiative and push the Arabs back into Egypt (Herbert, 
1988).   
 Of the two lessons, DePuy viewed the second as the most important.  A well trained and 
led army can overcome a numerically and technologically superior adversary, while all the 
additional manpower and technology in the world will do little to help a force that is poorly 
trained and led.  DePuy emphasized the primary role that leadership and training had played 
during the Arab-Israeli War in 1974 letter to Abrams: "If we had run the Arab-Israeli tank battles 
through our models and simulators, the Israelis would have lost every battle… Models and 
simulators cannot measure or reflect the quality of training and leadership… Training and 
leadership weighed more heavily than weapon systems' capabilities on the actual battlefield” 
(Shortal, 1998).  The new lethality of the battlefield as seen in the example of the Yom Kippur 
War demanded a different kind of maneuver where physical terrain must be considered and more 
detailed coordination of the combined arms team was required.  The reformation had started and 
these new lessons and requirements would be incorporated in new doctrine, training and 
equipment for the post Vietnam Army. 
 In light of DePuy’s choice, it is important to note a clear caveat to the limitation of 
warrior spirit and training over technology learned by the Japanese during World War II and 
throughout history.  The Japanese Army prior to World War II realized significant shortfalls in 
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the technology of the equipment as reported by Tomoyuki Yamashita.  Yamashita advised 
against war until technology improvements could be implemented.  Prime Minister Hideki Tojo 
believed that their country’s warrior spirit and code of Bushido would overcome any 
technological shortfall (Hastings, 2008).  The war proved this notion to be false.  Among many 
examples, radar provided detailed early warning to U.S. naval and ground forces of incoming 
Japanese aircraft as well as enabled the U.S. Navy to overcome the Japanese Navy nighttime 
fighting capability through radar directed gun fire.  Radar proved critical in the success of the 
battles of Midway and Guadalcanal among others (Brown, 1999).  Other U.S. technological 
advantages included self-sealing gas tanks on aircraft, M1 repeating rifle, and, of course, nuclear 
power.  
Further history is full of technology overcoming better trained and more experienced 
opponents.  The English Long Bow dominated warfare during the hundred years war (Keegan, 
1976).  Cannon, along with an open gate, brought down Constantinople in 1453 after more a 
thousand years of successful defense (Nicolle, 2000).  Cannon on secretly constructed Venetian 
galleas defeated the more numerous and more successful Turkish fleet at Lepanto in 1571 
(Konstam, 2003).  English ship and sail design defeated the Spanish Armada at Gravelines in 
1588 (Tincey, 1988).  The list goes on.  However, exceptions occur.  Even the best technology 
has been improperly employed leading to defeat, such as the improper employment of long-range 
firing and heavily frontal armored German Tiger and Panzer tanks in a close-range, swirling 
battle with T-34’s at Prokhorovka (Glantz & House, 1999),  
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The Role of DePuy’s World War II Experience 
 Given the many more successes of technology over expertise, then the other way around, 
one may be more apt to attribute General DePuy’s remarks in light of “poor” training versus 
“good” training.  General DePuy’s combat experiences as a company-grade infantry officer 
during World War II influenced reform of the post Vietnam Army.  He recalled that the two 
years of training that his unit conducted prior to D-Day were of little worth when compared to 
the on-the-job training that the German Army gave them in the first six weeks of combat.  In his 
initial combat experience in France he found that “the casualty curve was too steep and the 
seasoning curve too flat” as the unit he served with lost 100 percent of its soldiers and 150 
percent of its officers (Scales, 1994, p. 11).  Experience would provide the skills that the 
inadequate training program had not, but very few survived those first six weeks of on the job 
training to put those newly acquired skills to use.  DePuy attributed this carnage to the failure of 
division level leadership to properly train the platoons and companies to fight at the tactical level 
to take ground against a skilled enemy (Gorman, 1992b, p. II-77).   
 Training at that time was conducted “by the numbers” where every hour of the day was 
pack with weapons qualification, tactical road marches, and lectures.  However, “learning and 
relevance were secondary to scheduling” (Scales, 1994, p. 11).  The Army did an adequate job in 
teaching leaders how to develop feasible plans at the operational level in a classroom setting, but 
it did a poor job in training the units at the tactical level that would be expected to execute those 
operational plans.  Most division commanders knew how to “draw arrows on a map”, but many 
did not know what it took to make the units at the points of those arrows proficient enough to 
carry out their plans (Gorman, 1992b).    
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 Thirty years later, little had changed in the way that the Army approached training.  
General P.F. Gorman, Depuy’s chief of staff for training, likened Army training methods of the 
early 1970’s to an inflexible industrial process that was designed for throughput rather than 
learning: “This “factory system” drew heavily upon the hortative pedagogy of the Industrial 
Revolution, as well as emulating assembly line production… the Army’s industrial-mode of 
training introduced herd-like behavior more lethal among our troops than the enemy’s” (Gorman, 
1995, p. 4).  One might summarize General Gorman’s remarks as indicating that even good 
technology may lose its superior capabilities in the hands of poorly trained and poorly 
disciplined soldiers and units. 
The Reformation Begins 
 DePuy was intent on a bloodless increase of the seasoning curve and closure of the gap 
between the operational and tactical echelons.  Adopting the slogan, “An army must train as it 
fights”, TRADOC took leaders out of the classroom and placed them in practical field exercises 
that focused on collective training of units that coordinated the combined arms of armor, 
artillery, and infantry (Scales, 1994, pp 11-12).  At an individual basis, experiential learning is 
well known to increase knowledge and understanding.  Practice skills are considered one of the 
methods of learning with higher retention rates according to the Pyramid of Learning or Cone of 
Learning (Wood, 2004; Fannon, 2003).  Lalley and Miller (2007) propose that as one moves 
toward the base or down the pyramid, the learning experiences move from passive experiences to 
more interactive experience.  Collective training of units in the field would provide the platoons 
and companies at the tactical level with the skills required to carry out the higher headquarters’ 
operational plan.  At the same time, collective training places the tactical and operational 
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echelons within the same training audience, giving Brigade and above leadership the opportunity 
to learn how to make the units at the points of the arrows that they’ve drawn on the map 
successful.    
 
Figure 1. The Learning Pyramid 
Combat Training Centers-Learning how to Maneuver as a Combined Arms Team 
Collectively 
 TRADOCs quest for meaningful collective unit training was the genesis of the modern 
Combat Training Center (CTC), which provides the iterative combined arms training opportunity 
that Task Force Smith was never afforded.  Brigade level combined arms teams are placed in the 
collective training environment of Fort Irwin California to fight against a highly-skilled and 
aggressive Opposing Force (OPFOR).  The numerically superior CTC OPFOR replicated the 
new lethality of the battlefield, forcing the training unit to utilize a tightly controlled combined 
arms approach during the exercise.  The exercise engagements were designed to provide a 
grueling and realistic experience that tested the unit’s leadership and exposed training 
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deficiencies.  The first CTC allowed maneuver brigades to learn the lessons of the Arab-Israeli 
War in training instead of combat.   
 Several collective After Action Reviews (AAR) were held during the exercise where the 
unit’s leadership failures are discussed openly in front of the entire unit (Scales, 1994).  
Lieutenant General Frederick Brown, a member of the TRADOC staff, commented on the 
revolutionary use of the AAR in training: “No other army in the world exposes its unit chain of 
command to a no holds barred battle against an OPFOR controlled by another chain of command 
where if you fail as a leader it is evident in exquisite detail to your soldiers… No army-including 
the Israeli Defense Force-has dared to do this” (Gorman, 1995, p. 10).  This painfully honest 
assessment went a long way in closing the gap between the architects of the operational plan at 
brigade headquarters and the subordinate companies and platoons that would execute the plan at 
the tactical level.  The AAR process could be unpleasant, but not as unpleasant as the experience 
of failure in actual combat.  From the theoretical perspective of Organizational Learning, open 
dialog of valid information along with monitoring of the choice underscore Argyris’ Model II 
organizational learning (Argyris, 1992).  The confrontational approach is also more indicative of 
Argyris rather than either Schein or Senge techniques (Edmondson, 1996). 
 Over the last 32 years, the TRADOC CTC concept has continued to evolve with the 
addition of CTCs at Fort Polk Louisiana, and Hoenfels, Germany.  In an attempt to provide a 
CTC experience for Division and Corps level leadership, the Battle Command Training Program 
(BCTP) was created in 1984.  BCTP utilizes constructive simulation to drive exercises for 
generals and their staff as it does not make economic sense to place and entire Army division or 
corps in the field (Scales, 1994).   Exercise engagements as well as the composition and methods 
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of the OPFOR have been continually assessed and updated to best replicate emerging and likely 
threats of an often changing operating environment.  In 2003, all CTCs readjusted to better 
prepare units for the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan and Iraq by emphasizing training 
objectives that centered on human terrain as opposed to physical terrain.  Theater specific aspects 
such as Forward Operating Bases, non-combatant civilian role players, and Improvised 
Explosive Devices were also added (Department of the Army, 2011).  The Army describes 
training at a CTC as “the closest thing to combat the Army’s Soldiers, leaders, staffs, and units 
ever experience. It is a battlefield where Soldiers can die, come back to life, correct their 
mistakes, and fight again...” (Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5).  CTCs provide a realistic 
environment for Army units to practice and fine tune the techniques and procedures of combined 
arms synchronization prior to combat rather than learning in combat.   
New Doctrine-FM 100-5 
 Brigades training at the newly established CTC would require new doctrine that would 
move the Army away from a strategy of attrition and towards one of maneuver based land 
warfare.  DePuy applied what he had learned in observing the Yom Kippur War to produce FM 
100-5, Operations, a doctrinal guide that would allow the Army to “ prepare to win the first 
battle of the next war” (FM 100-5 Operations, 1976).  The 1976 edition of Operations stressed 
close coordination of combined arms (Summers, 1986).  The use of suppressive firepower and 
decisive maneuver to concentrate forces at the right time and place to exploit enemy 
vulnerability is what maneuver land warfare is all about (FM 3-0 Operations, 2008).  The 
essence of what DePuy was trying to convey with FM 100-5 is stated in an excerpt from the third 
chapter, How to Fight:  “The commander who employs his weapons at their full effectiveness, 
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reduces his vulnerability by using cover, concealment, and suppression, and moves decisively on 
the battlefield to accomplish his mission, has mastered the command of the combined arms 
team” (FM 100-5 Operations, 1976, p. 3-10).   
 In the first chapter, DePuy’s two primary lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli War are 
addressed.  Under paragraph 1-2, Austerity, it is emphasized in bold text that the Army must 
“prepare to fight outnumbered and win”.  Under paragraph 1-3, Weapons and Men, bold text 
indicates the need for “powerful weapons, proficient personnel, and best effective use of both”.  
The small peacetime Army would need the superior training and leadership as displayed by the 
Israelis and the most technologically relevant weapons systems as possessed by the Soviet 
supplied Arabs to be prepared for the next conflict.  A detailed description and comparison is 
provided of the characteristics, range, and accuracy of Warsaw Pact and U.S. Army weapons in 
the second chapter. This emphasizes the emerging precision and destructiveness of direct fire 
systems that created the new lethality of the battlefield.   
 Subsequent chapters show how increased lethality can be overcome by using mobility to 
control the tempo, considering terrain, and understanding the capabilities and limitations of 
weapons systems.  The “cross-reinforced tank or mechanized battalion task force”, which would 
later come to be known as the combined arms battalion, was identified as the most suitable 
formation for the anticipated conflict with the Soviets on the plains of Central Europe (FM 100-5 
Operations, 1976, p. 3-9).  As seen in the Yom Kippur War, armor did not enjoy freedom of 
movement without infantry support.  Infantry armed with ATGMs in the overwatch or clearing 
forward key terrain guaranteed unhindered movement.  However, the dismounted foot soldier of 
the infantry was more exposed to the effects of enemy fire and could not move as quickly as an 
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armor formation.  Dependence on the comparatively slow moving infantry made it difficult to 
maneuver faster than the enemy and retain control of the battlefield tempo.  The new operating 
environment required that the infantry be provided mobility in the form of Armored Personnel 
Carriers (APC), much like the Soviets had in creation of their motorized rifle battalions.   APCs 
provided increased rate of march and protection from small arms and airburst artillery munitions, 
allowing infantry to maneuver amongst and ahead of armor.    FM 100-5 advocates the use of 
APCs to form “cross-reinforced tank and mechanized battalion task forces” as well as 
employment of the airmobile concept to ensure freedom of movement (FM 100-5 Operations, 
1976, p. 2-30).    
 FM 100-5 states that “failure to make full protective use of terrain can be fatal” (FM 100-
5 Operations, 1976, p. 3-3).   If the enemy can see you and you are within range of his weapons 
systems he can engage and kill you.  Lethality on the battlefield can be limited by utilizing the 
cover, concealment, and observation provided by the elevation and relief of terrain.  Cover is the 
physical protection that terrain offers from enemy weapons effects.  Concealment permits a force 
to move undetected or out of view by ensuring that a major terrain feature lies between the 
maneuvering formation and known enemy positions.  Observation is typically associated with 
elevation and provides a vantage point that offers a clear view of the enemy from a distance.  
Observation from a covered and concealed position is the most advantageous (FM 100-5 
Operations, 1976).  These same concepts on the skillful use of terrain currently remain in Army 
doctrine and can be found in the Soldier Combat Skills Manual, FM 3-21.75, as well as many 
others.  
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 Once the terrain that offers the best cover, concealment, and observation has been chosen, 
the capabilities and limitations of both friendly and enemy weapons must be considered.  The 
optimal position from which to employ a weapon system offers observation and a fields of fire 
that allow engagement of the enemy force at the weapon’s maximum effective range.  By 
maximizing standoff from the target, it increases the distance that the enemy will have to 
maneuver in reacting to contact, providing the opportunity for multiple engagements and greater 
likelihood of target destruction.  Knowledge of enemy weapon system limitations my permit 
selection of a firing position that is within friendly effective range, but outside of the opposing 
weapon system’s range, providing a marked advantage (FM100-5 Operations, 1976).  
The Big Five- Equipping the Army for the New Lethality of the Battlefield 
 The Arab-Israeli War had shown the U.S. Army that cancellation of the MBT-70 
program and lack of motorized infantry had left it unprepared to fight in the way that FM 100-5 
proscribed.  For the most part Vietnam had been fought by dismounted infantry.  Armor and 
APCs had of little use in a country whose mountainous terrain, jungles, and rice paddies limited 
vehicular cross country movement.  Rotary wing aircraft provided most of the tactical mobility 
to this light force (Tolson, 1972).  General Creighton Abrams understood that the weapons 
technology gap with the Soviets would have to be closed in order for the Army to be successful 
on an increasingly deadly battlefield.  Faced with a constrained peacetime budget and a much 
smaller all volunteer force, Abrams procurement and modernization program targeted quality 
rather than quantity (Scales, 1994). Much to Congress’ dismay, any “peace dividend” resulting 
from the conclusion of the Vietnam conflict would need to be spent in modernizing the Army 
(Summers, 1986). 
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 Abrams selected the top five weapons systems that the Army required to be successful in 
future wars of ground based maneuver.  All five of these systems, also known as “the big five” 
complemented the new doctrine put forth by DePuy.  The M1 Abrams tank would pick up where 
the failed MBT-70 program had left off, surpassing the capabilities of the Soviet T-72 (Zaloga & 
Sarson, 1993).  The M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle would provide the survivability and mobility 
that the infantry required to support armor as part of a combined arms battalion.  Vietnam’s 
proven airmobile concept would be perpetuated with development of the UH-60 Blackhawk 
helicopter.  The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter provided the Army with an organic antitank 
and close combat attack asset, decreasing dependency on fixed wing close air support from the 
Air Force (Bishop, 2005).  Lastly, the MIM-104 Patriot surface to air missile provided a mobile 
integrated air defense umbrella that protected the maneuvering ground component from enemy 
air assets (Raytheon Company, n.d.).   
 Given the big five cited above, one must ask, how does the McMaster point of view that 
simulation enabled him to win, when in fact he and his unit drove in one of the big five systems, 
the M1 tank, which transformed the American Army after the Vietnam War? 
Effective Training Solutions of the Cold War Drawdown 
 The Cold War ended in 1989 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  In keeping with 
American post-conflict behavior, the Army was downsized from 28 (18 active and 10 National 
Guard and Reserve) divisions to 18 divisions (10 active and 8 National Guard and Reserve) by 
1996, and its resources were cut by 37 %.  However, this time lessons from past drawdowns 
would be recognized. Similar to the post World War II situation, U.S. foreign policy would play 
a key role in shaping the new international environment.  The fall of communism left a power 
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vacuum in several former Soviet Bloc countries.  The potential for global instability found in 
these vulnerable states meant that the national strategy would have to account for an uncertain 
future.  For the Army, this meant that “ready forces in being” would have to be maintained to 
react to crises in support of foreign policy despite constrained resources (Shortal, 1998, p. 71).     
 The Army began to search for innovative training solutions to preserve combined arms 
training during a period of constrained resources.  In the late 1980’s, CTC rotations were only 
offered to brigades on a bi-annual basis, leaving most collective training to be conducted at the 
homstation.  Limited training budgets made it difficult to provide the ammunition, fuel, and 
maintenance that live fire training required.  Use of virtual simulators for training had been 
considered as training in the virtual world minimized or negated the need for most live training 
resources.  An Abrams tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew could train in a simulator, which 
did not require real fuel, ammunition, or maintenance.  However, this training was not collective, 
as early stand-alone simulators only trained single vehicle crews. Although training individual 
and crew tasks is important in multi-echelon training, it is equally important how those lower 
echelon tasks support the collective unit’s training objectives (Lenoir & Lowood, 2003). 
 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded Simulation Network 
(SIMNET) project developed a way to bring these stand-alone simulators together to train 
vehicle crews in a collective manner.  Its design recognized the collective unit as the training 
center of gravity, rather than the individual crew.  In the spirit of multi-echelon training, the 
collective unit was the primary training audience and the vehicle crew was the secondary training 
audience. Training battles were now able to be fought in real time, by each crew, from their 
individual simulated vehicle platforms. This training was conducted on a common 50 km by 50 
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km terrain box that was capable of representing geo-specific terrain with a common form of 
communication (voice) to synchronize fire and maneuver.  SIMNET facilitated an incremental 
building block training approach that could start with individual crew training, progress to 
training of a vehicle section, and all the way up to a collective battalion (Lenoir & Lowood, 
2003). 
Winning the First Battle of the Next War- 73 Easting 
 With training ranging from the CTC to SIMNET, the U.S. Army broke its 20th century 
first battle losing streak on 26 February 1991, on the third day of the Gulf War.  While moving 
east from Saudi Arabia to find and fix the Iraqi Republican Guard in a sand storm, the 2nd 
Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) found itself amongst two Iraqi Divisions, outnumbered and 
out gunned.  In a masterpiece of combined arms synchronization and decisive leadership Troops 
E, G & I of 2nd ACR destroyed 160 Soviet main battle tanks, 180 armored fighting vehicles, 12 
artillery pieces, and 80 wheeled vehicles.  600 Iraqis were killed or wounded and approximately 
the same numbers were captured (Houlahan, 1999, p. 332). 
 This “first battle of the next war” was fought two years into the post Cold War drawdown 
during a time of limited training resources.  Surprisingly, there was not one combat veteran in 
2nd ACR at the time of the battle. A study was conducted after the Gulf War to determine how a 
peacetime Army, in the middle of a post-conflict drawdown, had uncharacteristically maintained 
such a high level of readiness.  At a conference to gather facts from 73 Easting participants, a 
general officer asked an enlisted member to explain 2nd ACR’s exemplary performance despite 
it being their first combat.  The Soldier replied, “Sir, this was not our first battle. This was our 
15th battle! We fought 3 wars at the NTC ... we fought 4 wars at the Combat Maneuver Training 
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Center (CMTC) Hohenfels, Germany; and a lot of other simulations like SIMNET . . . Yes sir, 
we had been "shot at" before. Many times. This war was just like our training.” (Gorman, 1995, 
p. 12) 
 Clearly McMaster’s view about the importance of simulation is underscored by the 
results at the Battle of 73 Easting.  Yet equally important are several additional critical factors.  
First General DePuy has an accurate vision of the future war based on the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  Secondly, he identified the big five systems identified necessary to win a desert battle.  
Thirdly these systems were in place within the Army at the time of Battle of 73 Easting.  Further, 
the NTC training and scenarios in the simulations fit scenarios that supported desert warfare.  
Additionally, organizational learning was advanced and reinforced through not only NTC 
scenarios but through CMTC and SIMNET supporting scenarios.  Finally, as evidenced by the 
statement of the 2
nd
 ACR soldier, his unit trained three times at NTC, four times at CMTC, and 
“a lot of other simulations like SIMNET.”  All together makes for a much larger set of variables 
contributed to success at the Battle of 73 Easting.  Thus the research questions necessary to be 
answered to determine the preparedness of the U.S. Army to win the first battle of the next 
conflict are: 
What is (are) the vision(s) for conflict in the future? 
What is (are) the facilities and technological system(s) needed to succeed in the future visions?  
What training facilities and/or simulation systems will be necessary to provide, first, accurate 
feedback to units being trained in those facilities, and secondly, reinforcement learning in 
simulation systems so that units retain and hopefully advanced their organizational skills? 
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What scenarios will be capable of being run at these facilities and/or on these simulation systems 
and do they align with actual battle scenarios envisioned in the future? 
Will sufficient resources in terms of time, facilities/simulations, and scenario runs be provided to 
achieve and maintain the skill set necessary to win the first battle of the next war? 
Scope Limitations 
Envisioning the future is a high risk activity.  Nations win or lose wars based on their 
choices.  Besides the fore mentioned Maginot Line, the Germans prior to World War II had two 
competing visions on how to win the war with England by strangling English water-borne 
commerce – surface commerce raiders and underwater U-boats.  Germany originally placed 
large investments into surface commerce raiders with the Bismarck being the iconic raider.  
After its sinking as well as other surface commerce raiders, Hitler re-directed his investments 
into U-boats.  But precious time and resources had been lost and the first battles of the sea 
already waged.  The result was that despite many victories by U-boats, they never had sufficient 
numbers nor were they able to maintain a competitive edge over counter-U-boat tactics (Ireland, 
2003). 
 Since this is a thesis with limited resources, this research must limit its scope.  While 
research is needed to select the correct vision, systems, facilities, and simulations to successfully 
win the first battle of the next war, this research will assume that the current vision, systems, 
facilities, and simulations determined by the U.S. Army are correct.  That limits this research to 
investigating the adequacy of the training infrastructures, scenarios, and databases dedicated to 
maintaining the skill set necessary to winning the first battle of the next war. 
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Towards Interoperability 
 SIMNET’s success in maintaining readiness for the Gulf War encouraged its evolution 
through the 1990s into an architecture that would support distributed training at the entity and 
aggregate levels across virtual and constructive training environments.  As evidenced by the 2
nd
 
ACR at the Battle of 73 Easting, SIMNET had successfully trained platoon and company sized 
elements in the combined arms fight from a single homestation location in the virtual training 
environment.  Now the Army sought to capitalize on SIMNET’s training effectiveness and 
efficiency by expanding it to the computer generated constructive training environment and to 
multiple, geographically separated training locations.   
 Beginning in 1989 a series of workshops on “Standards for the Interoperability of 
Defense Simulations” was hosted by the University of Central Florida Institute for Simulation 
and Training (IST) in coordination with DARPA and the U.S. Army.   This culminated in 1993 
with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) approving Distributed 
Interactive Simulation (DIS) as Standard 1278 (Voss, 1993).  The University of Central Florida’s 
IST in coordination with the workshop members developed DIS to “create synthetic, virtual 
representations of warfare environments by systematically connecting separate subcomponents 
of simulation which reside at distributed, multiple locations ... The property of connecting 
separate subcomponents or elements affords the capability to configure a wide range of 
simulated warfare representations patterned after the task force organization of actual units ... 
Equally important is the property of interoperability which allows different simulation 
environments to efficiently and consistently interchange data elements essential to representing 
warfighting outcomes”(University of Central Florida, 1993, p. 3).  DIS is an entity-level, real-
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time simulation.  An entity-level simulation replicates singular military objects such as 
individual soldiers and vehicles.  Real-time simulations do not model or represent time in the 
abstract, but base it on the real clock of the time zone in which training is occurring.  While DIS 
enabled the conduct of distributed exercises that make simultaneous use of virtual and 
constructive training environments, these initial training events were plagued by a faulty 
representation of time and state relationships as well as difficulties between simulations in 
modeling combat objects (Page & Smith, 1998).  As many of these early exercises utilizing DIS 
were geographically distributed over several differing time zones, the real-time simulation 
proved cumbersome in coordinating the exercise events and participant actions.  Additionally, 
distributed training events typically have larger training audiences that are at the battalion and 
brigade echelon.  As you will recall, DIS is an entity-level simulation whose representation of 
singular military objects is more useful in the training of platoon and company sized elements.   
 Beginning in 1990, the Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP) was developed by 
MITRE Corporation under contract from DARPA as an answer to DIS’s problems with time 
periods associated with activities of Army Corps size units and echelon aggregation necessary to 
simulate the huge force structures (Weatherly, Wilson, Canova, Page, Zabek, & Fischer, 1996).  
As its name suggests, ALSP represented an aggregate or collection of single military objects to 
form the battalion and brigade elements that would now be training in virtual/constructive 
environments of larger distributed exercises.  ALSP is a logical-time simulation.  Logical-time 
simulation is not based on real clock time, but in a manner that is matched to the requirements of 
the simulation.  An abstracted simulation time is established which maintains the 
synchronization of all exercise events and subsequent training audience actions across all time 
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zones.  According to Page & Smith, ALSP “coordinates the advance of simulation time, enforces 
adherence to a common object model of the shared simulation state, and arbitrates contests over 
the right to modify that shared state” (1998).  Most virtual and constructive simulations 
developed prior to 1996 utilized a combination of DIS and ALSP to satisfy the full range of 
collective training requirements.   
 High Level Architecture (HLA) advances the evolution of interoperability by providing a 
conceptual set of rules that determine how differing federations of simulations will interoperate 
within a common technical framework.  Depending on the nature of the federation, HLA may 
combine the real-time, entity-level aspects of DIS and the logical-time, aggregate-level aspects 
of ALSP.  IEEE standards 1516.3 -2003 provide tools for creating new federations through a 
recommended Federation Development and Execution Process (FEDEP).  FEDEP permits 
creation of new federations for federates that do not comply with existing and approved 
Federation Object Models (FOM) such as the Real Time Platform Reference FOM (RPR-FOM).  
The resulting overarching architecture enables different federations of various computer 
simulation systems to interoperate together and subsequently support collective training without 
the previously encountered time and echelon issues (Modeling & Simulation Coordination 
Office, n.d.).  Depending on the needs and constraints of the collaborating of federations, various 
FOMs and Run Time Infrastructures (RTI) were developed to enable interoperation.  In 1996, the 
U.S. Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology signed a memorandum stating that all 
DoD simulations that do not become HLA compliant by 2001 must be retired. (Page & Smith, 
1998).  Two years after this memorandum was published, the DMSO (Defense Modeling 
Simulation Office), now known as M&SCO (Modeling & Simulation Coordination Office) 
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formalized the requirements for HLA compliance by establishing a common technical 
framework (CTF) (Modeling & Simulation Coordination Office, n.d.).  According to Johnson, 
the  M&SCO CTF ensures that all HLA compliant simulations: use the same standards for 
describing and sharing data, synchronize clock timing of two different simulations or federates, 
and share common perceptions of battlespace (1999).   To achieve compliance, simulations were 
often modified with “Middleware” for the specific simulation that converts internal messages to 
external HLA compliant messages and vice versa.  Other simulations used “Gateway” software 
that provided the conversion.  As long as simulation messages could be converted into message 
formats in existing HLA FOM’s, using middleware or gateway solutions enabled simulations to 
achieve compliance and avoided the time consuming FEDEP process of creating a new HLA 
FOM mentioned above. 
Blended Training and the Promise of Integrated Training Environments 
 This last decade consisting of two theaters of war and high operational tempo has created 
a new set of training challenges. With short periods between deployments, the near continual 
rotation of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in and out of theater is typified by limited training 
time at homestation (Funk & Longo, 2011).  In a 2011 interview, COL Anthony Krogh, Director 
of the U.S. Army National Simulation Center, provided the example of Fort Lewis to illustrate 
how high OPTEMPO has led to constrained training resources at homestation.  “Seven 5,000-
person brigades are on the ground at Fort Lewis… But here’s the thing- there’s only enough 
maneuver space and range for one brigade there at a time… The only way we can make up for 
that is to use a synthetic, or virtual world” (Pellerin, 2011). 
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 The author, having served as an Army Simulations Officer at the Fort Lewis Mission 
Training Complex (MTC) from 2008 to 2010, has firsthand experience with this conundrum of 
increased training throughput despite limited resources.  With multiple BCTs in simultaneous 
training and deployment cycles, there were not enough live training facilities at any given time to 
adequately prepare all deploying tenant units if purely live training methods were utilized.  
Precious live training resources had to be conserved for culminating or capstone training events.  
This was accomplished by utilizing blended training environments in which the virtual and 
constructive environments augmented the live.  By leveraging the virtual and constructive in 
addition to traditional live simulation, local training directors blended training environments that 
were capable of producing effective training solutions while overcoming the challenge of 
diminished live training resources such as time, maneuver terrain, logistical support, and budget.  
Resource constraints were mitigated by spreading the training audience across all three 
environments to take the pressure off of the resource intense live training environment.  The cost 
of training a BCT is much less when two thirds of the unit is training in the virtual and 
constructive environments.  The virtual and constructive do not require live ammunition, 
vehicles, fuel, maneuver space, maintenance, or risk of soldier injury and equipment damage.   If 
all three domains are blended properly, volume of throughput and quality of training can remain 
high while scarce resources are conserved.  
 Yet, blended training is not synonymous with integrated training or simulation 
interoperability.  In blended training, the live, virtual, and constructive domains are brought 
together by means of “swivel chair” work arounds or locally produced, non-standard 
architectures to form a single overall training environment.  Based on the prior experience, 
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swivel chair training environments were necessitated by training demands that the 1998 DoD 
Common Technical Framework did not envision nor keep pace with.  The extent and depth of 
this short fall is perhaps defined by an out of date concept model of the mission space, High 
Level Architecture, and data standards. Truly integrated training has a digital architecture that 
connects the three training environments at the “ones and zeros”, which was what envisioned in 
1998 DoD Common Technical Framework.  Since the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, 
non-standard and often incompatible training simulation systems have emerged to address local 
training needs and the Common Technical Framework has not appeared to have kept pace with 
the local changes.  The extent of the incompatibility was perhaps masked by huge funding for 
mission accomplishment and turbulence of the force and leadership.  The DoD approved 
simulation interoperability architectures such as the High Level Architecture did not have 
Federation Object Models nor Run Time Infrastructure to accommodate the non-standard 
systems.  The forcing function of a work around is not required in an Integrated Training 
Environment (ITE) where simulation systems interoperate on a smooth digital basis.  
The Cost of Blended Training 
 Blended training solutions of the last decade have been designed at the local installation 
level to assist commanders in meeting unit specific training requirements while mitigating 
homestation specific resource constraints.  As noted below, there is little continuity between any 
two Army installations as to how blended training is designed or executed.  If the incompatibility 
of simulation interoperability is more general than noted below, this incompatibility makes it 
difficult to conduct distributed exercises or share already completed exercise products between 
units and installations.   
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 The work arounds required to reach an effective blended training solution are expensive 
and create unnecessary overhead for the training unit.  Most of this expense is tied up in the 
hiring of technical contractors to design non-standard digital architectures and the leasing of non-
military means of connectivity, such as commercial T1 lines and satellites.   
 The Joint Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN) serves as the Army’s persistent 
global network designed to support distributed LVC exercises.  As JTEN is a joint asset, the 
Army does not enjoy sole ownership and must share it with the other services.  JTEN does not 
exist at all Army homestations.  Use of an existing JTEN node at an installation, or establishing 
of a temporary node to support an exercise requires considerable lead time and coordination, 
adding to the overhead required of the training unit and installation training facilitators.  
Leveraging JTEN only connects geographically separated installations.  JTEN does nothing to 
connect the live, virtual, and constructive training environments that exist within the confines of 
individual homestations.  Furthermore, many theater-provided networks and equipment sets are 
not available to units while training for deployment at homestation.  Leasing of non-military 
satellites and T1 lines is often necessary to replicate the tactical networks and connectivity that 
the training unit would actual have while deployed in support of combat operations.   
 The training unit’s staff must devote much time to developing the exercise scenario.  
Friendly unit and OPFOR orders of battle; friendly unit and OPFOR orders, plans and graphics; a 
MSEL (Master Scenario Events List); Road to War (contextual background); and a central 
training database (CTDB) that provides intelligence, political, economic, and social inputs to the 
exercise must be constructed in accordance with the commander’s training objectives (U.S. 
Army Combined Arms Center, 2012).  The unit must also provide soldiers to operate 
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constructive simulation workstations and Observer Controllers (OCs) to guide the training and 
facilitate the AAR.  Interoperability and continuity of blended training, simulation systems, and 
supporting artifacts would enable leveraging of resources by sister installations thus reducing the 
fore mentioned cost.  Further, interoperability and continuity of blended training simulation 
systems and supporting artifacts would facilitate possible synergies between divergent 
installations.  Such synergies may enable the strengths of one installation in one dimension of 
warfare to complement and enhance another installation less capable in that dimension of 
warfare and vice versa.  
 Finally, the training unit’s tactical network and the simulation center’s simulation 
network must go through a lengthy network accreditation process with the installation Network 
Enterprise Center (NEC). It must be proven that the cross domain network established to conduct 
training supports both classified and unclassified systems without violating security.  As 
evidenced in the comments provided below, there is not one common network solution that 
supports all blended training approaches across all installations, so locally each installation must 
establish a new network and the unit has to endure the lengthy accreditation process for each 
exercise. In extreme cases, the people supporting training can outnumber the training audience.   
 Since blended training solutions are tailored for the specific unit and installation, they are 
seldom reused for the training of other units.  Typically, after each exercise, the architectures and 
networks established to facilitate an exercise are dismantled leaving no residual training 
capability to show for all of the time and money spent.  A standardized and persistent integrating 
architecture, consisting of compatible databases, shared network protocols and infrastructure 
would provide for a more efficient use of training resources.   
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 An example of high exercise cost and lack of return on investment can be found in two 
homestation pre-deployment CTEs (Culminating Training Exercises) conducted by the 25
th
 CAB 
(Combat Aviation Brigade) between 2009 and 2010.  Lack of technical expertise within the 
training unit and MTC as well as lack of a standardized and persistent architecture to integrate 
dissimilar LVC Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS) drove up the cost 
of the exercise.  According to LTC John Barry, the 25
th
 CAB Simulation Operations Officer, 
“the brigade spent $250,000 to contract a private technical firm to integrate constructive 
simulations with live, instrumented aircraft and $380,000 in overtime pay for the contractors 
who ran the non-standard integrated architecture during the exercise” (LTC J. Barry, personal 
communication, July 10, 2012). It took the contracted technical firm 6 months to design and test 
the non-standard exercise architecture. When the 2009 CTE concluded, no training capability 
was retained that could be reused in the 25
th
 CAB’s next major blended training exercise. 
 COL Anthony Krogh, Director of the U.S. Army National Simulation Center, commented 
on a 2011 CTE conducted by the very same CAB, in preparation for its deployment to 
Afghanistan. “A 25th CAB (Combat Aviation Brigade) LVC Exercise took 8 months to plan and 
execute, cost $7 million and the day after the exercise no residual capability existed.  The lack of 
consistent standards of training and persistent networks meant that even if it did retain its 
capability, it couldn't train with any other location.  We can't afford that approach any more” 
(COL A. Krogh, personal communication, April 5, 2012).    
 Now that combat operations in Iraq have officially concluded and a timeline for withdraw 
from Afghanistan has been tentatively set, the entire U.S Army will soon be back at their 
homestations.  At the height of the War on Terror, installations had a difficult time facilitating 
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simultaneous training for multiple units.  Clearly gaps in the 1998 DoD Common Technical 
Framework have emerged.  As in all wars, deficiencies in weapon systems and technologies 
emerge.  As overseas contingency operations wind down and units redeploy in the next two 
years, installation populations will increase. This homestation population growth paired with 
increasingly limited training resources will make sustainment of effective training a challenge 
(Pellerin, 2011).  The high cost and overhead of the last decade were manageable as the training 
budgets for homestation training were flush with money.  However, expensive blended training 
solutions are not as likely as in the past as the impending drawdown may likely constrain 
resources.  Thus the fore mentioned deficiencies in the Common Technical Framework need to 
be addressed if units are to be prepared and proficient in the next war as the units were prepared 
in the Battle of 73 Easting. 
The Impending Drawdown 
 As America enters a second decade of persistent conflict, although at a lower scale, 
combined with a struggling and uncertain economy, the Congress of the United States may 
appear to be war weary (Reuters, 2011). The Department of Defense (DOD) has already been 
directed to cut $450 billion from its budget over the next decade.  As mandated by the Budget 
Control Act of 2011, failure of the Joint Select Commission of Deficit Reduction to agree on 
$1.2 trillion in budget cuts last November, triggered $500 billion in additional cuts to the DOD’s 
budget.  It has still not been determined if the cuts to the defense budget will remain at the initial 
$450 billion amount or increase to almost $1 trillion (Congress of the United States, 2011).  
 The DOD revealed its plan to deal with the initial $450 billion in cuts with the release of 
Defense Budget Choices and Priorities in January of 2012.  This document rationalizes that the 
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force “…while smaller and leaner, will remain agile, flexible, ready, innovative, and 
technologically advanced” (p. 1).  This force plan harkens back to DePuy’s Army of the 1970’s, 
where superior equipment, training, and leadership were seen as the keys to success for a 
smaller, all volunteer Army.  The document also describes a carefully balanced priorities-based 
strategy that requires constant assumption and management of risk. “There is no room for 
modification if we are to preserve the force and capabilities that are needed to protect the country 
and fulfill the missions of the Department of Defense. A change in one area inevitably requires 
offsetting changes elsewhere, unbalancing the overall package” (p. 3).  If the lessons from 
DePuy and SIMNET are prologue for the future, updating and implementing a new Common 
Technical Framework for M&S for DoD, which shall be referred to as the Integrated Training 
Environment (ITE), will be an essential component of successful training preparedness if it is to 
be achieved.  
21
st
 Century Threat and Operating Environment 
 In contrast with this view where the future is so well known that it could be so delicately 
balanced, former Army Chief of Staff George Casey first termed the phrase “Persistent Conflict” 
when he described a new era where “… an increasing number of actors (state, non-state, and 
individual), in a less constrained international arena, are more willing to use violence to pursue 
their ends” (Casey, 2008).  Casey also identified a number of enduring trends that encourage 
persistent conflict that were included in FM 3-0, Operations.  These trends include: 
Globalization, Diffusion of Technology, Demographic Changes, Urbanization, Resource 
Demands, Natural Disasters, Proliferation of WMD, and Failed or Failing States.  These future 
state and non-state actors will employ an uncertain mix of the conventional, the unconventional, 
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terrorism, WMD, and proxy wars to overcome America’s technological and material advantages 
(FM 3-0 Operations, 2008, p. 1-1).  The uncertainty of the future assessed threat requires that the 
Army be adept at both regular and irregular warfare, while conducting Full Spectrum Operations 
(FSO). FSO requires the proper blend of offense, defense, and stability operations to meet 
varying tactical situation that can be found within the spectrum of conflict (FM 7-0 Training for 
Full Spectrum Operations, 2008, p. 1-7).  Figure 2 illustrates the concept of FSO by aligning the 
spectrum of conflict, its associated operational themes, and estimated operational combinations.  
The oval on Figure 2 indicates a training aimpoint halfway between Insurgency and General 
War.  This aimpoint suggests the Army’s current operational need to maintain the operational set 
developed over the last decade in Irregular Warfare and Limited Intervention while also 
developing capabilities for Major Combat Operations. 
 
Figure 2. Full Spectrum Operations, FM 7-0 
 For the last decade, the Army has become proficient in conducting FSO in a counter-
insurgency (COIN) centric environment where insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan largely 
employed irregular warfare.  Much like the post-Vietnam Army, counterinsurgency has been the 
collective training and operational experience for the current generation of field grade officers 
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and senior NCOs. The force has become unpracticed in conventional major combat operations 
(MCO) and must refocus training objectives.  The current training focus leaves the Army 
vulnerable should our adversary in the next conflict present a hybrid threat as current doctrine 
predicts (MacDonald, 2008).  This vulnerability is recognized and addressed in a 2011 article co-
authored by former Combined Arms Training Center Deputy, MG Paul Funk and former 
Training and Doctrine Command Deputy G3/5/7, MG Richard Longo: “Training and leader 
development is migrating from full spectrum operations in a COIN environment to full spectrum 
operations against a hybrid threat” (Funk & Longo, 2011).  The training implications are huge 
for a force that is now required to maintain proficiency across the full spectrum of operations in 
both conventional and unconventional environments.  
 As the Army has projected that it will remain in Afghanistan through 2014, it must 
maintain proficiency in full spectrum operations in a COIN environment while also preparing the 
force for full spectrum operations against future hybrid threats.  To ensure that its brigades are 
conducting appropriate training for uncertain future operations, the Army has created two 
different expeditionary forces with differing training strategies.  A Deployment Expeditionary 
Force (DEF) is any brigade which has received orders to a specific theater for which training can 
be tailored for a known threat and operational environment.  Units receiving orders for 
Afghanistan are considered DEFs as the known threat and operational environment require that 
they train for full spectrum operations in a COIN environment.  Any Army brigade that trains to 
maintain warfighting proficiency, but does not have orders for an upcoming deployment is 
considered a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF).  A CEF follows a generalized training 
plan which focuses on a well rounded form of full spectrum operations that gives equal time and 
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training to the offense, defense, and stability operations in the context of both conventional and 
irregular threats (Department of the Army, 2011).   
21st Century Doctrine- ADP 3-0 
 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, is the first manual to be 
published under the Army’s Doctrine 2015 initiative and provides the overarching doctrinal 
guidance and direction for conducting operations (ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, 2011).  
ADP 3-0 attempts to retain the proficiency gained over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan 
while at the same time transitioning from a COIN-centric force to an Army capable of a broader 
range of missions.  This need to execute broader range of missions is being driven by the hybrid 
threat and ambiguous OE.  In the foreword of ADP 3-0, GEN Odierno states, “In this edition, we 
not only reflect on the past but also look to an uncertain future” (ADP 3-0 Unified Land 
Operations, 2011).   
 The central idea of ADP 3-0 is that “Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to 
gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through 
simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, 
prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.” (ADP 3-0 Unified 
Land Operations, 2011, p. 1).  ADP 3-0 builds on the idea of FSO by requiring that Army 
operations are fully integrated with joint, interagency, and multinational partner efforts.  Unity of 
effort will allow a smaller, more versatile force, as prescribed by Defense Budget Choices and 
Priorities, to take on a broader range of missions.   
 Unified Land Operations will be executed through Decisive Action.  Decisive Action 
replaces FSO in all Army doctrine.  There is little difference between the two concepts other than 
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the change in terminology.  Decisive Action requires units to conduct sustained land operations 
through the simultaneous application of offense, defense, and stability operations in a manner 
that is appropriate for the mission and environment just as FSO did.  However, Decisive Action 
does introduce the Army’s two core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and 
Wide Area Security (WAS).   
 CAM and WAS allow for the balanced application of the elements of combat power and 
offense, defense, and stability operations in a unified manner at the right point on the spectrum of 
conflict.  CAM is focused on defeating enemy ground forces and  is defined as “The application 
of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, 
occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages 
over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative” (ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, 2011, p. 
6).  WAS is focused on protecting populations and infrastructure.  It   is defined as “The 
application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, 
infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains 
in order to retain the initiative” (ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, 2011, p. 6).   
New Army Training Strategy- Operational Adaptability, Optimize Training Resources & 
Revitalize Homestation Training 
 On 3 October, 2012, the Army Chief of Staff published a new training strategy to 
compliment ADP 3-0.  Appropriately titled The Army Training Strategy: Training in a Time of 
Transition, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Austerity, this document issued guidance for the 
training of a smaller, more versatile force in the conduct of unified land operations in a complex 
and uncertain environment.  The Army Training Strategy (ATS) cover memorandum, also 
80 
 
written by GEN Odierno, echoes the foreword for ADP 3-0.  “The ATS describes how the Army, 
while continuing the fight in Afghanistan and maintaining a range of global engagements, must 
simultaneously begin transitioning from a decade focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations to a smaller, more versatile Army that will take on a broader range of missions in 
support of national defense objectives” (Department of the Army, 2012).   
 Operational Adaptability is the main theme of the 2012 ATS.  Operational Adaptability is 
defined as, “the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and 
situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions” (TRADOC PAM 525-3-0 The U.S. 
Army Capstone Concept, 2012, p. 38).  The ATS characterizes units who train for Decisive 
Action and the two core competencies of CAM and WAS, as “agile, responsive, tailorable forces 
capable of responding to any mission, anytime, anywhere” (The Army Training Strategy, 2012, 
p. 4).   
 The ATS indicates that in order to effectively train units in Decisive Action, training 
events must faithfully replicate the hybrid nature of the threat and a complex and uncertain OE.  
By replicating these fluid and dynamic battlefield conditions, units will be afforded training 
opportunities were they can practice applying the appropriate, and ever changing mix of offense, 
defense, and stability operations as they transition between CAM and WAS.  However, 
replicating the COE is resource intensive and is becoming a significant challenge as training 
resources become increasingly constrained.   
 To overcome the challenge of increasingly limited training resources, the ATS has 
directed that Army leadership “optimize training resources” by developing innovative training 
methodologies.  Use of virtual and constructive capabilities in concert with live training methods 
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is recommended to mitigate resource constraints.  The ATS advises that, “senior mission 
commanders must synchronize and prioritize training resources across entire installations to 
mitigate limitations in assets and geography” (The Army Training Strategy, 2012, p. 8).   
 As previously discussed, the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will 
markedly grow homestation populations, which will in turn increase competition for strained 
training resources.  Additionally, it is recognized that the resource intense interoperability typical 
of blended training is no longer feasible.  In light of these two realities, the ATS has directed that 
“homestation training will transition from a blended training approach to the Integrated Training 
Environment to maximize scarce resources while simultaneously increasing operational realism 
and allowing commanders flexibility to scale training events to echelon, mission, and experience 
level” (The Army Training Strategy, 2012, p. 14).    
LVC-IA- The Next Step in Training Evolution? 
 Persistent conflict, uncertain operational environment, and hybrid threat have increased 
training requirements while training resources are expected to become increasingly constrained.  
The impending drawdown and persistent hybrid threat demand that the Army devise cost 
effective blended training solutions to sustain collective homestation training of FSO.  
Recognizing this demand, the Army is in the process of developing and fielding a new 
integrating architecture that will integrate at the “ones and zeros.”  The Army’s Capability 
Development Document (CDD) for Live Virtual Constructive-Integrating Architecture (LVC-
IA) stipulates that “LVC-IA must design and facilitate interoperability between LVC TADSS 
and battle command systems and reduce costs (manpower/ personnel) and exercise development 
time.  It must provide support that balances operational effectiveness with acceptable cost 
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parameters” (2009).  LVC-IA will negate the need for costly “swivel chair” solutions by 
providing “protocols, standards and interfaces to create interoperability of currently dissimilar 
TADSS supporting LVC training environments so that they can simultaneously stimulate 
Mission Command systems”.  LVC-IA provides the training unit and homestation with a 
persistent and accredited cross domain network and standardizes training across the entire force 
with a common architecture (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2012).  Installation specific 
training solutions that require the leasing of expensive non-military connectivity or the hiring of 
contractors will no longer be required.  Since the network will be persistent, training can be on-
demand, and there will no longer be the need to create and establish a new network for each 
exercise.  LVC-IA will be fielded as an accredited system, so the unit will no longer be 
responsible for the lengthy validation process.  The exorbitant number of personnel outside of 
the training audience to support training and effect “swivel chair” solutions will no longer be 
required.  Additionally, LVC-IA provides an Exercise Control (EXCON) station that will allow 
the commander to observe and control the exercise across all three training environments, as well 
as utilize a robust AAR tool (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2012).  According to the LVC-
IA CDD, version 1 fielding of LVC-IA will allow the Army to integrate:  
 1. The central live enabler of Homestation Instrumented Training System (HITS).  HITS 
supports force-on-force and force-on-target live training by providing position location and 
weapons effects data for real-time exercise monitoring and AAR production (U.S. Army 
Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation, n.d.).  
 2. The primary virtual enablers of the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), the 
Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), and the Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT).  
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CCTT, whose genesis can be traced to SIMNET, is a computer-driven, manned module 
simulator that replicates the wheeled and tracked vehicles common in maneuver combat units.  A 
squad thru battalion training audience conducts collective training from full-crew vehicle 
simulators, mock-up company command posts and live battalion command posts.   AVCATT, 
the rotary wing equivalent of CCTT, supports unit collective and combined arms training by 
virtually replicating any combination of attack, reconnaissance, lift and/or cargo helicopters.  
CFFT provides multiple virtual battlefield environments to train observed fire of Artillery, Close 
Air Support, Naval Artillery, and Mortar fires.  By utilizing common, correlated terrain, CCTT, 
AVCATT, and CFFT can be combined to conduct virtual combined arms training at the squad 
through battalion level (U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and 
Instrumentation, n.d.).   
 3. The key constructive enablers of the Entity Resolution Federation of the Joint Land 
Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC- ERF) and One Semi Automated Forces 
(OneSAF).  JLCCTC-ERF stimulates the real world digital Mission Command systems of 
battalion and brigade command posts to facilitate collective battle staff training.   Rather than 
placing an entire battalion in the field to drive the decision making process, constructive injects 
in the form of incoming digital information require the staff to react while executing the 
commander’s tactical plan (U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and 
Instrumentation, n.d.).   OneSAF is an entity level constructive simulation that individually 
replicates observable soldiers, vehicles, units, and their associated behaviors.  OneSAF presents a 
one solution for generating and controlling autonomous entities found in the virtual 
environment’s Semi-Automated Forces (SAF) and the constructive environment’s Computer 
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Generated Forces (CGF).  OneSAF makes it easier to integrate virtual and constructive 
simulations into a single training exercise (U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, 
Training and Instrumentation, n.d.).  OneSAF has been quite useful in making legacy DIS/ALSP 
simulations, such as CCTT, HLA and Common Technical Framework compliant.  OneSAF 
provides an updated RTI and FOM that allows still useful legacy systems the ability to 
interoperate with next generation HLA simulations (OneSAF, n.d.).  However, JLCCTC-ERF v 
6.0, which utilizes OneSAF as the maneuver driver, failed a recent Validation, Verification & 
Accreditation (VV&A) conducted by the NSC (National Simulation Center and was not 
approves for brigade and below training.  While the memorandum pointed out that “no single 
requirement failure in/of itself led to the decision not to accredit the JLCCTC-ERF v 6.0”, the 
majority of the problems were attributed to OneSAF (National Simulation Center, 2012, p. 2).  
As a result, OneSAF is not in use at homestation MTCs.  JLCCTC-ERF v5.3, which is the last 
accredited version, is what homestation MTCs are currently using.  JLCCTC-ERF v5.3 does not 
use OneSAF as a maneuver driver; it uses a legacy entity level constructive simulation known as 
Joint Conflict And Tactical Simulation JCATS). 
 4. Digital Mission Command systems found in command posts at the brigade and below 
level. When training is conducted within the ITE, the training unit’s subordinate elements are 
split between the live, virtual, and constructive training environments.  In the case of a brigade, 
each of its three maneuver battalions will train in a separate environment.  LVC-IA will integrate 
the TADSS of the three different training environments and stimulate the digital mission 
command systems in the brigade command post presenting the commander with a seamless 
tactical picture that is painted by the combined simulation inputs of the live, virtual, and 
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constructive.  The brigade commander commands and controls his maneuver battalions as if all 
three were maneuvering on live terrain.  The LVC-IA CDD presents the rationale for achieving 
this “sim to stim” effect.  “To “train as we operate,” commanders, leaders, and battle staffs 
require the ability to rehearse missions and train with an accurate representation of the entire 
Area of Operation, Influence, and Interest.  LVC subsystems are responsible for replicating, 
stimulating, and simulating the operational environment.  On demand, the LVC-IA connects the 
tools that produce the stimuli required by MC [Mission Command] systems to provide the 
capability to exercise mission command” (p. 23, 2009).          
Army ITE- The Bigger Picture 
 Army ITE, for which LVC-IA serves as the foundation, is best described as a three 
legged stool (See Figure 3).  The three legs are:  training infrastructure, framework for training, 
and LVC-ITE.  LVC-IA connects the training infrastructure which is the physical means used to 
train, such as instrumented ranges, TADSS (HITS, CCTT & JLCCTC-ERF), simulation facilities 
(MTCs), and networks.  Once the training infrastructure has been connected via the architecture, 
the framework for training can be incorporated to drive training.  The framework for training is 
composed of training tools such as scenarios, databases, and training support packages. The final 
leg of LVC-ITE is the interface where mission command and simulation systems communicate 
through an exchange of simulation data and operational inputs (U.S. Army Combined Arms 
Center, 2011).    
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Figure 3. Army ITE (Integrated Training Environment) "Stool" 
LVC-IA not a Magic Pill for Training 
 Since LVC-IA is the Army’s material solution to interoperate dissimilar TADSS and 
move toward an ITE, it enjoys the status of a fully funded Program of Record (U.S. Army 
Combined Arms Center, 2012).  LVC-IA reduces cost by providing a persistent and accredited 
training network, and by doing away with the need for expensive connectivity solutions. LVC-IA 
also provides connectivity of an installations existing training infrastructure and facilitates for 
overlay of the existing framework for training.  However, LVC-IA only provides the architecture 
to connect dissimilar TADSS, and will not augment existing installation training infrastructures 
or Frameworks for Training and Education. According to LTC Johnny Powers, PEO-STRI’s 
executive agent for Simulation to Mission Command Interoperability, LVC-IA will not facilitate 
training unless the homestation already possesses:  an intra-post fiber simulation network, LVC 
TADSS, on post training facilities, and properly formatted scenarios and databases that replicate 
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the contemporary operating environment (LTC J. Powers, personal communication, 15 October, 
2011).  The Army ITE is the sum of its parts and the supporting legs of training infrastructure, 
framework for training, and LVC-ITE must progress at the same pace as LVC-IA for a truly 
integrated training solution to be achieved.  None of the three supporting legs of ITE are Army 
Programs of Record, which may explain a slower rate of development when compared to LVC-
IA.  
Training Infrastructure: The First Leg of the Stool 
 LVC-IA version 1 will be fielded to a total of 18 sites by the end of FY 2017.  Between 
2013 and 2017, LVC-IA will be fielded at 15 active component Army installations.  In 2017, 
LVC-IA will be fielded at one yet to be determined Army National Guard location,  one Combat 
Training Center (CTC) location (NTC, JRTC, or JMRC), and one Center of Excellence (COE) 
location (Fort Benning, Fort Sill, or Fort Rucker).  The initial 15 installations (Alaska, Fort Bliss, 
Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, Fort Carson, Fort Drum, Fort Hood, Fort Knox, Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, Fort Polk, Fort Riley, Schofield Barracks, Fort Stewart, Germany, and Korea) were 
chosen for the suitability of their training infrastructures, suggesting that some installation 
training infrastructures are better than others (LVC-IA CDD, 2009).  A March 2011 information 
paper, written by PEO-STRI’s assistant LVC-IA project manager, lists “resident capabilities” as 
one of the fielding site selection criterion.  This information paper defines resident capabilities as 
“the quality of existing TSS [Training Support System] facilities, communications assets (RF 
[Radio Frequency] networks, fiber networks, etc.), and TADSS” (U.S. Army Program Executive 
Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, 2011, p. 2).   
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 TSS facilities include training areas, ranges, and MTCs.  The installation training areas 
and ranges must be large enough to safely support vehicle maneuver and live fire training.  
Nothing has been found in current literature that suggests the optimal size live maneuver space 
for integrated training,  However, as brigades are the target training audience of homestation, and 
each brigade has three subordinate battalions that could each train in one of the LVC 
environments, common sense would indicate that a battalion size maneuver space is desirable.  
The homestation MTC typically operates virtual and constructive training facilities and is the 
facilitator of all LVC blended and future integrated training. 
 LVC-IA version 1 required TADSS, which have previously been defined, include: the 
HITS instrumentation of live ranges; the virtual simulations of CCTT, AVCATT, and CFFT; and 
the constructive simulations of JLCCTC ERF and OneSAF.  Every homestation must possess the 
prescribed TADSS of the three separate training environments in order for the integrating 
architecture to deliver a true ITE.  The only exception to this list would be OneSAF, as the 
federation to which it belongs to did not pass VV&A.  
 The Army’s Capability Development Document for LVC-IA states that “the 
foundation/cornerstone of a LVC-IA [enabled] training environment is a robust homestation 
training communication network infrastructure” (p. 14, 2009).  Since LVC-IA only provides the 
integrating architecture for the ITE, a permanent fiber network is required that connects the LVC 
training environments and their corresponding TADSS.  In addition to the fiber simulation 
network on which LVC-IA will ride, a persistent tactical network is also required.  Establishment 
of operational RF networks used to propagate FM voice messages and the wireless networks of 
the tactical internet can require considerable training unit time and resources.  Several 
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homestations have saved their tenant training units considerable time and effort by providing a 
Fixed Tactical Internet (FTI).  Typically, this involves a secure facility and radio tower which are 
capable of permanently maintaining the encrypted RF and wireless networks required for 
training. Tenant units can utilize the FTI at any time without prior coordination as all unit 
specific frequencies and IP addresses are maintained in a persistent manner.  Training units are 
only required to provide the MTC with the most current unit specific encryption keys and LDIFs.  
The Fort Lewis MTC, which has established and FTI, describes this training capability as 
“providing a homestation communications infrastructure which enables digital communications 
across the Army’s Tactical Internet as an alternative to deploying signal assets to support digital 
communications, providing linkage to inject simulation into tactical environment. The 
infrastructure is integral to future TSPs as a “cross- domain” digital training enabler” (Joint Base 
Lewis McChord MTC, n.d.).   
 Homestation training infrastructure should be configured and managed in a manner that 
supports ATS guidance to “optimize training resources”.  Homestation training infrastructure 
should be capable of mitigating training resource constraints by spreading the training audience 
across all three LVC environments.  Tenant units should be provided with a flexible menu of 
TADSS, networks, and facilities which can be scaled to meet specific training objectives for 
differing units, echelons, and experience levels.  All TADSS, and facilities should be located at 
homestation or in close proximity to prevent resource intense troop movement off post.  The 
current level of homestation TADSS, networks, and facilities should support blended training 
without the supplemental lease, purchase or installation of temporary training infrastructure.   At 
the completion of a blended LVC exercise, training infrastructure should not be dismantled, so 
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that residual training capability remains and it is easier for the next unit to set up and conduct 
training.  Use of homestation TADSS, facilities, and networks to conduct brigade and below 
blended training should require minimal lead time, coordination, and resources.  A clear and 
concise system to schedule and coordinate homestation training infrastructure should be 
published by senior installation leadership.  Corps and Division G3s should host training 
resource management conferences where all stakeholders (tenant units, MTC, range control, 
facilities managers, etc.) can set priorities and de-conflict training infrastructure requirements.   
 In order for LVC-IA to enable a true ITE, the installation must provide the required 
ranges and facilities, TADSS for each of the training environments, and persistent simulation and 
tactical networks. To enjoy the cost saving benefits of the ITE, many installations may first be 
required to spend much of their training budgets upgrading training infrastructure.  This will 
prove to be an unexpected cost, and may not be within the realm of the possible for many 
installations depending on the severity of defense budget cuts over the next decade.   
Framework for Training- The Second Leg of the Stool 
 The framework for training is comprised of the scenarios, databases, and training support 
packages required to drive an exercise in the ITE.  As LVC-IA only provides interoperability, 
homestations are required to develop and make available, their own Frameworks for Training.  
Many installations have compiled the necessary scenarios, databases and training support 
packages into training product repositories.  These local training product repositories provide 
tenant training units with “off the shelf” products that are readily available for the design of 
blended LVC training.  Content within repositories grows with each new exercise.  Repositories 
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reduce exercise build time by providing training units with partial solutions that can be rapidly 
altered to meet training objectives.     
 Training scenarios should meet the Operational Adaptability requirements specified by 
the ATS.  Scenarios within the framework for training should contain the full range of 
complexity and uncertainty typical of the anticipated OE and  threat of a hybrid nature if units 
are to be trained to standard in Decisive Action and the core competencies of CAM and WAS.  A 
robust set of scenarios is needed to encompass the specific training requirements of DEFs as well 
as the broader training requirements of CEFs.  Scenarios should span the spectrum of conflict, 
from Stable Peace to General War, and should not be limited to the COIN-centric operational 
themes of the last decade.  Decisive Action dynamics such as “plug and play” task organization, 
varying combinations of offense/defense/stability operations, lethal to non-lethal transitions, and 
changing human terrain should be replicated in scenarios.   Finally, scenarios should drive the 
collective training of the entire combined arms team, to include logistics and support units of the 
non combat arms variety. 
 Databases contained within the local training product repository must be in a TADSS 
consumable format.  In other words, these databases must be in a format that is recognizable and 
usable by all LVC TADSS of the ITE and all digital mission command systems of the training 
unit.  Typically, eleven databases of a TADSS consumable format are utilized to conduct a 
blended or integrated LVC exercise.  These eleven required databases, as specified in the draft 
Army ITE Strategy (2012), are listed below.   
 1. TADSS Terrain: Scenario terrain data must be in a format that correlates with and is 
recognizable to the instrumented homestation training ranges and live TADSS (HITS), virtual 
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TADSS (CCTT, AVCATT, CFFT), and constructive TADSS (JLCCTC ERF, OneSAF).  The 
data must present a common picture to a large group of dissimilar TADSS. 
 2. Blue (friendly) Unit Order of Battle: This specifies number and type of formations, 
vehicle and equipment sets, weapons systems, and overall unit capabilities.  This database must 
include Blue order of battle that is representative of every arm of the combined arms team as 
capabilities differ greatly between them.  
 3. Parametric Data: This database provides the information that controls the mobility and 
rate of travel for vehicles and units as well as rate of fire, range, and effects of weapon systems 
in differing weather and terrain.  If simulated weather conditions are bad and terrain is 
restrictive, parametric data will limit the visibility and rate of march of entities accordingly.  
Parametric data ensures that an M1 Abrams tank shoots a 120 mm round instead of a 7.62 mm 
round.  This data also ensures that the same tank cannot shoot through significant terrain features 
or achieve its maximum effective range during conditions of poor weather or limited visibility. 
 4. Contemporary Operating Environment/OPFOR: This is the Order of Battle for Red or 
enemy forces.  This database must replicate the anticipated complex and uncertain operating 
environment as well as varying degrees of conventional, irregular, and hybrid threat.  
 5. LDIF (Lightweight Data Interchange Format):  This is the command and control 
registry or “IP address book” that tracks the assigned IP address for each “real world” digital 
mission command system utilized by the training unit. Like the Blue Order of Battle database, 
the LDIF database must represent the varying number and type of mission control systems found 
in every arm of the combined arms team. 
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 6. LDIF to TADSS Synch: This database ensures that the dissimilar TADSS unified by 
LVC-IA are synchronized with and stimulate the real world digital mission command systems of 
the training unit. 
 7. Civilian/NGO/”Green” Order of Battle:  The database that defines the capabilities and 
goals of Non Governmental Organizations and the Order of Battle for Host Nation Forces. It also 
addresses the behavior and influence of the civilian population on offensive, defensive and, 
stability operations with much emphasis placed on ethnic and cultural characteristics.  
 8. MSEL (Master Scenario Events List):  A database that contains the chronological 
timeline of expected actions and scripted events.  These events are introduced or “injected” into 
the exercise by controllers or the simulation to present a decision point to the training audience 
which will require decisive action. MSEL injections ensure that unit training objectives are met 
by presenting relevant operational dilemmas that will require training audience reaction.  Using a 
“cause and effect” approach, a positive training audience reaction will make the tactical situation 
better, while a negative reaction will cause it to deteriorate.  The training audience’s reaction to 
MSEL injects and salient teaching points are captured for discussion in AARs.  Like the 
Contemporary Operating Environment/OPFOR database, the MSEL database must faithfully 
replicate events that are in keeping with a complex and uncertain operational environment. 
 9. Visualization Data: Allows the visual portrayal of events not occurring in the live 
environment, such as generation of a UAV (Unmanned Ariel Vehicle) feed of an event that is 
occurring in the virtual or constructive environment. 
 10. Road to War:  Adjustment of STARTEX (starting point of an exercise) data to 
correlate with events that lead to the specific starting point. 
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 11. Exercise Cartoons:  The intelligence summary for the exercise.  
 The training product repository should provide tenant units with comprehensive training 
support packages that reduce effort and time required to design an exercise.  If started from 
scratch, exercise design and the requisite Training Support Package is a laborious process that 
can take more time than conduct of the exercise itself.  Training Circular (TC) 7-101, Exercise 
Design (2010), defines the formal exercise design process which consists of twenty different 
actions divided up into four phases.  Each of these four phases requires that detailed products 
such as higher unit and OPFOR orders, plans, and task organizations be produced.  Table 1 lists 
the four phases of exercise design as described by TC 7-101 and the training support package 
products that must be developed during each phase.  Homestation training product repositories 
that retain the training support packages from previous exercises reduce exercise build time by 
providing partial solutions for key products.   
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Table 1. Training Support Package products required by exercise design phase IAW TC 7-101 
Design Phase Products Required
Exercise design parameters based on available resources 
Priroitized Training Objectives
OPFOR Counter Tasks
OPFOR Order of Battle
OPFOR Task Organization
OPFOR Equipment Levels
Definition of OE
Refined Training Objectives
Higher Unit Orders (WARNO, OPORD,FRAGO)
Higher Unit Plans
Higher Intel Estimate
Country Studies
Rules of Engagement
OPFOR Orders (WARNO, OPORD, FRAGO)
OPFOR Plans
Role Player Instructions
Road to War Brief
Initial Planning
Task and Countertask Development
Operational Environment Development
Orders, Plans, and Instruction Development
 
LVC-ITE- The Third Leg of the Stool 
 LVC-ITE (Live Virtual Constructive-Integrated Training Environment) is the leg where 
seamless integration, or what is generally referred to as “sim to stim” occurs.  This is the process 
by which the training unit’s mission command systems and the TADSS of the homestation 
training infrastructure exchange data to produce a common operating picture for training across 
all LVC environments.  The resulting integrated exercises are intended to be so realistic that 
commanders and their staffs cannot tell if the information they are receiving from subordinate 
units, spread across the LVC training environments, is real or simulated (Department of the 
Army, 2009).  The LVC-ITE differs from the other legs of the ITE Stool in that it is a process 
rather than a set of tangible elements such as the facilities, TADSS, and networks of the training 
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infrastructure, or the scenarios, databases, and training support packages of the framework for 
training.  This process is reliant on the training infrastructure and framework for training. 
Emerging Framework for Training Resources 
 Over the past two years a number of tools and resources have emerged that may prove 
useful to the homestation training community in developing a comprehensive training product 
repository and framework for training.  TRADOC’s 11 regionally based CFoS scenarios can be 
accessed online by the homestation training community.  The Decisive Action Training 
Environment (DATE), which has been available online since October 2012, is a baseline source 
for conditions in the OE and structure of opposing forces.  TRADOC G2’s Training Brain 
Operations Center (TBOC), which has already provided exercise materials to a limited number 
of training units, will eventually serve as the central repository for all training support packages 
utilized in integrated training.  Joint Training Data Services (JTDS), a database generation tool 
developed at USJFCOM (U.S. Joint Forces Command), is useful in generating databases that are 
of a TADSS consumable format.  While JTDS is a joint enabler, it is being taught at the Army 
Simulations Operations Course.  If used in conjunction with each other, these four emerging 
enablers have the potential to produce a useful and comprehensive homestation framework for 
training.  CFoS provides the base scenario.  DATE provides the complex OE and hybrid threat.  
JTDS provides the TADSS consumable databases.  TBOC provides exercise materials and 
training support packages based on real world events and a central repository to store them in.   
Many homestation MTCs and tenant units may not be aware of several of these tools as they are 
still being developed, have just been released, or just have not had that much exposure as of yet.  
Level of knowledge and use of these emerging tools at homestation is unknown at this time.  
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Early use of these tools would indicate that Army-provided solutions are starting to replace 
locally produced homestation solutions of the blended training era as the Army moves towards 
an ITE. 
Summary 
 It would appear that MG McMaster was correct in his 1992 supposition.  The U.S. Army 
broke the cycle of lost first battles through the efforts of post-Vietnam reformers, such as 
Abrams and DePuy.  These visionaries initiated positive change in peacetime training 
methodology by taking heed of lessons learned from their own experiences in World War II, 
Korea, and Vietnam.  These experiences, as well as the revelations of the Yom Kippur War, 
illustrated the importance of preserving collective combined arms training opportunities despite 
peacetime strategies and budgets.  The post-Vietnam reformers provided the new doctrine of FM 
100-5 that stressed close coordination of combined arms, procured the Big 5 weapons systems 
that complimented the new doctrine, and provided the experiential learning environment of the 
CTC where units could “train as they would fight”.  History has shown that sustainment of 
combined arms training during force downsizing is dependent on efficient management of 
limited training resources.  Early use of SIMNET made the most of limited training resources 
during the Cold War drawdown.  Leveraging of cost-cutting simulations in concert with DePuy’s 
training reformation ensured 2nd ACR’s victory in the first major battle of the Gulf War. 
Training of the combined arms concept in an environment of limited resources has continued to 
evolve over the last decade through the design and execution of blended training.  By combining 
the live, virtual, and constructive domains, homestations have been able to meet the demands of 
simultaneous training objectives and increased throughput associated with high OPTEMPO.  
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Blended training methods have proven effective in sustaining a combined arms capability 
sufficient for first battle success in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, plentiful Overseas 
Contingency Operations funds which are no longer available provided for these expensive 
blended training solutions.  With the impending drawdown, a post-conflict strategy heavily 
influenced by the economy, and proposal of crippling defense budget cuts, the future of Army 
readiness is uncertain. 
 LVC-IA promises to take the next step in training evolution which will allow the force to 
sustain its recent streak of first battle success by facilitating a genuine ITE that does not require 
the expensive work arounds of its blended predecessor.  While LVC-IA is the foundation of the 
Army ITE, it cannot act alone. As LVC-IA is merely an integrating architecture, it requires that 
the homestation possess the requisite TADSS and fiber network on which it will ride.  The new 
era of uncertain and persistent conflict has precipitated a marked increase in training 
requirements as the Army must now be prepared to react to the full spectrum of conflict.  LVC-
IA and the training infrastructure that it connects will remain impractical without a robust set of 
scenarios to drive training of Decisive Action and the two core competencies of CAM and WAS.  
The “sim to stim” process which is accomplished within the third leg of LVC-ITE cannot occur 
without the requisite training infrastructure, and framework for training.  These two vital 
components of the ITE must support ATS directives to optimize training resources at 
homestation while simultaneously developing and sustaining a force characterized by 
Operational Adaptability.  If the supporting structures of the ITE are not developed in parallel 
with the integrating architecture, some homestation MTCs and training units may have no choice 
but to fall back to time consuming and expensive blended training methods.  With the current 
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fiscal realities, neither the hiring of contractors to design ad hoc software solutions and build 
TADSS consumable databases nor the leasing of non-standard connectivity to execute a blended 
training exercise is feasible.  An assessment of the current state of homestation training 
infrastructure and framework for training should be conducted to define any existing issues that 
may hinder LVC-IA from delivering the Army ITE.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
Purpose of Research 
 The purpose of this research is to understand the current state and ability of training 
infrastructure and framework for training to support an LVC-IA delivered ITE from the 
homestation training community’s perspective.  Additionally, the accuracy of homestation 
perceptions regarding knowledge of emerging framework for training enablers and LVC-IA’s 
role in the Army ITE will be gauged.  The initial variables to be assessed in this cross-sectional, 
survey-based study are:  
 -Training facilitator (MTC) versus training user (tenant unit) perspective. 
 -Location of homestation 
 It is assumed that the Army’s material solution of LVC-IA cannot act alone in delivering 
a truly integrated training environment.  As explained in Chapter Two, the ITE is the sum of its 
parts. The foundational architecture of LVC-IA is of little use if there is no training infrastructure 
for it to integrate or training scenarios and properly formatted databases of the framework for 
training to drive the exercise.  LVC-IA only serves as an integrating architecture for dissimilar 
LVC TADSS.  LVC-IA fielding does not provide improved infrastructure or training scenarios 
with accompanying databases to the homestation.  When LVC-IA is installed at homestation it 
will work in conjunction with existing infrastructure, scenarios, and databases to deliver an ITE.  
If an installation’s training infrastructure and framework for training are not adequate, then the 
ITE that is produced will be of a diminished capability.  Homestations with inadequate training 
infrastructure and framework for training may be required to spend limited funds on expensive 
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improvements before a fully functional ITE can be established.  By understanding the current 
state and ability of homestation training infrastructure and framework for training it may be 
easier to identify deficiencies that would hinder the ITE’s effectiveness.  Homestation training 
infrastructure should be configured and managed in a manner that supports the 2012 Army 
Training Strategy’s (ATS) directive to optimize training resources.  Framework for training 
scenarios should support ATS Operational Adaptability requirements.  
 Several tools are currently available that may assist in homestation scenario, database, 
and training support package development.  Common Framework of Scenarios (CFoS) is a set of 
11 regionally based scenarios that cover the full spectrum of conflict, permit the training of 
Decisive Action, and allow units to develop Operational Adaptability.  The Decisive Action 
Training Environment (DATE) is a composite model of the real world environment that provides 
units with the ability to replicate the contemporary operating environment and the structure of 
the opposing force.  TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) G2’s Training Brain 
Operations Center (TBOC) has been compiling training products from across the Army into a 
single database.  This database is not yet fully operational, but the TBOC will support units with 
robust training support packages upon request.  Joint Training Data Services (JTDS), developed 
by JFCM (Joint Forces Command) provides the ability to generate TADSS consumable 
databases. Early use of these tools would indicate that Army-provided solutions are starting to 
replace locally produced homestation solutions of the blended training era as the Army moves 
towards an ITE. 
 Gauging the understanding of LVC-IA’s role in the ITE will indicate whether or not the 
training community realizes that LVC-IA’s sole function is that of an integrating architecture.  It 
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is suspected that some members of the simulations training community believe that LVC-IA will 
also provide infrastructure, scenario, database, and training support package solutions.  
Homestations are not likely to pay much attention to problems with training infrastructure and 
framework for training if they believe that LVC-IA embodies the complete integrated training 
solution.  
 This research focuses on six specific areas: 
 1. The ability of current homestation training infrastructure to meet LVC-IA version 1 
requirements for establishment of the Army ITE. 
 2. The ability of training infrastructure to assist the homestation training community in 
optimizing training resources as directed by the Army Training Strategy. 
 3. The perceived level of homestation framework for training and its contents.  
 4. The ability of local training repository scenarios to assist the homestation training 
community in meeting the Operational Adaptability training requirements of the ATS. 
 5. Homestation training community awareness of emerging resources that can be 
leveraged to develop the framework for training and speed exercise design. 
 6. Accuracy of homestation training community perceptions regarding the role of LVC-
IA in establishing the Army ITE. 
Limitations 
 A survey-based method is proposed to evaluate responses from homestation training 
community members about the current state and ability of training infrastructure and framework 
for training.  Time, level of respondent participation, face to face access to the study population, 
the standardized format of questionnaires, context of data, and respondent bias are the limiting 
factors for the chosen method of research.  We do not possess the time or resources for travel to 
multiple Army installations to conduct personal interviews of homestation training community 
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members.  As participation in the survey is voluntary, the sample for this study will be self-
selected which may limit its size.  The questionnaire, which serves as the primary research 
instrument, is limited to questions of a general nature if it is to remain appropriate for all 
respondents.   Unlike direct observation and personal interviews, the standardized nature of 
questionnaires does not capture the context in which responses are made.   The current state of 
homestation training infrastructure and framework for training may be a controversial issue as it 
is likely to be tied to local budget decisions and politics.  Respondents who feel they have 
something to gain or lose may provide biased feedback.   
 The limitations stated above are typical of survey research and should not prevent this 
study from contributing to research literature.  It should still be possible to gain understanding of 
the current state and ability of homestation training infrastructure and framework for training and 
Education to support the ITE training methodology, as perceived by members of the homestation 
training community.  To increase participation, the U.S. Army Simulations Operations proponent 
office will announce the upcoming survey and describe the importance of this study to future 
Army training.  This announcement will be posted on SIMOPS NET, the Army simulation 
operations community’s main forum for collaboration. As this announcement will be authored by 
the Simulation Operations Proponent Officer, a respected member of the community, it will also 
serve as a letter of endorsement and recommendation.  All respondents will be ensured of 
anonymity during the informed consent process, which should encourage honest and unbiased 
answering of any questions viewed as controversial.  A pilot survey was conducted on 26 
October, 2012 with three senior U.S. Army Simulation Operations officers to ensure that 
standardized questions are not of an overly general nature and within the proper context.   
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Target Population 
 The target population of this research is represented by the homestation training 
communities of the fifteen installations designated to receive LVC-IA version 1 over the next 
four years.  Also included in the target population are the three Centers of Excellence (COE) that 
are being considered for LVC-IA version 1 fielding in 2017.  The three Combat Training Centers 
(CTC) and Army National Guard locations being considered for fielding in 2017 were excluded 
from the target population.  The CTCs do not represent homestation training activity and there is 
not yet a definitive list of future Army National Guard fielding locations.  Therefore a total of 
eighteen installations represent the target population of this study.  Figure 4 lists the 18 
installations of the target population and depicts their geographic location.  These 18 installations 
will utilize their existing homestation training infrastructures and framework for training in 
conjunction with a newly fielded integrating architecture to establish the Army ITE at their 
location.   
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Figure 4. Target Population: LVC-IA version 1 fielding sites 
 The homestation training community of each of these 18 installations is further broken 
down into “training facilitators” and “training users”.  Training facilitators are installation MTC 
(Mission Training Complex) Directors, Deputies, Plans Chiefs, Operations Chiefs, and LVC 
Coordinators.  These MTC staff members are responsible for enabling tenant unit training.  
Training facilitators are either Department of the Army M&S specialists (CP 36) or Army 
Simulation Operations Officers (FA 57).  Training users are the Army Simulation Operations 
Officers (FA 57) assigned to tenant brigade, division, and corps level units.  Simulation officers 
leverage the training capability provided by the local MTC to ensure that their unit’s training 
objectives are being accomplished.  These particular members of the Army training community 
have been chosen for their level of experience and understanding of operations and use of 
modeling and simulations to conduct collective training.  CP 36s and FA 57s  possesses the 
proper level of training and experience in simulations for training to accurately describe the 
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current state and ability of training infrastructure and framework for training to support an LVC-
IA delivered ITE. 
 CP 36s are typically retired field grade officers with operational and/or simulations 
experience at and above brigade echelon.  CP 36s without operational military experience must 
hold a B.S. in a simulations related field and are required to complete a two year internship with 
the Department of the Army before being assigned to a MTC.  Many are given the opportunity to 
earn advanced degrees in modeling and simulations.  
 FA 57s are commissioned Army officers in the grade of senior captain to colonel.  FA 
57s are well versed in the operational realm and understand how to conduct collective training of 
combined arms teams.  FA 57s are recruited from operational units and successful company 
command is a prerequisite for assignment to the simulation operations functional area.   
Simulations Operations officers are provided with initial training through the six week U.S. 
Army Simulations Operations Course and are given the opportunity to earn advanced degrees in 
modeling and simulations after their initial assignment.  
  The total number of Training facilitators from across the 18 surveyed Army installations 
that will be solicited for responses is 59.  The total number of training users from across the 18 
surveyed Army installations that will be solicited for responses is 102.  Assuming full 
participation from these two sub-groups of the homestation training community, a total of 161 
responses are expected. 
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A Priori Power Analysis 
 The “a priori” function of G*Power v3.1.5 software was used to estimate initial sample 
size.  G*Power is cost free statistical power analysis software introduced by Faul, Buchner, 
Erdfelder, and Lang in 2007. The “A priori” function of G*Power considers the required power 
level (1-β), the pre-specified significance level alpha, and the population effect size to be 
detected with probability (1-β) to compute an estimated minimum sample size required to 
conduct statistical tests (Faul et al., 2007).  It must be stressed that a priori power analysis only 
provides an estimated required sample size that is based on hypothetical data, prior to the actual 
experiment.  “Post hoc” power analysis will be conducted on observed data after the survey has 
been completed to determine observed power.  The “post hoc” function of G*Power considers 
alpha, the population effect size, and final sample size to compute the observed power (Faul et 
al., 2007).  Post hoc power analysis results will be discussed in Chapter 4.   
Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Analysis Design 
Research Question 1.  Does currently available homestation training infrastructure meet the 
requirements of LVC-IA version 1?  (SQ 2-4) 
H0 = Median number of each LVC-IA CDD version 1 training infrastructure requirement 
reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
Ha = Median number of each LVC-IA CDD version 1 training infrastructure requirement 
reported by the homestation training community population ≠ 1 
 Questions 2 through 4 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research question.  
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be conducted on responses for each of the ten training 
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infrastructure requirements to determine if reported level of homestation training infrastructure 
meets LVC-IA CDD requirements.  Each of the ten homestation training infrastructure 
requirements is represented by the ten sub-hypotheses listed below.  Cohen’s (1992) 
recommendation of a medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for 
analysis.  For this effect size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample 
size of 35 to achieve a power of .80 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  Post hoc G*Power 
analysis will be conducted on observed data after the survey has been completed to determine 
observed power. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (HITS-Homestation Instrumentation Training System):  Median 
number of HITS reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (CCTT-Close Combat Tactical Trainer): Median number of CCTT 
reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (RVTT-Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer): Median number of 
RVTT reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (AVCATT-Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer): Median 
number of AVCATT reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (CFFT-Call For Fire Trainer): Median number of CFFT reported by 
the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (JLCCTC-ERF-Joint Land Component Constructive Training 
Capability-Entity Resolution Federation): Median number of JLCCTC-ERF reported by the 
homestation training community population = 1 
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 Sub-hypothesis 7 (Permanent Simulation Network): Median number of permanent 
simulation networks reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (Persistent Tactical Networks): Median number of persistent tactical 
networks reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 9 (MTC Capable of Blending Brigade level LVC Training): Median 
number of MTCs capable of blending brigade level LVC training reported by the homestation 
training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 10 (Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of Battalion LFX): Median number 
of combined arms T.A.s capable of battalion LFX reported by the homestation training 
community population = 1 
Research Question 2.  Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure? (SQ 2-4) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
reporting of required homestation training infrastructure. 
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
reporting of required homestation training infrastructure.  
 Questions 2 through 4 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research question.  
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test will be utilized to determine significant differences between 
training facilitator and training user population reporting of the ten training infrastructure 
requirements.  Each of the ten homestation training infrastructure requirements is represented by 
the ten sub-hypotheses listed below.  Cohen’s (1992) recommendation of a medium effect size of 
.5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for analysis. For this effect size, alpha, and beta, 
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G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample size of 136 to achieve a power of .80 for the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  Post hoc G*Power analysis will be conducted on observed data 
after the survey has been completed to determine observed power. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (HITS-Homestation Instrumentation Training System): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of HITS. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (CCTT-Close Combat Tactical Trainer): There is no difference 
between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of CCTT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (RVTT-Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of 
RVTT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (AVCATT-Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of 
AVCATT 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (CFFT-Call For Fire Trainer): There is no difference between training 
facilitator population and training user population reporting of CFFT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (JLCCTC-ERF-Joint Land Component Constructive Training 
Capability-Entity Resolution Federation): There is no difference between training facilitator 
population and training user population reporting of JLCCTC-ERF. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (Permanent Simulation Network): There is no difference between 
training facilitator population and training user population reporting of permanent simulation 
networks. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 8 (Persistent Tactical Networks): There is no difference between training 
facilitator population and training user population reporting of persistent tactical networks. 
 Sub-hypothesis 9 (MTC Capable of Blending Brigade level LVC Training): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of MTCs 
capable of blending brigade level LVC training. 
 Sub-hypothesis 10 (Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of Battalion LFX): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of 
combined arms T.A.s capable of battalion LFX. 
Research Question 3.  In the training facilitator and training user populations, is the perceived 
ability of homestation training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”, as directed by the 
2012 Army Training Strategy, different from “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training 
Resources question? (SQ 11-18) 
H0 = For each population, there is no difference between perceived ability of training 
infrastructure and “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training Resources question 
Ha = For each population, there is a difference between perceived ability of training 
infrastructure and “Undecided” for any given question. 
 Questions 11 through 18 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research 
question.  The Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be utilized to determine significant differences 
between responses and ambivalence (“Undecided”) regarding the perceived ability of 
homestation training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”.  Each of the eight Optimize 
Training Resource survey questions is represented by the eight sub-hypotheses listed below.  
Cohen’s (1992) recommendation of a medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 
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will be used for analysis. For this effect size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” 
minimum sample size of 35 to achieve a power of .80 for the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  Post 
hoc G*Power analysis will be conducted on observed data after the survey has been completed to 
determine observed power. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FACILITIES):  For 
each population, there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 11 
(SQ 11) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 12 (SQ 12) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTALLATION OF 
TEMPORARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED):  For each population, there is 
no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 13 (SQ 13) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (MITIGATES TRAINING RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS):  For each 
population, there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 14 (SQ 
14) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (REQUIRES MINIMAL LEAD TIME, COORDINATION & 
RESOURCES):  For each population, there is no difference between Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 15 (SQ 15) and “Undecided”. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 6 (RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS):  For each 
population there, is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 16 (SQ 
16) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (CLEAR & CONCISE SYSTEM PRESENT TO SCHEDULE & 
COORDINATE):  For each population, there is no difference between Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 17 (SQ 17) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (FORUMS EXIST TO COORDINATE & DECONFLICT 
RESOURCES):  For each population, there is no difference between Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 18 (SQ 18) and “Undecided”.  
Research Question 4. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize training 
resources”? (SQ 11-18) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”. 
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”. 
 Questions 11 through 18 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research 
question.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test will be utilized to determine significant differences 
between training facilitator and training user population responses to all eight Optimize Training 
Resources Questions.  Each of the eight Optimize Training Resource survey questions is 
represented by the eight sub-hypotheses listed below.  Cohen’s (1992) recommendation of a 
medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for analysis. For this effect 
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size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample size of 136 to achieve a 
power of .80 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  Post hoc G*Power analysis will be 
conducted on observed data after the survey has been completed to determine observed power. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FACILITIES):  For 
Optimize Training Resources survey question 11 (SQ 11), there is no difference between 
populations.  
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING): For Optimize 
Training Resources survey question 12 (SQ 12), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTALLATION OF 
TEMPORARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED):  For Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 13 (SQ 13), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (MITIGATES TRAINING RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS): For 
Optimize Training Resources survey question 14 (SQ 14), there is no difference between 
populations.   
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (REQUIRES MINIMAL LEAD TIME, COORDINATION & 
RESOURCES): For Optimize Training Resources survey question 15 (SQ 15), there is no 
difference between populations.   
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS): For Optimize 
Training Resources survey question 16 (SQ 16), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (CLEAR & CONCISE SYSTEM PRESENT TO SCHEDULE & 
COORDINATE): For Optimize Training Resources survey question 17 (SQ 17), there is no 
difference between populations.   
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 Sub-hypothesis 8 (FORUMS EXIST TO COORDINATE & DECONFLICT 
HOMESTATION RESOURCES): For Optimize Training Resources survey question 18 (SQ 
18), there is no difference between populations.   
Research Question 5. Do homestations possess training product (training support packages, 
databases, scenarios) repositories? (SQ 19) 
 Question 19 of the survey found in Appendix C addresses this research question. Survey 
question 19 only permitted participants to respond “yes, “no”, or “I don’t know” when asked 
whether or not a training product repository exists at their homestation. Therefore, no hypothesis 
tests are associated with Research Question 5 and descriptive statistics are utilized to analyze 
survey question 19.  
Research Question 6. Are training facilitator and training user perceptions regarding the 
existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation training product repositories 
different from “Undecided? (SQ 21) 
H0 = For each population, there is no difference between perceived existence of TADSS 
consumable databases and “Undecided”. 
Ha = For each population, there is a difference between perceived existence of TADSS 
consumable databases and “Undecided”. 
  Question 21 of the survey found in Appendix C addresses this research question.  The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be utilized to determine significant differences between responses 
and ambivalence (“Undecided”) regarding the perceived existence of TADSS consumable 
databases within homestation training product repositories.  Cohen’s (1992) recommendation of 
a medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for analysis.  For this 
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effect size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample size of 35 to 
achieve a power of .80 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  Post hoc G*Power analysis will be 
conducted on observed data after the survey has been completed to determine observed power. 
Research Question 7. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within 
homestation training product repositories? (SQ 21) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
training product repositories.  
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
training product repositories 
 Question 21 of the survey found in Appendix C addresses this research question.  The 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test will be utilized to determine significant differences between 
training facilitator and training user population responses for survey question 21.  Cohen’s 
(1992) recommendation of a medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be 
used for analysis.  For this effect size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” 
minimum sample size of 136 to achieve a power of .80 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  
Post hoc G*Power analysis will be conducted on observed data after the survey has been 
completed to determine observed power. 
117 
 
Research Question 8. Are training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided”? (SQ 22) 
H0 = For each population, there is no difference between perceived existence of comprehensive 
training support packages and “Undecided”. 
Ha = For each population, there is a difference between perceived existence of comprehensive 
training support packages and “Undecided”. 
 Question 22 of the survey found in Appendix C addresses this research question.  The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be utilized to determine significant differences between responses 
and ambivalence (“Undecided”) regarding the perceived existence of comprehensive training 
support packages within homestation training product repositories.  Cohen’s (1992) 
recommendation of a medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for 
analysis.  For this effect size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample 
size of 35 to achieve a power of .80 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  Post hoc G*Power 
analysis will be conducted on observed data after the survey has been completed to determine 
observed power. 
Research Question 9. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages 
within homestation training product repositories? (SQ 22) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories.  
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Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories. 
 Question 22 of the survey found in Appendix C addresses this research question.  The 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test will be utilized to determine significant differences between 
training facilitator and training user population responses for survey question 22.  Cohen’s 
(1992) recommendation of a medium effect size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be 
used for analysis.  For this effect size, alpha, and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” 
minimum sample size of 136 to achieve a power of .80 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  
Post hoc G*Power analysis will be conducted on observed data after the survey has been 
completed to determine observed power. 
Research Question 10. In the training facilitator and training user populations, is the perceived 
ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the 
Army Training Strategy different from “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability 
question? (SQ 20, 23-27) 
H0 = For each population, there is no difference between perceived ability of training repository 
scenarios and “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question. 
Ha = For each population, there is a difference between perceived ability of training 
infrastructure and “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question. 
 Questions 20 and 23 through 27 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research 
question.  The Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be utilized to determine significant differences 
between responses and ambivalence (“Undecided”) regarding the perceived ability of training 
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repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training 
Strategy.  Each of the six Operational Adaptability survey questions is represented by the six 
sub-hypotheses listed below.  Cohen’s (1992) recommendation of a medium effect size of .5, an 
alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for analysis.  For this effect size, alpha, and beta, 
G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample size of 35 to achieve a power of .80 for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  Post hoc G*Power analysis will be conducted on observed data after 
the survey has been completed to determine observed power. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (REPLICATE OE & THREAT REQUIRED BY DECISIVE 
ACTION):  For each population, there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey 
question 20 (SQ 20) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 23 (SQ 23) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 24 (SQ 24) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (ACCOMMODATE DECISIVE ACTION DYNAMICS):  For each 
population, there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 25 (SQ 25) 
and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (PERMIT TRAINING OF WAS & CAM):  For each population, there 
is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 26 (SQ 26) and “Undecided”. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 6 (LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 27 (SQ 27) and 
“Undecided”. 
Research Question 11. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the 
Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy? (SQ 20, 23-27) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational 
Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy. 
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational 
Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy. 
 Questions 20 and 23 through 27 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research 
question.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test will be utilized to determine significant differences 
between training facilitator and training user population responses to all six Operational 
Adaptability questions.  Each of the six Operational Adaptability survey questions is represented 
by the eight sub-hypotheses listed below.  Cohen’s (1992) recommendation of a medium effect 
size of .5, an alpha of .05, and a beta of .2 will be used for analysis.  For this effect size, alpha, 
and beta, G*Power calculated an “a priori” minimum sample size of 136 to achieve a power of 
.80 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  Post hoc G*Power analysis will be conducted on 
observed data after the survey has been completed to determine observed power. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 1 (REPLICATE OE & THREAT REQUIRED BY DECISIVE 
ACTION):  For Operational Adaptability survey question 20 (SQ 20), there is no difference 
between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 23 (SQ 23), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 24 (SQ 24), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (ACCOMMODATE DECISIVE ACTION DYNAMICS): For 
Operational Adaptability survey question 25 (SQ 25), there is no difference between populations.  
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (PERMIT TRAINING OF WAS & CAM):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 26 (SQ 26), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 27 (SQ 27), there is no difference between populations.  
Research Question 12. Is the homestation training community aware of emerging resources that 
can be leveraged to develop the framework for training? (SQ 28-31) 
 Questions 28 through 31 of the survey found in Appendix C address this research 
question. Survey question 28 through 31only permitted participants to respond “yes, “no”, or “I 
don’t know” when asked whether or not a training product repository exists at their homestation. 
Therefore, no hypothesis tests are associated with Research Question 12 and descriptive statistics 
are utilized to analyze survey questions 28-31.  
Research Question 13. Do each of the homestation training community populations hold an 
accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in the Army ITE? (SQ 32)  
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 Question 32 of the survey found in Appendix C addresses this research question. There is 
no hypothesis test associated with Research Question 13 and descriptive statistics are utilized to 
analyze survey question 32.  In survey question 32, respondents are asked, “When fielded, which 
of the following components of the Army ITE will LVC-IA provide?  They are then provided 
with nine options and told to “check all that apply”.  The first option, “An IA that connects 
dissimilar TADSS in a persistent manner” is the true role of LVC-IA in delivering the Army 
ITE.  The remaining eight options to choose from are not functions of the LVC-IA. 
Research Design 
 An electronic survey (Appendix C) will be distributed to 59 training facilitators and 102 
training users currently posted to the 18 active component Army installations that are scheduled 
to receive LVC-IA fielding over the next four years.  The main focus of the survey is to describe 
the current state of training infrastructure and framework for training and its ability to support a 
LVC-IA delivered ITE from the home station training community’s perspective.  Additionally, 
the survey solicits information to gauge the accuracy of homestation perceptions regarding LVC-
IA’s role in the Army ITE and knowledge of emerging framework for training enablers. The 
survey is designed to answer the thirteen research questions and corresponding hypothesis listed 
above.   
 Question 1 of the survey identifies participants as a training facilitator or a training user.  
Facilitator and user responses will be compared during data analysis to determine if these two 
segments of the homestation training community share common views regarding: homestation 
training infrastructure; framework for training; the role of LVC-IA in the ITE; and emerging ITE 
enablers. 
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 Questions 2 through 10 are intended to confirm the current capability and capacity of 
homestation training infrastructure (LVC TADSS, Networks, and Facilities).  Responses will be 
compared to the LVC-IA Capability Development Document (CDD) to see if what is currently at 
homestation will support establishment of the Army ITE when version 1 of LVC-IA is fielded.  
Figure 7 shows all homestation training infrastructure requirements according to the LVC-IA 
CDD.  The infrastructure listed below must have the capacity to support simultaneous collective 
training of an entire brigade within a LVC-IA delivered ITE. 
 Questions 11 through 18 are indented to determine homestation training community 
perceptions regarding the ability of local training infrastructure to optimize training resources.  
The Army Training Strategy, published on 3 October, 2012, directs homestation leadership to 
“optimize training resources” (p. 8).  Local training infrastructure may or may not assist 
homestation leadership in making the most of limited training resources, depending on how it is 
configured and managed. 
 Questions 19, 21, and 22 are intended to confirm the currently available framework for 
training as can be found in locally maintained training product repositories typically maintained 
by the homestation MTC.  As described in Chapter 2, the framework for training is composed of 
the scenarios, TADSS consumable databases, and robust training support packages that are 
required to drive a training exercise.  Homestations are responsible for developing and 
maintaining local training product repositories, or framework for training, which is needed to 
establish the ITE.   
 Questions 20 and 23 through 27 are indented to determine homestation training 
community perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the 
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Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy.  The Army Training 
Strategy, published on 3 October, 2012, directs homestation leadership to train for “operational 
adaptability” (p. 5).  Scenarios found in local training repositories should faithfully replicate a 
hybrid threat as well as a complex and uncertain OE which allows tenant units to train for 
Decisive Action and the two core competencies of CAM and WAS.   
 Questions 28-31 are intended to discover homestation training community level of 
exposure to emerging resources useful in the development of homestation scenarios, databases 
and training support packages.   Potential solutions to identified gaps in the homestation 
framework for training lie in the combined use of CFoS, DATE, TBOC, and JTDS.  Current 
homestation training community knowledge and use of these enablers is unknown at this time. 
 Question 32 is intended to discover homestation training community perceptions 
regarding LVC-IA’s role in the ITE.  While LVC-IA is the foundation of the Army ITE, it only 
provides interoperability of dissimilar TADSS.  In addition to LVC-IA, successful establishment 
of the ITE requires the additional elements of training infrastructure and framework for training.  
LVC-IA cannot establish the ITE at homestation on its own.    
 Questions 33-37 gather demographic information for each respondent.  Respondents will 
be asked to provide information on: duty position, duty location, level operational experience, 
level of simulations experience, and level of simulations training. Survey participants will not be 
asked to provide any personally identifiable information in the demographic section. 
 On 26 October 2012 a pilot using a paper based survey was conducted with three senior 
ranking U.S. Army Simulation Operations Officers (FA 57) in Orlando, Florida.  The purpose of 
the pilot survey was to time the length it would take to complete, and obtain feedback on length, 
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format, and accuracy of doctrinal content.  The survey took the three officers approximately 40 
minutes to complete.  Several recommendations were made on length and format which were 
incorporated.  Several participants commented on recent changes in Army Doctrine and 
emerging training enablers useful in development of homestation scenarios, databases, and 
training support packages which were also incorporated.   
Data Collection Procedure 
 A variation of Dillman’s “four contacts” approach for survey implementation will be 
utilized during the data collection phase of this study (Dillman, 2000).  The intent of these 
multiple contacts is to maximize the response rates to mail and internet surveys. Dillman’s four 
contacts consist of a pre-notice letter, the survey itself, a postcard thank you / reminder, and a 
second replacement questionnaire (Dillman, 2000, pp. 150-184).  The four contacts utilized in 
this study’s data collection procedure will consist of: 
 1.  Announcement of the upcoming survey to the entire Army simulation operations 
community with a posting to SIMOPS NET.  SIMOPS NET is the Army simulation 
community’s main forum for collaboration. This message will be posted by the Army Simulation 
Operation’s Proponent Officer as part of a “Proponent Sends” message on 19 November 2012.  
Periodic “Proponent Sends” messages focus on issues that impact Army simulations and they are 
anticipated by the community.  The purpose of this posting is to build anticipation of the 
survey’s arrival within the community as a whole. 
 2.  Distribution of the electronic survey.  On 3 December 2012 all 161 potential 
respondents will receive an e-mail from the primary investigator, inviting them to participate in 
the survey.  All 161 potential respondents will be solicited through their U.S. Army e-mails to 
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participate in the electronic survey.  This e-mail will serve as the cover letter to the survey.  In 
accordance with Dillman, this cover letter will include: the formal request for respondent 
participation, purpose of the survey, explanation for their selection, usefulness of the survey, 
confidentiality, intended use of data, and primary investigator contact information for any 
inquiries.  A link provided at the bottom of the e-mail will take respondents to the survey which 
will be hosted on Army Research Institute, Orlando’s servers.  Upon clicking this link, the 
respondent will be presented with an informed consent page that describes survey objectives, 
participant rights, benefits of participation, risks, disclosure, confidentiality, voluntary 
participation, and intended use of data.  The informed consent can be found in Appendix B.   
After reading the informed consent page, prospective respondents can choose to participate by 
clicking an “I consent” button.  Upon clicking the “I consent” button the survey (Appendix C) 
will be presented by section with a brief explanation for each section.  Respondents will be asked 
to complete the 37 question survey by 21 December 2012. The U.S. Army Research Institute of 
Orlando provided DoD approved Vovici v6.4 software that was utilized to create the survey.  
Data collected through survey participant responses will be stored on secure servers located at 
the Army Research Institute, Orlando. 
 3. An e-mail reminder for those who do not respond by 9 December 2012.  On 10 
December 2012 an e-mail from the Director of the U.S. Army National Simulation Center will 
be sent out notifying any potential respondent who has not participated that they will have the 
opportunity to do so until 21 December 2012.  This e-mail will be of a cordial, non-
confrontational nature, and it will be reiterated that participation is completely voluntary.  
However, at the same time the importance of this survey and the data it will provide will also be 
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reiterated.  The link to the survey will also be attached to this e-mail.  The Director of the NSC is 
personally responsible for development of the Army ITE strategy.  He is also a highly recognized 
and respected member of the simulation operations community.  As such, he adds an increased 
level of credibility to this final request for participation.    
 4. Final e-mail reminder for those who do not respond by 16 December 2012.  On 17 
December 2012 a final e-mail reminder will be sent out, by the primary investigator, notifying 
any potential respondent who has not participated that they will have the opportunity to do so 
until 21 December 2012.  This e-mail will be of a cordial, non-confrontational nature, and it will 
be reiterated that participation is completely voluntary.  However, at the same time the 
importance of this survey and the data it will provide will also be reiterated.  The link to the 
survey will also be attached to this e-mail.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents the data utilized and analysis of 37 survey questions conducted to 
examine thirteen research questions.  Data from one or more survey question was used to support 
analysis of each research question.  The thirteen research questions were divided into six focus 
areas for this research.  The first four focus areas support the overarching goal of this thesis -to 
understand the current state and ability of training infrastructure and framework for training to 
support an LVC-IA delivered ITE from the homestation training community’s perspective.  The 
last two focus areas are designed to gauge homestation perceptions regarding the role of LVC-IA 
in establishing the ITE and knowledge of emerging exercise design resources.  Descriptive and 
inferential statistics were performed using SPSS v20.0 GradPack for Windows and Microsoft 
Excel.  Inferential statistical analysis was supplemented with both a priori and post hoc power 
analysis using G*Power v3.1.5.  Analysis sought to illustrate differences between training 
facilitator and training user perspectives. 
 Research Question 1-2 focus on the ability of current homestation training infrastructure 
to meet LVC-IA version 1 requirements for establishment of the Army ITE.  A hypothesis test 
was conducted on responses to survey questions 2-4 to determine whether homestation LVC 
TADSS, networks, and facilities, as reported by training facilitator and training user populations, 
meet the requirements prescribed by the LVC-IA version 1 Capability Development Document 
(CDD).  A second hypothesis test was conducted to determine if there is a difference between 
training facilitator and training user responses. 
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 Research Questions 3-4 focus on the ability of training infrastructure to assist the 
homestation training community in optimizing training resources.  The Army Training Strategy, 
published in October 2012, has directed trainers to mitigate resource limitations through 
increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities.  A hypothesis test was conducted 
on responses to survey questions 11-18 to analyze homestation training community perceptions 
regarding the ability of local training infrastructure to mitigate training resource issues.  A 
second hypothesis test was conducted to determine if there is a difference between training 
facilitator and training user responses. 
 Research Questions 5-9 focus on the current content of homestation framework for 
training as found in local training product repositories. Survey question 19 only permitted 
participants to respond “yes, “no”, or “I don’t know” when asked whether or not a training 
product repository exists at their homestation.  Therefore, no hypothesis tests are associated with 
Research Question 5 and descriptive statistics are utilized to analyze survey question 19.  A 
hypothesis test was conducted on responses to survey question 21 to analyze homestation 
training community perceptions regarding the level at which training product repositories contain 
TADSS consumable databases.  A second hypothesis test was conducted on survey question 21 
to determine if there is a difference between training facilitator and training user responses.  A 
hypothesis test was conducted on responses to survey question 22 to analyze homestation 
training community perceptions regarding the level at which training product repositories contain 
comprehensive training support packages.  A second hypothesis test was conducted on survey 
question 22 to determine if there is a difference between training facilitator and training user 
responses.   
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 Research Questions 10-11 focus on the ability of local training repository scenarios to 
assist the homestation training community in meeting Operational Adaptability training 
requirements.  The Army Training Strategy, published in October 2012, has stated that “training 
to develop adaptability is now the highest priority near-term goal”.  Operational Adaptability is 
defined as, “the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and 
situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions” (TRADOC PAM 525-3-0 The U.S. 
Army Capstone Concept, 2012).  A hypothesis test was conducted on responses to survey 
questions 20, 23-27 to analyze homestation training community perceptions regarding the ability 
of local training repository scenarios to assist in training for Operational Adaptability.  A second 
hypothesis test was conducted to determine if there is a difference between training facilitator 
and training user responses. 
 Research Question 12 focuses on describing homestation training community awareness 
of emerging resources that can be leveraged to develop the framework for training and speed 
exercise design.  Survey questions 30-33 only permitted participants to respond “yes, “no”, or “I 
don’t know” when asked whether or not CFoS (Common Framework of Scenarios), DATE 
(Decisive Action Training Environment), TBOC (Training Brain Operations Center), or JTDS 
(Joint Training Data Services) had been used in exercise design at their homestations.  Therefore, 
no hypothesis tests are associated with Research Question 12 and descriptive statistics are 
utilized to analyze survey questions 30-33. 
 Research Question 13 focuses on describing the accuracy of homestation perceptions 
regarding role of LVC-IA in establishing the Army ITE at homestation. .  There is no hypothesis 
test associated with this research question as descriptive statistics were utilized to analyze survey 
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questions 34-35. Survey responses from the homestation training community regarding the role 
of LVC-IA in establishing the Army ITE are reported in the context of the DRAFT Army ITE 
strategy, dated 3 April 2012.    
Data Collection 
 The target population for this research was the homestation training community of the 18 
active duty U.S. Army installations selected for LVC-IA fielding over the next four years.  These 
18 installations will utilize their existing homestation training infrastructures and framework for 
training in conjunction with a newly fielded integrating architecture to establish the Army ITE at 
their location.  A total of 161 members of the Army homestation training community have been 
identified at these 18 installations.   
 These 161 members of the homestation training community were further broken down 
into training facilitators and training user populations.  Training facilitators are MTC (Mission 
Training Complex), or COE (Center of Excellence) Directors, Deputies, Plans Chiefs, 
Operations Chiefs, LVC Coordinators.  Training facilitators are either Department of the Army 
M&S specialists (CP 36) or Army Simulation Operations Officers (FA 57), or Department of the 
Army Civilians (DAC).  These MTC and COE staff members are responsible for enabling tenant 
unit training. A total of 59 training facilitators were identified across the 18 homestations 
scheduled to receive LVC-IA.  Training users are the Army Simulation Operations Officers (FA 
57) assigned to tenant brigade, division, and corps level units.  Simulation officers leverage the 
training capability provided by the local MTC to ensure that their unit’s training objectives are 
being accomplished.  A total of 102 training users were identified across the 18 homestations 
scheduled to receive LVC-IA.  
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 All 161 potential respondents were solicited through their U.S. Army e-mail to participate 
in an electronic survey.   The U.S. Army Research Institute of Orlando provided the DoD 
approved Vovici v6.4 software that was utilized to create the survey and hosted it on their 
servers.  The survey can be found in Appendix C.   
 Communication was established with the U.S. Army Simulation Operations Proponent 
Office early in the data collection period.  This agency directly manages the placement of FA 57s 
and CP 36s at the 18 targeted installations.  The Proponent Office was instrumental in identifying 
all 161 potential respondents and provided the contact information for all solicitations.  All 
solicitations were conducted on the author’s personal computer through the Army’s .mil e-mail 
network. A variation of Dillman’s “four contacts” approach for survey implementation was 
utilized to maximize the response rates to this study’s internet surveys. (Dillman, 2000).  
 The first contact occurred on 19 November, 2012 with an announcement of the upcoming 
survey on SIMOPS NET, the Army simulation training community’s main forum for 
collaboration.  The announcement was posted by the Army Simulation Operations Proponent 
Officer and served to build anticipation of the survey’s arrival within the community as a whole. 
 The second contact occurred on 3 December, 2012 with the release of the survey and 
initial solicitation to all 161 potential respondents.  No technical difficulties were encountered 
during this first solicitation and the respondent contact list was confirmed as none of the 161 e-
mail invites to participate were returned by the .mil e-mail server.  Of the 161 members of the 
homestation training community invited, 56 participated, resulting in a 34.8% response rate.     
 The third contact occurred on 10 December, 2012 with an e-mail reminder, endorsed by 
the Director of the National Simulation Center (NSC), to all potential respondents who had not 
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yet participated.  As the Director of the NSC is personally responsible for development of the 
Army ITE strategy, his endorsement added an increased level of credibility to this reminder to 
participate.  No technical difficulties were encountered during this second solicitation.  At the 
end of this solicitation period, 74 out of 161 homestation training community members had 
participated, bringing the response rate up to 46%.   
 Due to the travel and vacation period associated with the Holidays, the fourth and final 
contact did not occur until 2 January, 2013, in the form of a final e-mail reminder to those who 
had not yet participated.  No technical difficulties were encountered during this final solicitation.  
When the survey closed on 9 January, 2013, 118 out of 161 homestation training community 
members had participated, resulting in a final response rate of 73.3%. 
 Of the 118 responses received, 81 surveys were answered completely, and 30 surveys 
were incomplete.  During review of the data, 11 of the 30 incomplete surveys were accepted for 
analysis.  While these 11 surveys had incomplete demographic sections, they provided the data 
required to analyze all twelve research questions.  In the end, 92 participant responses were 
accepted into the data pool for analysis.  The resulting response rate of the target population was 
57.1%, with a high of 86.4% for training facilitators and a low of 40.2% for training users.  
These response rates are indicated below in Table 1.  This response rate is typical of similar e-
mail surveys of federal employees, which averaged 51.6% and ranged between 37% and 61% 
(Shih & Fan, 2009). 
 The original data analysis plan intended to assess the initial variables of homestation 
location, and training facilitator/training user perspective.  However, 10 of the 92 surveys 
accepted for analysis are lacking in homestation demographic responses.  Additionally, members 
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of the homestation training community are not evenly distributed across the 18 installations 
scheduled to receive LVC-IA.  As an example, the MTC in Germany has 30 simulation 
professionals working at it, while the Fort Knox MTC only has one.  With incomplete data and 
single digit cell sizes it is not possible to determine statistical differences between the 18 
homestation locations.  Therefore, training facilitator versus training user perspective is the only 
variable assessed herein.  Table 2 represents the distribution of responses between training 
facilitators and training users.  Table 3 represents the frequency of responses of training 
facilitators and training users as a percentage of the total. 
Table 2. Response distribution by Facilitator/User population 
Population Sent Response Received Response Rate
Training Facilitator 59 59 51 0.864
Training User 102 102 41 0.402
Total 161 161 92 0.571  
Table 3. Frequency of responses as a percentage of the total 
Population Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Training Facilitator 51 55.4 55.4 55.4
Training User 42 44.6 44.6 100
Total 92 100 100  
Sample Population Demographics 
Duty Position 
 The Duty Position mode for the sample population was MTC Director.  There were no 
responses from Simulation Chiefs.  Two respondents failed to report their current duty position.  
Table 4 represents the distribution of the sample population by duty position. 
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Table 4. Distribution by duty position 
Duty Position Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
MTC Director 17 18.5 18.9 18.9
MTC Deputy Director 6 6.5 6.7 25.6
Plans Chief 3 3.3 3.3 28.9
Operations Chief 5 5.4 5.6 34.4
LVC Coordinator 3 3.3 3.3 37.8
Simulations Chief 0 0.0 0.0 37.8
FA 57, CP 36, or DAC assigned to a MTC 6 6.5 6.7 44.4
FA 57, CP 36, or DAC assigned to a COE 10 10.9 11.1 55.6
FA 57 assigned to a Brigade/Regiment 12 13.0 13.3 68.9
FA 57 assigned to a Division 9 9.8 10.0 78.9
FA 57 assigned to a Corps 9 9.8 10.0 88.9
Recently designated FA 57 10 10.9 11.1 100.0
Total 90 97.8 100.0
* Invalid response 2 2.2
Total 92 100  
Homestation 
 The sample population was bimodal in the Homestation demographic, as Fort Hood and 
the USAEUR (U.S. Army EUROPE) Simulation Center in Germany tied for the largest number 
of respondents, at eight each.  All 18 surveyed installations were represented in the final data 
pool.  However, ten respondents failed to report their duty station.  Table 5 represents the 
distribution of the sample population by homestation. 
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Table 5. Distribution by homestation 
Installation Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Alaska (Fort Wainright/Fort Richardson) 4 4.3 4.9 4.9
Fort Benning 4 4.3 4.9 9.8
Fort Bliss 6 6.5 7.3 17.1
Fort Bragg 3 3.3 3.7 20.7
Fort Campbell 5 5.4 6.1 26.8
Fort Carson 6 6.5 7.3 34.1
Fort Drum 5 5.4 6.1 40.2
Fort Hood 8 8.7 9.8 50.0
Fort Knox 1 1.1 1.2 51.2
Joint Base Lewis-McChord 5 5.4 6.1 57.3
Fort Polk 1 1.1 1.2 58.5
Fort Riley 2 2.2 2.4 61.0
Fort Rucker 4 4.3 4.9 65.9
Schofield Barracks 7 7.6 8.5 74.4
Fort Sill 4 4.3 4.9 79.3
Fort Stewart 2 2.2 2.4 81.7
USAREUR (JMTC/JMSC) 8 8.7 9.8 91.5
Korea (KBSC) 7 7.6 8.5 100.0
Total 82 89.1 100.0
* Invalid response 10 10.9
Total 92 100.0  
Level of Operational Experience 
 The Level of Operational Experience mode for the sample population was Division and 
Above.  There were no responses at the Team/Squad and Platoon levels.  Three respondents 
failed to report their highest level of operational experience.  Table 6 represents the distribution 
of the sample population by level of operational experience. 
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Table 6. Distribution by level of operational experience 
Level of Operational 
Experience
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 6 6.5 6.7 6.7
Team/Squad 0 0 0 6.7
Platoon 0 0 0 6.7
Company/Troop 6 6.5 6.7 13.5
Battalion/Squadron 7 7.6 7.9 21.3
Brigade/Regiment 28 30.4 31.5 52.8
Division & Above 42 45.7 47.2 100.0
Total 89 96.7 100.0
* Invalid response 3 3.3
Total 92 100.0  
Years of Simulation Experience 
 The Years of Simulation Experience mode for the sample population was Over 10 Years.  
Two respondents failed to report their number of years in simulation operations.  Table 7 
represents the distribution of the sample population by years of simulation experience. 
Table 7. Distribution by years of simulation experience 
Years of 
Simulation 
Experience
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 10 10.9 11.1 11.1
1-2 years 12 13.0 13.3 24.4
3-4 years 10 10.9 11.1 35.6
5-6 years 16 17.4 17.8 53.3
7-8 years 11 12.0 12.2 65.6
9-10 years 8 8.7 8.9 74.4
Over 10 years 23 25.0 25.6 100.0
Total 90 97.8 100.0
* Invalid response 2 2.2
Total 92 100.0  
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Highest level of M&S Training/Education 
 The Level of M&S Education mode for the sample population was SOC/BCOIC 
(Simulation Operations Course/Battle Command Officer Integration Course).  There were no 
responses at the PhD level.  All respondents completed this survey question.  Table 8 represents 
the distribution of the sample population by level of M&S education. 
Table 8. Distribution by level of M&S education 
Level of M&S 
Education
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 27 29.3 29.3 29.3
SOC/BCOIC 38 41.3 41.3 70.7
ADV SOC 9 9.8 9.8 80.4
B.S. 4 4.3 4.3 84.8
CP 36 Internship 2 2.2 2.2 87.0
M.S. 12 13.0 13.0 100.0
PhD 0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
Test for Homogeneity 
 Homogeneity tests by homestation training community population (facilitator/user) were 
conducted to validate the quantity of “e-mail response rate” (expected) to “e-mail received rate” 
(observed).  The purpose of a homogeneity test is to determine whether or not frequency count 
distribution is the same across more than one population (Conover, 1999).  Comparison of the 
training facilitator and training user populations revealed significant counts and a lack of 
homogeneity.  Tests resulted in: Pearson X2 (1, N = 161) = 32.642, p = .000, and Cramers V = 
.450.  Received e-mails are not representative of the population as the count of e-mails received 
is significantly different from the count of e-mails sent.  E-mails received served as the basis for 
all research question analysis.  A possible explanation for this lack of homogeneity may be the 
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large differences in training facilitator and training user population size.  The training facilitator 
population consists of 59 potential respondents while the training user population consists of 102 
potential respondents.  Another possibility may be differences in overall motivation of the 
populations to participate in the survey with the facilitator population more motivated than the 
user population.  None the less, this lack of homogeneity is not seen as undermining the results 
of this research.  Response levels of the facilitator population exceeded normal response levels.  
Higher than normal response levels are not considered as undermining the research.  At the same 
time, user response levels were still within past similar e-mail surveys of DoD employees as 
stated above.  Table 9 represents overall homogeneity counts by population.   
Table 9. Overall homogeneity by population 
Emails sent 
(Expected)
Emails received 
(Observed)
Count 8 51 59
Expected Count 25.3 33.7 59
% within Pop. 13.6 86.4 100
Count 61 41 102
Expected Count 43.7 58.5 102
% within Pop. 59.8 40.2 100
Count 69 92 161
Expected Count 69 92 161
% within Pop. 42.9 57.1 100
Total
Facilitator Population
User Population
Total
Overall by Population
 
Reliability of Population Responses 
 Survey questions 11-18 were grouped together to answer Research Questions 3 and 4, 
which dealt with homestation training community perceptions regarding the ability of training 
infrastructure to “optimize training resources”, as directed by the 2012 Army Training Strategy.  
Survey questions 20, 23-27 were grouped together to answer Research Questions 10 and 11, 
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which dealt with homestation training community perceptions regarding the ability of training 
repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training 
Strategy.  Cronbach’s alpha test was conducted to test reliability of population responses for 
these two groupings of survey questions.   
 The resulting alpha indicates level of relationship between test items (survey questions).  
An alpha closer to .00 would suggest an absence of relationship between test items.  An alpha 
closer to 1.00 would suggest a high level of relationship between test items.  According to Kline 
(1999), α ≥ 0.9 is excellent, 0.8 ≤ α < 0.9 is good, 0.7 ≤ α < 0.8 is acceptable, 0.6 ≤ α < 0.7 is 
questionable, 0.5 ≤ α < 0.6 is poor, and α < 0.5 is unacceptable. 
 The resulting alpha for the test conducted on survey questions 11-18 (Optimize Training 
Resources) was .614.  According to Kline (1999), this alpha suggests that the relationship 
between these eight survey questions and reliability of responses is questionable.  Table 10 is the 
SPSS output of the Cronbach’s alpha test conducted on survey questions 11-18. 
Table 10. Chronbach's alpha test for survey questions 11-18 (Optimize Training) 
 
 The resulting alpha for the test conducted on survey questions 20, 23-27 (Operational 
Adaptability) was .557.  According to Kline (1999), this alpha suggests that the relationship 
between these eight survey questions and reliability of responses is poor.  Table 11 is the SPSS 
output of the Cronbach’s alpha test conducted on survey questions 20, 23-27. 
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Table 11. Chronbach's alpha test for survey questions 20, 23-27 (Operational Adaptability) 
 
 A possible explanation for these low alphas may be the highly localized nature of blended 
training at each of the 18 homestations that participated in the survey.  Homestation training 
community members may look at and answer these groups of questions differently as brigade 
types (Stryker, Light, Heavy, etc.) vary between installations and each is dealing with installation 
specific training resource constraints.  Due to this fact, commonality of blended LVC solutions 
between the 18 installations is unlikely.  Commonality between homestations is one of the aims 
of an LVC-IA delivered ITE. Research Questions 3, 4, 10, and 11 will be analyzed in this 
chapter for informational purposes.  However, due to poor Chronbach’s alpha results, they will 
not be included in the conclusions of Chapter 5.   
A Priori and Post Hoc Power Analysis 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, power analysis up to this point has been conducted “a priori”, 
utilizing hypothetical data to estimate a minimum sample size required to uniformly conduct 
statistical tests of the hypothesis for an alpha of .05 and achieve a desired power of .8 or greater.  
Since theoretical power standards had already been set for the overall experiment for medium 
effect size, alpha of .05, and beta of .2, no further a priori analysis is done, except where the 
sample size did not meet specified sample size requirements.  Further, upon completion of the 
survey, observed, non-theoretical data became available for power analysis.  The “post hoc” or 
“after the fact” function of G*Power was utilized to compute the observed power, given alpha, 
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the population effect size, and final sample size.  Resulting observed beta and observed power 
are summarized and included in the analysis of each research question below.  
Alpha and Beta Values for Type 1 and Type 2 Error Assessment 
 Type 1 error, or alpha error, is the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis.  To 
prevent the occurrence of a false positive, low levels, or alphas are set for rejection of the null 
hypothesis.  Type 2 error, or beta error, is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis.  To prevent 
the occurrence of a false negative, larger, rather than smaller sample sizes are sought.  Beta 
complements Power (1‐β).  As an example, if β = .20, then Power = .80. (Sheskin, 2004).  
 As recommended by Cohen (1992), all analysis was conducted with an alpha value of .05 and a 
beta value of .2.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis 
unless tests of significance give p values that are less than or equal to .05.  At the same time, in 
order to reject the null and accept the alternative, post hoc power analysis must produce an 
observed power that does not exceed .80, which would equate to an observed β of .2 or less. If 
either test alpha or beta exceeds the thresholds described above, we conduct further analysis as 
discussed below.  SPSS v20.0 for Windows GradPack, Microsoft Excel, and G*Power v3.1.5 
were utilized to analyze all research questions. 
Analysis of Research Questions 
Research Question 1.  Does currently available homestation training infrastructure meet the 
requirements of LVC-IA version 1?  (SQ 2-4) 
H0 = Median number of each LVC-IA CDD version 1 training infrastructure requirement 
reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
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Ha = Median number of each LVC-IA CDD version 1 training infrastructure requirement 
reported by the homestation training community population ≠ 1 
 The original intent was to analyze the current state of training infrastructure at each of the 
18 homestations scheduled for LVC-IA fielding.  However, demographic data was lacking in the 
“homestation location” category and it is not possible to conduct analysis on the current 
disposition of LVC TADSS, networks and facilities at the installation level.  Therefore, analysis 
is limited to the training facilitator and training user population demographic.  
 Additional data concerning the capacity of homestation training infrastructure was 
collected, but not utilized in the analysis of this research question.  This data can be found in 
Appendix D.   Survey questions 5-10, which were utilized to collect this data, can be found in 
Appendix C.   
 The LVC-IA CDD prescribes the training infrastructure (TADSS, networks, and 
facilities) required at homestation to ensure successful establishment of the Army ITE when 
LVC-IA is fielded.  Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a check 
box question format to indicate which required training infrastructure elements are currently 
available at their installation. Despite being a requirement of the LVC-IA CDD data was not 
collected on the constructive TADSS of OneSAF. As previously discussed, JLCCTC-ERF v 6.0, 
which uses OneSAF as its maneuver driver, failed VV&A.  Therefore, OneSAF is not currently 
in use at homestation MTCs.   Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine whether 
or not current homestation training infrastructure meets LVC-IA CDD requirements.  Survey 
questions 2 through 4 support the following ten sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix C. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 1 (HITS-Homestation Instrumentation Training System):  Median 
number of HITS reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (CCTT-Close Combat Tactical Trainer): Median number of CCTT 
reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (RVTT-Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer): Median number of 
RVTT reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (AVCATT-Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer): Median 
number of AVCATT reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (CFFT-Call For Fire Trainer): Median number of CFFT reported by 
the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (JLCCTC-ERF-Joint Land Component Constructive Training 
Capability-Entity Resolution Federation): Median number of JLCCTC-ERF reported by the 
homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (Permanent Simulation Network): Median number of permanent 
simulation networks reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (Persistent Tactical Networks): Median number of persistent tactical 
networks reported by the homestation training community population = 1 
 Sub-hypothesis 9 (MTC Capable of Blending Brigade level LVC Training): Median 
number of MTCs capable of blending brigade level LVC training reported by the homestation 
training community population = 1 
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 Sub-hypothesis 10 (Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of Battalion LFX): Median number 
of combined arms T.A.s capable of battalion LFX reported by the homestation training 
community population = 1 
 A one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted on responses for each of the ten 
training infrastructure requirements.  This test was utilized because the data set was ordinal and a 
non-parametric test for a one sample case was required.  The median responses for all ten LVC-
IA CDD requirements were compared to a hypothesized median of 1.  A median response equal 
to 1 would suggest that the homestation training community population report possession of a 
particular LVC-IA CDD requirement. An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis 
of Research Question 1.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  Differences 
revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the unaided human eye, and a large 
effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  The final population sample size of 92 
more than meets the estimated minimum sample size requirement of 35 that was generated by a 
priori G*Power analysis for a medium effect size, alpha of .05, and beta of .2.  Post hoc 
G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 12 summarizes the results for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and G*Power post hoc 
power analysis for sub-hypotheses 1-10.   The first column lists the ten required homestation 
training infrastructure requirements.  Columns through four present alpha values, p values, 
observed beta values, and observed power.  The color red indicates that test results show a 
particular training infrastructure requirement is not ready for establishment of an LVC-IA 
delivered ITE. The color amber indicates that readiness is undecided.  The color green indicates 
that training infrastructure is ready.   
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 Table 13 presents the distribution of the mean quantity for each training infrastructure 
requirement, as reported by the sample population.  The first column lists the three major 
categories of training infrastructure.  The rows following each of these categories shows how the 
training infrastructure requirements are distributed within the category by listing them from 
lowest to highest mean quantity reported.  The final cell in each column indicates the objective 
mean quantity for each training infrastructure requirement, which is one.   
Table 12. Does currently available homestation training infrastructure meet the requirements of LVC-IA 
version 1? (RQ1) 
 
 
Statistical Inference
Training Infrastructure Not Ready
Training Infrastructure Ready
Table Legend
Undecided
 
 
α = .05                                                   
p values
β Power (1-β)
SH 1: HITS p < .001 0 1
SH 2: CCTT p < .001 0 1
SH 3: RVTT p < .001 0.001 0.999
SH 4: AVCATT p < .001 0 1
SH 5: CFFT p < .001 0.001 0.999
SH 6: JLCCTC-ERF p < .001 0.001 0.999
SH 7: Permanent 
Simulation Network
p < .001 0 1
SH 8: Persistent Tactical 
Network
p < .001 0 1
SH 9: MTC capable of 
blending BDE level LVC 
Training
p < .001 0.018 0.982
SH 10: Combined Arms 
T .A.s capable of BN LFX
p < .001 0.001 0.999
Homestation Training Infrastructure 
Requirement
Entire Sample (N=92)
NETWORKS
LVC TADSS
FACILITES
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Table 13. Distribution of mean quantity reported for: Does currently available homestaion training infrastructure meet the requirements of LVC-IA 
version 1? (RQ1) 
LVC TADSS
HITS       
.3696
CCTT      
.4831
AVCATT 
.6087
RVTT      
.6739
CFFT       
.6848
JLCCTC-ERF 
.7391
1
Networks 1
Facilities 1
Tactical Network                                         
.4457
Simulation Network                                     
.5652
T.A.s Capable of BN LFX                          
.6957
MTC Capable of Blending BDE Level LVC 
Training                                                        
.8370
Objective Mean 
Quantity For 
Each 
Requirement
Homestation 
Training 
Infrastructure 
Requirement
Lowest Mean 
Quantity 
Reported
Highest 
Mean 
Quantity 
Reported
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Research Question 1 Summary and Analysis 
 As displayed in Table 12, resulting p values do not exceed the significance level of .05 
and beta error does not exceed .2.  Therefore, we can reject the null for all sub-hypotheses, as 
well as the null for the main hypothesis.  None of the ten required training infrastructure 
requirements reported by the homestation training community population has a median equal to 
one.  It would appear that training infrastructure is not ready for the fielding of LVC-IA and 
establishment of the ITE at homestation.   
 The mean quantity reported for all ten training infrastructure requirements, as shown in 
Table 13, is less than one.  Additionally, Table 13 indicates that the highest mean quantities 
reported, by training infrastructure category, were found in JLCCTC-ERF, Simulation Network, 
and MTCs Capable of Blending BDE Level LVC Training.   It is interesting that the training 
infrastructure with the highest mean quantity reported is located at or emanates from the MTC.  
All other training infrastructure requirements, with lower mean quantities reported, may be 
distributed across the installation at various locations, decreasing their visibility to the 
homestation training community population.   Higher mean quantity reported for these three 
elements of training infrastructure could be associated with the higher visibility afforded by 
collocation with the MTC.    
 It should also be pointed out that even though many respondents reported the absence of 
LVC TADSS at their homestation, this does not mean that they will not receive them prior to 
fielding of LVC-IA.   Each of the LVC TADSS considered in this research question has its own 
acquisition and fielding schedule which may or may not aligned with the fielding of LVC-IA at a 
particular installation.    With that said, it is imperative that all deficient LVC TADSS are fielded 
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prior to the fielding of LVC-IA.  Successful establishment of the ITE at homestation is 
dependent on the successful fielding of all LVC-IA CDD required training infrastructure prior to 
the fielding of LVC-IA. 
Research Question 2.  Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure? (SQ 2-4) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
reporting of required homestation training infrastructure. 
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
reporting of required homestation training infrastructure.  
 The LVC-IA CDD prescribes the training infrastructure (TADSS, networks, and 
facilities) required at homestation to ensure successful establishment of the Army ITE when 
LVC-IA is fielded.  Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a check 
box question format to indicate which required training infrastructure elements are currently 
available at their installation.  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine whether 
or not a difference exists between training facilitator and training user reporting.  Survey 
questions 2 through 4 support the following ten sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix C. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (HITS-Homestation Instrumentation Training System):  There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of HITS. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (CCTT-Close Combat Tactical Trainer): There is no difference 
between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of CCTT. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 3 (RVTT-Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of 
RVTT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (AVCATT-Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of 
AVCATT 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (CFFT-Call For Fire Trainer): There is no difference between training 
facilitator population and training user population reporting of CFFT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (JLCCTC-ERF-Joint Land Component Constructive Training 
Capability-Entity Resolution Federation): There is no difference between training facilitator 
population and training user population reporting of JLCCTC-ERF. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (Permanent Simulation Network): There is no difference between 
training facilitator population and training user population reporting of permanent simulation 
networks. 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (Persistent Tactical Networks): There is no difference between training 
facilitator population and training user population reporting of persistent tactical networks. 
 Sub-hypothesis 9 (MTC Capable of Blending Brigade level LVC Training): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of MTCs 
capable of blending brigade level LVC training. 
 Sub-hypothesis 10 (Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of Battalion LFX): There is no 
difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting of 
combined arms T.A.s capable of battalion LFX. 
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 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was conducted to compare training facilitator and 
training user population response medians for each of the ten training infrastructure 
requirements. This test was chosen as a non-parametric t test to detect differences between two 
independent samples was required.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of 
Research Question 2.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  Differences 
revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the unaided human eye, and a large 
effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  The final population sample size of 92 did 
not meet the estimated minimum sample size requirement of 136 that was generated by a priori 
G*Power analysis for an alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  Additional a priori 
analysis, as shown in Figure 5 below, indicates that an alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 can only be 
maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this research question.  Post hoc 
G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
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Figure 5. A priori G*Power output demonstrating large effect size dictated by observed sample size 
 Table 14 summarizes the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and G*Power post 
hoc power analysis for sub-hypotheses 1-10.  The first column lists the two homestation training 
community population samples.  Columns three thru four provide alpha values, p values, 
observed beta, and observed power under the heading of each required element of training 
infrastructure.  The color red indicates that a difference was detected between facilitator and user 
population reporting of required training infrastructure.  The color green indicates that no 
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difference was detected.  Any p values or beta values that exceed established thresholds for alpha 
and beta error are indicated by bold text.   
 Table 15 presents the actual mean quantity reported for each training infrastructure 
requirement by population sample.  The first column lists the ten required homestation training 
infrastructure requirements.  Columns two through three present the actual mean quantity of each 
training infrastructure requirement as reported by the facilitator and user samples.  The color red 
indicates where facilitator and user reporting do not agree.  The color green indicates where 
facilitator and user reporting do agree. 
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Table 14. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting 
of required homestation training infrastructure? (RQ2)  
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed Power (1-
β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed Power (1-
β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed Power (1-
β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed Power (1-
β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed Power (1-
β)
Facilitator
User
0.921 0.079p = .015 0.2 0.8 0.813
0.62 0.38
SH 9: MTC Capable of BDE Level LVC Trng SH 10: Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of BN LFX
p <.001 0.028 0.972 p = .170
0.025 0.975
SH 7: Permanent Simulation Network SH 8: Persistent Tactical Network
p = 0.629 0.881 0.119 p <.001
0.495 0.505
SH 5: CFFT SH 6: JLCCTC-ERF
p = 0.468 0.827 0.173 p = 0.091
SH 3: RVTT SH 4: AVCATT
p = 0.264 0.713 0.287 p = 0.726 0.904 0.096
SH 1: HITS SH 2: CCTT
 
Table Legend
See the World the Same
See Things Differently
Statistical Inference of Level of Community Agreement
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Table 15. Mean quantity response, by population sample for: Is there a difference between training facilitator 
population and training user population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure? (RQ2) 
HITS
CCTT
RVTT
AVCATT
CFFT
JLCCTC-ERF
Permanent 
Simulation Network
Persistent Tactical 
Network
MTC capable of 
blending BDE level 
LVC TrainingCombined Arms 
T .A.s capable of BN 
LFX
0.7059 0.6341
0.7059
Homestation Training 
Infrastructure Requirement
User Sample (N=41)
Mean Quantity Reported Mean Quantity Reported
Facilitator Sample (N=51)
0.3171
0.6585
0.8824 0.561
NETWORKS
0.7255 0.3659
0.5098 0.3659
LVC TADSS
0.4314
0.6863 0.5122
0.4423 0.4878
FACILITES
0.9216 0.7317
0.7059 0.6829
 
 Research Question 2 Summary and Analysis 
 Of the ten training infrastructure elements required by the LVC-IA CDD: JLCCT-ERF, 
Permanent Simulation Network, and MTC Capable of Blending BDE Level Training were the 
only elements found to have a statistically significant different large effect size between training 
facilitator and training user population response medians.  The p values did not exceed the .05 
threshold and the observed beta values did not exceed the .2 threshold for all three of these sub-
hypotheses. Therefore, we reject the null and accept the alternative for these three sub-
hypothesis. The remaining seven sub-hypotheses had alpha and beta errors that exceed analysis 
thresholds.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null for these seven remaining sub-hypotheses.   
 The large differences in mean quantity reported between populations for the three sub-
hypotheses that rejected the null is displayed in Table 15   The mean quantity reported for all 
three of these training infrastructure requirements was higher in the facilitator sample. This may 
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be attributed to the fact that all three of these elements of training infrastructure inherently 
belong to and are controlled by training facilitators.   Training user contact with these three 
elements would not be as prevalent which may explain lower response averages.   
 Even though we failed to reject the null for seven out of ten sub-hypothesis, we must still 
reject the null for the main hypothesis.  There is a difference between training facilitator 
population and training user population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure.   
Research Question 3.  In the training facilitator and training user populations, is the perceived 
ability of homestation training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”, as directed by the 
2012 Army Training Strategy, different from “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training 
Resources question? (SQ 11-18) 
H0 = For each population there is no difference between perceived ability of training 
infrastructure and “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training Resources question 
Ha = For each population there is a difference between perceived ability of training 
infrastructure and “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training Resources question. 
 Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal 
scale to answer eight questions that measured their perceptions regarding the ability of training 
infrastructure to “optimize training resources”, as directed by the 2012 Army Training Strategy.  
The seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 16.  
Table 16. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine facilitator and user population 
ambivalence for each of the eight survey questions that pertain to this research question.  A 
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response of “4” from the seven point scale indicates that the respondent is “Undecided”.  Survey 
Questions 11-18, that support the following eights sub-hypotheses can be found in Appendix C.   
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FACILITIES):  For 
each population there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 11 
(SQ 11) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING):  For each population 
there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 12 (SQ 12) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTALLATION OF 
TEMPORARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED):  For each population there is 
no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 13 (SQ 13) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (MITIGATES TRAINING RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS):  For each 
population there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 14 (SQ 
14) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (REQUIRES MINIMAL LEAD TIME, COORDINATION & 
RESOURCES):  For each population there is no difference between Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 15 (SQ 15) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS):  For each 
population there is no difference between Optimize Training Resources survey question 16 (SQ 
16) and “Undecided”. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 7 (CLEAR & CONCISE SYSTEM PRESENT TO SCHEDULE & 
COORDINATE):  For each population there is no difference between Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 17 (SQ 17) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (FORUMS EXIST TO COORDINATE & DECONFLICT 
RESOURCES):  For each population there is no difference between Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 18 (SQ 18) and “Undecided”.  
 All eight Optimize Training Resources questions were evaluated against a hypothesized 
median of ambivalence, which was represented by “4” (Undecided).  Level of ambivalence in the 
subjective responses to all eight questions was determined by the seven point ordinal scale 
shown in Table 16.  The one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was utilized to determine 
significant differences between responses and ambivalence within populations, as the data set 
was ordinal and a non-parametric test for a one sample case was required.  An alpha of .05 and a 
beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 3.  A medium effect size was desired 
for analysis of data.  Differences revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the 
unaided human eye, and a large effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  The final 
population sample size of 92 more than meets the estimated minimum sample size requirement 
of 35 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was 
conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.  Chronbachs’ alpha results 
have shown that the reliability of responses between survey questions 11-18 is questionable.  
Therefore, the analysis conducted for this research question will not be included in the 
conclusions of Chapter 5.  It is provided here for informational purposes only. 
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 Table 17 summarizes the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and G*Power post hoc 
power analysis for sub-hypotheses 1-8.  The first column lists the eight Optimize Training 
Resource questions compared to “Undecided”.  The second and third columns provide alpha 
values, p values, observed beta values, and observed power by population sample. The color red 
indicates that training infrastructure does not optimize training resources.  The color amber 
indicates undecided.  The color green indicates that training infrastructure does optimize training 
resources.  Any p values or beta values that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta 
error are indicated by bold text. 
 Table 18 presents the seven point ordinal scale answer choice that the facilitator and user 
response averages were closest to for each Optimize Training Resources question.   The first 
column lists the eight Optimize Training Resource questions compared to “Undecided”.  The 
second and third columns provide the closest ordinal scale answer choices, from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, for the training facilitator and training user population samples.  
The color red indicates a negative response average.  The color amber represents an undecided 
response average.  The color green indicates a positive response average.  An asterisk is placed 
on each side of the response average to indicate when it differs from the color code displayed. 
Difference between the response average and color code in this table may be caused by reverse-
wording of questions or large beta error that requires that we fail to reject the null despite 
response averages that are different from “Undecided”.  Additionally, cluster bar charts 
displaying the type and frequency of responses, by population, for each of the Optimize Training 
Resources questions can be found in Appendix F.   
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Table 17. In the training facilitator and training user populations, is the perceived ability of homestation training infrastructure to “optimize training 
resources”, as directed by the 2012 Army Training Strategy, different from “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training Resources question? (RQ3) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
SH 1: FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FACILITIES to Undecided p < .001 0.001 0.999 p < .001 0.001 0.999
SH 2: AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING to Undecided p < .001 0.009 0.991 p = .030 0.396 0.604
SH 3: SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTALLATION to Undecided p = .216 0.731 0.269 p = .443 0.903 0.097
SH 4: MITIGATES TRAINING RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS from Undecided p < .001 0.002 0.998 p < .001 0.016 0.984
SH 5: REQUIRES MINIMAL LEAD TIME, COORDINATION & RESOURCES to Undecided p = .047 0.511 0.489 p = .004 0.132 0.868
SH 6: RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS to Neutral p = .526 0.889 0.111 p = .635 0.929 0.071
SH 7: CLEAR & CONCISE SYSTEM PRESENT TO SCHEDULE & COORDINATE to Undecided p = .004 0.142 0.858 p = .018 0.303 0.697
SH 8: FORUMS EXIST TO COORDINATE & DECONFLICT RESOURCES to Undecided p < .001 0.002 0.998 p < .001 0 1
Perceived Ability of Homestation Training Infrastructure to Optimize Training 
Resources
Facilitator Sample (N=51) User Sample (N=41)
 
Table Legend
Statistical Inference
Does Not Optimize Training Resources
Undecided
Optimizes Training Resources  
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Table 18. Response averages for: In the training facilitator and training user populations, is the perceived ability of homestation training infrastructure 
to “optimize training resources”, as directed by the 2012 Army Training Strategy, different from “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training 
Resources question? (RQ3) 
SH 1: FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FACILITIES to Undecided
SH 2: AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING to Undecided
SH 3: SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTALLATION to Undecided
SH 4: MITIGATES TRAINING RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS from Undecided
SH 5: REQUIRES MINIMAL LEAD TIME, COORDINATION & RESOURCES to Undecided
SH 6: RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS to Undecided
SH 7: CLEAR & CONCISE SYSTEM PRESENT TO SCHEDULE & COORDINATE to Undecided
SH 8: FORUMS EXIST TO COORDINATE & DECONFLICT RESOURCES to Undecided Somewhat Agree Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Undecided Undecided
Somewhat Agree *Somewhat Agree*
User Sample                            
Repsonse Average
Perceived Ability of Homestation Training Infrastructure to Optimize Training 
Resources
Facilitator Sample                     
Response Average
Somewhat Agree Somewhat Agree
*Somewhat Disagree*
Agree Somewhat Agree
*Somewhat Disagree* *Strongly Disagree*
Undecided Undecided
 
*Response Average Differs From Color Code*
Positive Response
Undecided
Negative Response
Table Legend
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Research Question 3 Summary and Analysis 
 Chronbachs’ alpha results have shown that the reliability of responses between survey 
questions 11-18 is questionable; therefore statistical assessment of the overall research question 
is not valid. 
 For sub-hypotheses associated with individual survey questions, Table 17 shows that the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test gave p values that exceeded the threshold of .05 for sub-hypotheses 3 
and 6.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null for sub-hypotheses 3 and 6, and assume that the 
populations are “undecided” about these concerns.  We reject the null and accept the alternative 
for sub-hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, whose alpha error did not violate established thresholds.   
 Although we base the rejection of the null on resulting p value, the beta error from post 
hoc power analysis of observed data exceeded the .2 threshold for sub-hypothesis 5 within the 
facilitator population as well as for Sub-hypotheses 2 and 7 within the user population.  These 
observed powers were greater than the experimental design theoretical assumptions.  The first 
assumption is that the effect size observed in the survey scale is directly related to a real world 
effect size relevant to optimization of training resources.  The second assumption is that sample 
sizes provided sufficient power to test for alpha of .05, given beta of .2 and a medium effect size.  
Due to time limitations, observed beta is simply reported without further analysis.  However, 
population samples with large beta error and the sub-hypothesis that they belong to will remain 
highlighted in amber within Tables 17 and 18 to indicate that the power which we are utilizing to 
reject the null in these sub-hypotheses may be very weak due an observed effective size that may 
not have a significance in practice (in the field).  
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 Table 18 illustrates how responses were different from ambivalent. As would be 
expected, Table 18 shows sub-hypotheses 3 and 6 as “Undecided”.  Both populations expressed 
positively significant perceptions for Sub-hypotheses 1, 4, 7, and 8.  Sub-hypotheses 2 and 5 had 
negative response averages within both populations. Several of the response averages within 
Table 18 do not correspond with the color code assigned.  The reasons for which are explained 
below. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 has a positive response average.  However, post hoc power analysis 
gave a beta error that exceeded .2 for the user population for Sub-hypothesis 7, requiring that we 
utilize an amber color code to indicate low statistical power.  Therefore, despite positive 
response averages, the user population for Sub-hypothesis 7 is highlighted in amber.   
 Reverse-wording of the survey question pertaining to Sub-hypothesis 2 required a 
negative response to answer in the positive. Additionally, post hoc power analysis gave a beta 
error that exceeded .2 for the user population of Sub-hypothesis 2, requiring that we retain amber 
color code.  Therefore, despite negative response averages, the facilitator population for Sub-
hypothesis 2 is highlighted in green (positive response) and the user population for Sub-
hypothesis 2 is highlighted in amber (undecided response).  In the facilitator population of Sub-
hypotheses 5, post hoc power analysis gave a beta error that exceeded .2, requiring that we retain 
the amber color code.  Therefore, despite negative response averages, the facilitator population 
for Sub-hypothesis 5 is highlighted in amber (undecided response). 
 It is not surprising that Sub-hypothesis 3 and 6 had “undecided” response averages in 
both populations.  The supplemental purchase, lease, or installation of temporary infrastructure 
to conduct training, as well as presence of residual training capability, once temporary 
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infrastructure has been dismantled, are hallmarks of blended training.  Having heard that the ITE 
will solve these two problems that practitioners of blended training have grown accustomed to, 
responses may have been guarded or uncertain.  
Research Question 4. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize training 
resources”? (SQ 11-18) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”. 
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize training resources”. 
 Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal 
scale to answer eight questions that measured their perceptions regarding the ability of training 
infrastructure to “optimize training resources”, as directed by the 2012 Army Training Strategy.  
The seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 19.  
Table 19. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine differences between facilitator 
and user populations for each of the eight survey questions that pertain to this research question. 
Survey Questions 11-18, that support the following nine sub-hypotheses can be found in 
Appendix C.   
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 Sub-hypothesis 1 (FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FACILITIES):  For 
Optimize Training Resources survey question 11 (SQ 11) there is no difference between 
populations.  
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING): For Optimize 
Training Resources survey question 12 (SQ 12) there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTALLATION OF 
TEMPORARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED):  For Optimize Training 
Resources survey question 13 (SQ 13) there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (MITIGATES TRAINING RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS): For 
Optimize Training Resources survey question 14 (SQ 14) there is no difference between 
populations.   
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (REQUIRES MINIMAL LEAD TIME, COORDINATION & 
RESOURCES): For Optimize Training Resources survey question 15 (SQ 15) there is no 
difference between populations.   
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS): For Optimize 
Training Resources survey question 16 (SQ 16) there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (CLEAR & CONCISE SYSTEM PRESENT TO SCHEDULE & 
COORDINATE): For Optimize Training Resources survey question 17 (SQ 17) there is no 
difference between populations.   
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (FORUMS EXIST TO COORDINATE & DECONFLICT 
HOMESTATION RESOURCES): For Optimize Training Resources survey question 18 (SQ 18) 
there is no difference between populations.   
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 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was utilized to determine significant differences 
between populations, as the data was ordinal and a non-parametric t test to detect differences 
between two independent samples was required.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized 
for analysis of Research Question 4.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  
Differences revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the unaided human eye, and 
a large effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  The final population sample size of 
92 did not meet the estimated minimum sample size requirement of 136 that was generated by a 
priori G*Power analysis for an alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  Additional a 
priori analysis, discussed previously and shown above in Figure 5, indicates that an alpha of .05 
and a beta of .2 can only be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this 
research question.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine 
observed beta and power.  Chronbachs’ alpha results have shown that the reliability of responses 
between survey questions 11-18 is questionable.  Therefore, the analysis conducted for this 
research question will not be included in the conclusions of Chapter 5.  It is provided here for 
informational purposes only. 
 Table 20 summarizes the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and G*Power post 
hoc power analysis for sub-hypotheses 1-8.  The first column lists the two homestation training 
community population samples.  Columns three through four provide alpha values, p values, 
observed beta, and observed power under the heading of each Optimize Training Resources 
question.  The color red indicates that a difference was detected between facilitator and user 
population perceptions regarding the ability of homestation training infrastructure to optimize 
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training resources.  The color green indicates that no difference was detected.  Any p values or 
beta values that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
Table 20. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to optimize training resources? (RQ4) 
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
SH 1: FLEXIBLE MENU OF TADSS, NETWORKS & FAC. SH 2: AWAY FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING
0.243
SH 3: SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE, PURCHASE, OR INSTAL SH 4: MITIGATES  RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS 
p = 0.135 0.77 0.23 p = 0.45 0.757
0.827 0.173
SH 5: REQUIRES MIN  TIME, COORD. & RESOURCES SH 6: RESIDUAL TRAINING CAPABILITY REMAINS
p = 0.334 0.848 0.152 p = 0.256
0.8 0.2
SH 7: CLEAR & CONCISE SYST TO SCHEDULE & COORD. SH 8: FORUMS COORD. & DECONFLICT RESOURCES 
p = 0.485 0.81 0.19 p = 0.351
0.566p = 0.891 0.934 0.066 p = 0.187 0.434
 
Table Legend
See the World the Same
See Things Differently
Statistical Inference of Level of Community Agreement
 
Research Question 4 Summary and Analysis 
  Chronbachs’ alpha results have shown that the reliability of responses between 
survey questions 11-18 is questionable, therefore analysis of the overall research question based 
on questionable data is not valid.  For each of the sub hypothesis, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
analysis showed that there is no significant difference between the training facilitator and 
training user population perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to “optimize 
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training resources”.  The p values and observed beta for all eight sub-hypotheses exceed 
established thresholds for alpha and beta error.  Therefore, we must fail to reject the null.   
Research Question 5. Do homestations possess training product (training support packages, 
databases, scenarios) repositories? (SQ 19) 
 The LVC-IA CDD and the draft Army ITE Strategy both indicate that homestations are 
responsible for developing their own training product repositories of scenarios, data bases and 
training support packages.  Homestation training product repositories serve as the framework for 
training.  Table 21 describes the response to survey question 19, “Does your MTC or another 
homestation training entity possesses a training product repository of "off the shelf” scenarios, 
databases, and training support packages that are readily available for the design of blended 
training?”  The first column indicates response by population.  Columns two through five 
indicate the frequency, percent, valid percent, and cumulative percent for each. 
Table 21. Do homestations possess training product repositories? (RQ 5) 
Facilitator Sample Response Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 40 78.4 78.4 78.4
No 6 11.8 11.8 90.2
Don't Know 5 9.8 9.8 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
User Sample  Reponse Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 30 73.2 73.2 73.2
No 4 9.8 9.8 82.9
Don't Know 7 17.1 17.1 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
Entire Sample Response Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 70 76.1 76.1 76.1
No 10 10.9 10.9 87.0
Don't Know 12 13.0 13.0 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
169 
 
Research Question 5 Summary and Analysis 
 It would appear that just over 75% of the 92 homestation training community members 
that were surveyed have a training product repository at their disposal.  Of the 51 training 
facilitators who responded, 78.4% indicated “yes”, their homestation possesses a training product 
repository.  Of the 41 training users who responded, 73.2% indicated “yes”, their homestation 
possesses a training product repository. Only respondents who answered “yes” to survey 
question 19 were presented with survey questions 20-27.  This reduces the sample population 
from 51 training facilitators and 41 training users (total of 92) to 40 training facilitators and 30 
training users (total of 70) for Research Questions 6-11.   
Research Question 6. Are training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
training product repositories different from “Undecided? (SQ 21) 
H0 = For each population there is no difference between perceived existence of TADSS 
consumable databases and “Undecided”. 
Ha = For each population there is a difference between perceived existence of TADSS 
consumable databases and “Undecided”. 
 Databases within the training product repository should be in a TADSS consumable 
format.  In other words, in a format that is recognizable to all LVC TADSS and the real world 
mission control systems of the training unit. Each homestation training community member was 
asked to utilize a seven point ordinal scale to answer survey question 21. This question measured 
their perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
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training product repositories.  The seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is 
presented in Table 22.  Survey Question 21 can be found in Appendix C.   
Table 22. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
 Survey question 21 was evaluated against a hypothesized median of ambivalence, which 
was represented by “4” (Undecided).  Level of ambivalence in the subjective responses to this 
question was determined by the seven point ordinal scale shown in Table 22.  The one sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was utilized to determine significant differences between responses 
and ambivalence within populations, as the data set was ordinal and a non-parametric test for a 
one sample case was required.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of 
Research Question 6.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  Differences 
revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the unaided human eye, and a large 
effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  As previously discussed in Research 
Question 5, 40 out of 51 training facilitators, and 30 out of 41 training users answered “yes” to 
survey question 19.  Survey question 19 asked if a training repository existed at homestation.  
This brings the sample size down to 70 for Research Question 6.  This population sample size of 
70 more than  meets the estimated minimum sample size requirement of 35 that was generated 
by a priori G*Power analysis.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to 
determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 23 summarizes the results for the one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test and 
G*Power post hoc power analysis of observed data for survey question 21.  The first column 
presents survey question 21 compared to “Undecided”.  The second and third columns provide 
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alpha values, p values, observed beta values, and observed power by population sample.  The 
color red indicates that training product repositories do not contain TADSS consumable 
databases.  The color amber indicates undecided.  The color green indicates that training product 
repositories do contain TADSS consumable databases.  Any p values or beta values that exceed 
established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
  Table 24 presents the seven point ordinal scale answer choice that the facilitator and user 
response averages were closest to for survey question 21.   The first column states question 21 
compared to “Undecided”.  The second and third columns provide the closest ordinal scale 
answer choices, from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, for the training facilitator and 
training user population samples.  The color red indicates a negative response average.  The 
color amber represents an undecided response average.  The color green indicates a positive 
response average.  An asterisk is placed on each side of the response average to indicate when it 
differs from the color code displayed. Difference between the response average and color code in 
this table may be caused by reverse-wording of questions or large beta error.  For a large beta 
error where a p value indicates that we can statistically reject the null, observed effect size in the 
sample may indicate that it may be too small to be of practical significance.  Hence due to 
conflicting statistical data, assessment of the hypothesis concerning the Facilitator population is 
INCONCLUSIVE despite response averages that are different from “Undecided”.  Additionally, 
cluster bar charts displaying the type and frequency of responses, by population, for survey 
question 21 can be found in Appendix G.   
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Table 23. Are training facilitator population and training user population perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within 
homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided? (RQ6) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
RESPOSITORY INCLUDES TADSS 
CONSUMABLE DATABASES to Undecided
p = 0.031 0.41 0.59 p = 0.004 0.084 0.916
Survey Question 21
Facilitator Sample (N=40) User Sample (N=30)
Undecided
Statistical Inference
Table Legend
Does not Include TADSS Consumable Databases
Includes TADSS Consumable Databases  
Table 24. Response averages for: Are training facilitator population and training user population perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS 
consumable databases within homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided? (RQ6) 
RESPOSITORY INCLUDES TADSS 
CONSUMABLE DATABASES to Undecided
*Somewhat Agree* Somewhat Agree
User Sample Response        
Average 
Survey Question 21 Facilitator Sample Response 
Average
Table Legend
Negative Response
Undecided
Positive Response
*Response Average Differs From Color Code*  
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Research Question 6 Summary and Analysis 
 Statistical results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicate that perceived existence of 
TADSS consumable databases, for both facilitator and user populations was not “Undecided”.  
The p values reported in Table 23 were less than .05, which infers that we reject the null 
hypothesis.    
 However, post hoc power analysis of observed data in the facilitator population gave a 
beta that exceeded the .2 threshold.  Given an alpha of .05, a training facilitator sample size of 
40, a H0 mean of 4 (“undecided”), a Ha mean of 4.575 (calculated from observed data on SPSS), 
and a standard deviation of 1.583 (calculated from observed data on SPSS), the post hoc function 
of G*Power computed an observed effect size, which it then utilized to compute the observed 
power of .59 and observed beta of .41 highlighted in amber above.  This observed power violated 
experimental design and theoretical assumptions.  The first theoretical assumption being that the 
effect size observed in the survey scale is directly related to a real world effect size that is 
relevant to TADSS homestation training product repositories.  The second assumption being that 
the sample sizes provided sufficient power to test for alpha 0f .05, given beta of .2, and a 
medium effect size.  Our sample size is large compared to the population and the distributions of 
the response are also large.   While we may reject the null, the power with which we are able to 
do so is very weak, and more importantly, may be weaker than our original estimate.  Dr. Alex 
Buchner, who developed G*Power, supports this view.  When asked, “If my old assumptions 
about the population effect size were wrong, and if my sample effect size were in fact identical to 
the correct population effect size, what would the power of my study be?”, Buchner replied, 
“apparently the power of your study would be very small” (Dr. Alex Buchner, personal 
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communication, 19 March, 2013).   Due to time limitations, observed beta is simply reported 
without further analysis.  However, the facilitator sample and the actual survey question in 
Tables 23 and 24 will be highlighted in amber to indicate that the power which we are utilizing 
to reject the null may be very weak. 
Research Question 7. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within 
homestation training product repositories? (SQ 21) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
training product repositories.  
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
training product repositories 
 Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal 
scale to answer survey question 21. This question measured their perceptions regarding the 
existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation training product repositories.  
The seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 25.  Survey 
Question 21 can be found in Appendix C.   
Table 25. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was utilized to determine significant differences 
between population responses for survey question 21.  The data was ordinal and a non-
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parametric t test to detect differences between two independent samples was required.  An alpha 
of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 7.  A medium effect size 
was desired for analysis of data.  Differences revealed by a small effect size may not be 
discernible to the unaided human eye, and a large effect size may completely miss smaller 
differences.  As previously discussed in Research Question 5, 40 out of 51 training facilitators, 
and 30 out of 41 training users answered “yes” to survey question 19.  Survey question 19 asked 
if a training repository existed at homestation.  This brings the sample size down to 70 for 
Research Question 7.  The final population sample size of 70 did not meet the estimated 
minimum sample size requirement of 136 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis for an 
alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  Additional a priori analysis, discussed 
previously and shown above in Figure 5, indicates that an alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 can only 
be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this research question.  Post hoc 
G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 26 summarizes results for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and G*Power post hoc 
analysis of observed data for survey question 21.    The first column lists the two homestation 
training community population samples.  Columns two thru four provide alpha values, p values, 
observed beta values, and observed power under the heading of REPOSITORY INCLUDES 
TADSS COMSUMABLE DATABASES SQ 21. The color red indicates that a difference was 
detected between facilitator and user population perceptions regarding the perceived existence of 
TADSS consumable databases within training product repositories.  The color green indicates 
that no difference was detected.  Any p values or beta values that exceed established thresholds 
for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
176 
 
Table 26. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation training product 
repositories? (RQ7) 
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed Power 
(1- β)
Facilitator
User
SQ 21: REPOSITORY INCLUDES TADSS CONSUMABLE DATABASES
p = .686 0.826 0.174
 
Table Legend
See the World the Same
See Things Differently
Statistical Inference of Level of Community Agreement
 
Research Question 7 Summary and Analysis 
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney analysis showed that there is no significant difference 
between the training facilitator and training user population perceptions regarding the existence 
of TADSS consumable databases within homestation training product repositories.  The p value 
in Table 26 is greater than .05.  Additionally, the resulting beta from post hoc analysis exceeded 
the .2 threshold. We must fail to reject the null.   
Research Question 8. Are training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided”? (SQ 22) 
H0 = For each population there is no difference between perceived existence of comprehensive 
training support packages and “Undecided”. 
Ha = For each population there is a difference between perceived existence of comprehensive 
training support packages and “Undecided”. 
 Training support packages should be comprehensive in that they include all required 
orders (higher and threat), graphic control measures, digital overlays, and event lists.  Each 
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homestation training community member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal scale to 
answer survey question 22. This question measured their perceptions regarding the existence of 
comprehensive training support packages within homestation training product repositories.  The 
seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 27.  Survey Question 
22 can be found in Appendix C.   
Table 27. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
 Survey question 22 was evaluated against a hypothesized median of ambivalence, which 
was represented by “4” (Undecided).  Level of ambivalence in the subjective responses to this 
question was determined by the seven point ordinal scale shown in Table 27.  The one sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was utilized to determine significant differences between responses 
and ambivalence within populations, as the data set was ordinal and a non-parametric test for a 
one sample case was required.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of 
Research Question 8.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  Differences 
revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the unaided human eye, and a large 
effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  As previously discussed in Research 
Question 5, 40 out of 51 training facilitators, and 30 out of 41 training users answered “yes” to 
survey question 19.  Survey question 19 asked if a training repository existed at homestation.  
This brings the sample size down to 70 for Research Question 8.  This population sample size of 
70 more than meets the estimated minimum sample size requirement of 35 that was generated by 
a priori G*Power analysis.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to 
determine observed beta and power.   
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 Table 28 summarizes the results for the one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test and 
G*Power post hoc power analysis of observed data for survey question 22.  The first column 
presents survey question 22 compared to “Undecided”.  The second and third columns provide 
alpha values, p values, observed beta values, and observed power by population sample.  The 
color red indicates that training product repositories do not contain comprehensive training 
support packages.  The color amber indicates undecided.  The color green indicates that training 
product repositories do contain comprehensive training support packages.  Any p values or beta 
values that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
 Table 29 presents the seven point ordinal scale answer choice that the facilitator and user 
response averages were closest to for survey question 22.   The first column states question 22 
compared to “Undecided”.  The second and third columns provide the closest ordinal scale 
answer choices, from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, for the training facilitator and 
training user populations. The color red indicates a negative response average.  The color amber 
represents an undecided response average.  The color green indicates a positive response 
average.  An asterisk is placed on each side of the response average to indicate when it differs 
from the color code displayed. Difference between the response average and color code in this 
table may be caused by reverse-wording of questions or large beta error that requires that we fail 
to reject the null despite response averages that are different from “Undecided”.  Additionally, 
cluster bar charts displaying the type and frequency of responses, by population, for survey 
question 22 can be found in Appendix H.  
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Table 28. Are training facilitator population and training user population perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support 
packages within homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided”? (RQ 8) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
REPOSITORY INCLUDES COMPREHENSIVE 
TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGES to "Undecided"
p < .001 0.015 0.985 p = .028 0.388 0.612
Survey Question 22
Facilitator Sample (N=40) User Sample (N=30)
 
Statistical Inference
Undecided
Includes Comprehensive Training support Packages
Table Legend
Does not Include TADSS Comprehensive Training Support Packages
 
Table 29. Response Averages for: Are training facilitator population and training user population perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive 
training support packages within homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided”? (RQ 8) 
REPOSITORY INCLUDES COMPREHENSIVE 
TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGES to Undecided
User Sample                         
Response Average
Survey Question 22
Facilitator Sample               
Response Average
Somewhat Agree *Somewhat Agree*
 
Table Legend
Negative Response
Undecided
Positive Response
*Response Average Differs From Color Code*  
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Research Question 8 Summary and Analysis 
 Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicate that perceived existence of 
comprehensive training support packages, for both facilitator and user populations was not 
“Undecided”. The p values reported in Table 28 were less than .05. Therefore, we reject the null 
on a statistical basis.   However, post hoc power analysis of observed data in the user population 
gave a beta that exceeded the .2 threshold.  This violates previously discussed elements of 
experimental design and theoretical assumptions as discussed above.  Due to time limitations, 
observed beta is simply reported without further analysis.  However, the user sample and the 
actual survey question in Tables 28 and 29 will be highlighted in amber to indicate that the 
power which we are utilizing to reject the null may be very weak. 
 Research Question 9. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and 
training user population perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support 
packages within homestation training product repositories? (SQ 22) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories.  
Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories. 
 Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal 
scale to answer survey question 22. This question measured their perceptions regarding the 
existence of comprehensive training support packages within homestation training product 
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repositories.  The seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 30.  
Survey Question 22 can be found in Appendix C.   
Table 30. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was utilized to determine significant differences 
between population responses for survey question 22.  The data was ordinal and a non-
parametric t test to detect differences between two independent samples was required. An alpha 
of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 9.  A medium effect size 
was desired for analysis of data.  Differences revealed by a small effect size may not be 
discernible to the unaided human eye, and a large effect size may completely miss smaller 
differences.  As previously discussed in Research Question 5, 40 out of 51 training facilitators, 
and 30 out of 41 training users answered “yes” to survey question 19.  Survey question 19 asked 
if a training repository existed at homestation.  This brings the sample size down to 70 for 
Research Question 9.  The final population sample size of 70 did not meet the estimated 
minimum sample size requirement of 136 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis for an 
alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  Additional a priori analysis, discussed 
previously and shown above in Figure 5, indicates that an alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 can only 
be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this research question.  Post hoc 
G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 31 summarizes results for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and G*Power post hoc 
analysis of observed data for survey question 22.    The first column lists the two homestation 
training community population samples.  Columns two thru four provide alpha values, p values, 
182 
 
observed beta values, and observed power under the heading of REPOSITORY INCLUDES 
COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE SQ 22.  The color red indicates that a 
difference was detected between facilitator and user population perceptions regarding the 
perceived existence of TADSS consumable databases within training product repositories.  The 
color green indicates that no difference was detected.  Any p values or beta values that exceed 
established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
Table 31. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive Training Support Packages within homestation 
training product repositories? (RQ9) 
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β Observed Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
SQ: 22 REPOSITORY INCLUDES COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGES
0.137 0.675 0.325
 
Table Legend
See the World the Same
See Things Differently
Statistical Inference of Level of Community Agreement
 
Research Question 9 Summary and Analysis 
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney analysis showed that there is no significant difference 
between the training facilitator and training user population perceptions regarding the existence 
of comprehensive training support packages within homestation training product repositories.  
The p value in Table 31 is greater than .05.  Additionally, the resulting beta from post hoc 
analysis exceeded the .2 threshold. We must fail to reject the null.   
Research Question 10. For each population, is the perceived ability of training repository 
scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy 
different from “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question? (SQ 20, 23-27) 
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H0 = For each population, there is no difference between perceived ability of training repository 
scenarios and “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question. 
Ha = For each population, there is a difference between perceived ability of training 
infrastructure and “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question. 
 Training scenarios should support the most recent doctrine and training guidance.  The 
most recent guiding document to be published is the 2012 Army Training Strategy which stresses 
the importance of training for Operational Adaptability. Each homestation training community 
member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal scale to answer six questions. These six 
questions measured their perceptions regarding the ability of local training repository scenarios 
to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy.  The seven 
point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 32.  
Table 32. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine facilitator and user population 
ambivalence for each of the six survey questions that pertain to this research question.  A 
response of “4” from the seven point scale indicates that the respondent is “Undecided”.  Survey 
Questions 20, 23-24 support the following six sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix C.  
  Sub-hypothesis 1 (REPLICATE OE & THREAT REQUIRED BY DECISIVE 
ACTION):  For each population, there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey 
question 20 (SQ 20) and “Undecided”. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 2 (MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 23 (SQ 23) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 24 (SQ 24) and 
“Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (ACCOMMODATE DECISIVE ACTION DYNAMICS):  For each 
population, there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 25 (SQ 25) 
and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (PERMIT TRAINING OF WAS & CAM):  For each population, there 
is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 26 (SQ 26) and “Undecided”. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES):  For each population, 
there is no difference between Operational Adaptability survey question 27 (SQ 27) and 
“Undecided”. 
 All six Operational Adaptability questions were evaluated against a hypothesized median 
of ambivalence, which was represented by “4” (Undecided).  Level of ambivalence in the 
subjective responses to all six questions was determined by the seven point ordinal scale shown 
in Table 32.  The one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was utilized to determine significant 
differences between responses and ambivalence within populations, as the data set was ordinal 
and a non-parametric test for a one sample case was required.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 
were utilized for analysis of Research Question 10.  A medium effect size was desired for 
analysis of data.  Differences revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the 
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unaided human eye, and a large effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  As 
previously discussed in Research Question 5, 40 out of 51 training facilitators, and 30 out of 41 
training users answered “yes” to survey question 19.  Survey question 19 asked if a training 
repository existed at homestation.  This brings the sample size down to 70 for Research Question 
10.  This population sample size of 70 more than meets the estimated minimum sample size 
requirement of 35 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis.  Post hoc G*Power analysis 
was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.  Chronbachs’ alpha 
results have shown that the reliability of responses between survey questions 20, 23-23 is poor.  
Therefore, the analysis conducted for this research question will not be included in the 
conclusions of Chapter 5.  It is provided here for informational purposes only. 
 Table 33 summarizes the results for the one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test and 
G*Power post hoc analysis of observe data, by population, for each of the six Operational 
Adaptability questions.  The first column lists the six Optimize Training Resource questions 
compared to “Undecided”.  The second and third columns provide alpha values, p values, 
observed beta values, and observed power by population sample.   The color red indicates that 
training product repository scenarios do not meet operational adaptability training requirements.  
The color amber indicates undecided.  The color green indicates that training product repository 
scenarios do meet operational adaptability training requirements.  Any p values or beta values 
that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
 Table 34 presents the seven point ordinal scale answer choice that the facilitator and user 
response averages were closest to for each Operational Adaptability question.   The first column 
lists the eight Operational Adaptability questions compared to “Undecided”.  The second and 
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third columns provide the closest ordinal scale answer choices, from “Strongly Disagree” to 
“Strongly Agree”, for the training facilitator and training user populations. The color red 
indicates a negative response average.  The color amber represents an undecided response 
average.  The color green indicates a positive response average.  An asterisk is placed on each 
side of the response average to indicate when it differs from the color code displayed. Difference 
between the response average and color code in this table may be caused by reverse-wording of 
questions or large beta error that requires that we fail to reject the null despite response averages 
that are different from “Undecided”.  Additionally, cluster bar charts displaying the type and 
frequency of responses, by population, for each of the Operational Adaptability questions can be 
found in Appendix I.   
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Table 33. For each population, is the perceived ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army 
Training Strategy different from “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question? (RQ10) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
SH 1: REPLICATE OE & THREAT REQUIRED BY DECISIVE ACTION to Undecided p < .001 0 1 p < .001 0 1
SH 2: MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES to Undecided p = .004 0.077 0.923 p = .015 0.273 0.727
SH 3: TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM to Undecided p < .001 0.001 0.999 p = .032 0.472 0.528
SH 4: ACCOMMODATE DECISIVE ACTION DYNAMICS to Undecided p = .015 0.2 0.8 p < .001 0.008 0.992
SH 5: PERMIT TRAIING OF WAS & CAM to Undecided p = .001 0.024 0.976 p < .001 0 1
SH 6: LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES to Undecided p < .001 0.002 0.998 p = .047 0.479 0.521
Perceived Ability of Homestation Training Repository Scenarios to Meet 
Operational Adaptability Requirements
Facilitator Sample (N=40) User Sample (N=30)
Table Legend
Does Not Meet Operational Adaptability Requirements 
Statistical Inference
Undecided
Meets Operational Adaptability Requirements  
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Table 34. Response averages for: For each population, is the perceived ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability 
requirements of the Army Training Strategy different from “Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question? (RQ10) 
SH 1: REPLICATE OE & THREAT REQUIRED BY DECISIVE ACTION to Undecided
SH 2: MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES to Undecided
SH 3: TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM to Undecided
SH 4: ACCOMMODATE DECISIVE ACTION DYNAMICS to Undecided
SH 5: PERMIT TRAIING OF WAS & CAM to Undecided
SH 6: LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES to Undecided
User Sample                       
Repsonse Average
Perceived Ability of Homestation Training Repository Scenarios to Meet 
Operational Adaptability Requirements
Facilitator Sample             
Response Average
Agree Agree
Somewhat Agree *Somewhat Agree*
Somewhat Agree *Somewhat Agree*
Somewhat Agree Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Agree Somewhat Agree
*Somewhat Disagree* *Somewhat Disagree*  
Table Legend
Negative Response
Undecided
Positive Response
*Response Average Differs From Color Code*  
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Research Question 10 Summary and Analysis 
 Chronbachs’ alpha results have shown that the reliability of responses between survey 
questions 20, 23-23 is poor.  Therefore any analysis of the overall research question is not valid. 
 For the sub-hypothesis, the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicate that both training 
facilitators and training users rejected the null of ambivalence for all six Operational 
Adaptability sub-hypotheses.  Table 33 shows that the p values for all six sub-hypotheses were 
less than .05 for both populations. Therefore, we reject the null for all six sub-hypothesis, based 
on statistics.   
 However, as highlighted in amber above, sub-hypothesis 2, 3, and 6 have an observed 
beta within the user population which exceeds the beta error threshold of .2.  This violates 
previously discussed elements of experimental design and theoretical assumptions discussed 
above.  Due to time limitations, observed beta is simply reported without further analysis.  
However, the user population samples and headings for these three sub-hypothesis within Tables 
33 and 34 will be highlighted in amber to indicate that the power which we are utilizing to reject 
the null may be very weak. 
 Table 34 illustrates how responses were different from ambivalent.  Both facilitator and 
user populations expressed positively significant perceptions for all sub-hypothesis, except sub-
hypothesis 6 which had a negative response average of “Somewhat Disagree”.  Several of the 
response averages within Table 34 do not correspond with the color code assigned.  The reasons 
for which are explained below. 
 In the user population of Sub-hypotheses 2 and 3, post hoc power analysis gave a beta 
error that exceeded .2, requiring that we indicate low power.  Therefore, despite positive 
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response averages, the user population for Sub-hypothesis 2 and 3 are highlighted in amber 
(undecided response).   
 Reverse-wording of the survey question pertaining to Sub-hypothesis 6 required a 
negative response to answer in the positive. Additionally, post hoc power analysis gave a beta 
error that exceeded .2 for the user population of Sub-hypothesis 6, requiring that we fail to reject 
the null of ambiguity.  Therefore, despite negative response averages, the facilitator population 
for Sub-hypothesis 6 is highlighted in green (positive response) and the user population for Sub-
hypothesis 6 is highlighted in amber (undecided response).    
 Recent changes in training and doctrine may explain the undecided nature for Sub-
hypothesis 2, 3, and 6.  After more than a decade of COIN-Centric training and operations, the 
Army has re-focused training for Decisive Action (formerly Full spectrum Operations), to create 
an operationally adaptive for that is capable of winning against a hybrid threat in an uncertain 
and complex environment.  All three of the Sub-hypotheses in question have been introduced or 
are in the process of being “re-blued” to meet new Army Training Strategy requirements.  There 
is bound to be uncertainty when broad changes are introduced to training methodology.   
Research Question 11. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the 
Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy? (SQ 20, 23-27) 
H0 = There is no difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational 
Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy. 
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Ha = There is a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational 
Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy. 
 Each homestation training community member was asked to utilize a seven point ordinal 
scale to answer eight questions that measured their perceptions regarding the ability of training 
repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training 
Strategy.  The seven point scale utilized to answer these questions is presented in Table 35.  
Table 35. Seven point ordinal scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree
Undecided
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree
Strongly 
Agree  
  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine differences between facilitator 
and user populations for each of the six survey questions that pertain to this research question.  
Survey Questions 20, 23-27, that support the following nine sub-hypotheses can be found in 
Appendix C.   
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (REPLICATE OE & THREAT REQUIRED BY DECISIVE 
ACTION):  For Operational Adaptability survey question 20 (SQ 20), there is no difference 
between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 23 (SQ 23), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 24 (SQ 24), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (ACCOMMODATE DECISIVE ACTION DYNAMICS): For 
Operational Adaptability survey question 25 (SQ 25), there is no difference between populations.  
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 Sub-hypothesis 5 (PERMIT TRAINING OF WAS & CAM):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 26 (SQ 26), there is no difference between populations. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES):  For Operational 
Adaptability survey question 27 (SQ 27), there is no difference between populations.  
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was utilized to determine significant differences 
between populations, as the data was ordinal and a non-parametric t test to detect differences 
between independent samples was required.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for 
analysis of Research Question 11.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  
Differences revealed by a small effect size may not be discernible to the unaided human eye, and 
a large effect size may completely miss smaller differences.  As previously discussed in 
Research Question 5, 40 out of 51 training facilitators, and 30 out of 41 training users answered 
“yes” to survey question 19.  Survey question 19 asked if a training repository existed at 
homestation.  This brings the sample size down to 70 for Research Question 11.  The final 
population sample size of 70 did not meet the estimated minimum sample size requirement of 
136 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis for an alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium 
effect size.  Additional a priori analysis, discussed previously and shown above in Figure 5, 
indicates that an alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 can only be maintained if a large effect size is 
present for analysis of this research question.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on 
observed data to determine observed beta and power.  Chronbachs’ alpha results have shown that 
the reliability of responses between survey questions 20, 23-23 is poor.  Therefore, the analysis 
conducted for this research question will not be included in the conclusions of Chapter 5.  It is 
provided here for informational purposes only. 
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 Table 36 summarizes results for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and G*Power post hoc 
analysis of observed data for sub-hypotheses 1-6.  The first column lists the two homestation 
training community population samples.  Columns two thru four provide alpha values, p values, 
observed beta values, and observed power under the heading of each Operational Adaptability 
question.  The color red indicates that a difference was detected between facilitator and user 
population perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the 
operational adaptability training requirements.  The color green indicates that no difference was 
detected.  Any p values or beta values that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error 
are indicated by bold text. 
Table 36. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the Operational Adaptability 
requirements of the Army Training Strategy? (RQ11) 
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
Question
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
SH 5: PERMIT TRAIING OF WAS & CAM SH 6: LIMITED TO COIN-CENTRIC THEMES
0.704 0.766 0.234 0.066 0.551 0.449
SH 3: TRAIN ENTIRE COMBINED ARMS TEAM SH 4: ACCOMMODATE DEC. ACTION DYNAMICS
0.056 0.4 0.6 0.792 0.833 0.167
SH 1: REPLIC OE & THREAT REQ. BY DEC. ACTION SH 2: MEET CEF/DEF TRAINING OBJECTIVES 
0.411 0.921 0.079 0.231 0.775 0.225
 
Table Legend
See the World the Same
See Things Differently
Statistical Inference of Level of Community Agreement
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Research Question 11 Summary and Analysis 
 Chronbachs’ alpha results have shown that the reliability of responses between survey 
questions 20, 23-23 is poor.  Therefore, analysis of the overall research hypothesis using this data 
is not valid. 
 For the individual sub-hypotheses, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney analysis showed that 
there is no significant difference between training facilitator and training user perceptions 
regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the operational adaptability 
requirements of the Army Training Strategy.  All p values in Table 36 are greater than .05.  
Additionally, the power resulting from post hoc analysis gave a beta error that exceeded the 
threshold of .2 for all observed data.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null.  
Research Question 12. Is the homestation training community aware of emerging resources that 
can be leveraged to develop the framework for training? (SQ 28-31) 
   Survey questions 28-31ask participants if they are aware of these resources that have 
become available over the last two years.  Tables 37-40 describe the responses to these four 
questions.  The first column indicates response by population sample.  Columns two through five 
provide frequency of response, percent, valid percent, and cumulative percent. 
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Table 37. Homestation training community awareness of CFoS? (RQ12) 
Facilitator Sample (N=51) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 11 21.6 21.6 21.6
No 22 43.1 43.1 64.7
Don't Know 18 35.3 9.8 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
User Sample (N=41) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 6 14.6 14.6 14.6
No 10 24.4 24.4 39.0
Don't Know 25 61.0 61.0 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
Entire Sample (N=92) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 17 18.5 18.5 18.5
No 32 34.8 34.8 53.3
Don't Know 43 46.7 46.7 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
Table 38. Homestation training community awareness of DATE (RQ12) 
Facilitator Sample (N=51) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 19 37.3 37.3 37.3
No 15 29.4 29.4 66.7
Don't Know 17 33.3 33.3 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
User Sample (N=41) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 10 24.4 24.4 24.4
No 8 19.5 19.5 43.9
Don't Know 23 56.1 56.1 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
Entire Sample (N=92) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 29 31.5 31.5 31.5
No 23 25.0 25.0 56.5
Don't Know 40 43.5 43.5 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
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Table 39. Homestation training community awareness of TBOC (RQ12) 
Facilitator Sample (N=51) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 18 35.3 35.3 35.3
No 23 45.1 45.1 80.4
Don't Know 10 19.6 19.6 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
User Sample (N=41) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 5 12.2 12.2 12.2
No 12 29.3 29.3 41.5
Don't Know 24 58.8 58.8 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
Entire Sample (N=92) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 23 25.0 25.0 25.0
No 35 38.0 38.0 63.0
Don't Know 34 37.0 37.0 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
Table 40. Homestation training community awareness of JTDS (RQ12) 
Facilitator Sample (N=51) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 7 13.7 13.7 13.7
No 24 47.1 47.1 60.8
Don't Know 20 39.2 39.2 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
User Sample (N=41) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 4 9.8 9.8 9.8
No 10 24.4 24.4 34.1
Don't Know 27 65.9 65.9 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
Entire Sample (N=92) Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Yes 11 12.0 12.0 12.0
No 34 37.0 37.0 48.9
Don't Know 47 51.1 51.1 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
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Research Question 12 Summary and Analysis 
CFoS.  Of the 51 training facilitators who responded, 43.1% indicated “no” and 35.5% indicated 
“don’t know”.   Of the 41 training users who responded, 24.4% indicated “no” and 61% 
indicated “don’t know”.  This would suggest that a sizable portion of the homestation training 
community is unaware of CFoS. 
DATE.  Of the 51 training facilitators who responded, 29.4% indicated “no” and 33.3% 
indicated “don’t know”.   Of the 41 training users who responded, 19.5% indicated “no” and 
56.1% indicated “don’t know”.  This would suggest that a sizable portion of the homestation 
training community is unaware of DATE. 
TBOC.  Of the 51 training facilitators who responded, 45.1% indicated “no” and19.6% indicated 
“don’t know”.   Of the 41 training users who responded, 29.3% indicated “no” and 58.8% 
indicated “don’t know”.  This would suggest that a sizable portion of the homestation training 
community is unaware of TBOC.  
JTDS.  Of the 51 training facilitators who responded, 47.1% indicated “no” and 39.2% indicated 
“don’t know”.   Of the 41 training users who responded, 24.4% indicated “no” and 55.9% 
indicated “don’t know”.  This would suggest that a sizable portion of the homestation training 
community is unaware of JTDS.   
 Limited homestation training community awareness of these emerging resources is 
interesting, considering their value in “optimizing training resources”.  Much time and effort 
could be saved by utilizing any one of these resources to develop the contents of local training 
product repositories.  Increased effort to educate the homestation training community on 
existence and location of these assets may help to streamline the exercise design process.    
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Research Question 13. Do each of the homestation training community populations hold an 
accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in the Army ITE? (SQ 32)  
 In survey question 32, respondents are asked, “When fielded, which of the following 
components of the Army ITE will LVC-IA provide?  They are then provided with nine options 
and told to “check all that apply”.  The first option, “An IA that connects dissimilar TADSS in a 
persistent manner” is the true role of LVC-IA in delivering the Army ITE.  The remaining eight 
options to choose from are not functions of the LVC-IA.  Table 41 describes the responses to this 
question by training facilitator and training user population.  The first column indicates 
population.  Columns two through nine provide the nine options to choose from and the 
frequency in which they were chosen. 
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Table 41. Do each of the homestation training community populations hold an accurate view of LVC-IA's role in the Army ITE? (RQ13) 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Facilitator Sample (N=51) 30 58.8 15 29.4 13 25.5 13 25.5 15 29.4 8 15.7 14 27.5 8 15.7 17 33.3
User Sample (N=41) 22 53.7 12 29.3 9 22 16 39 10 24.4 11 26.8 14 34 8 19.5 18 43.9
Entire Sample (N=92) 55 56.5 27 29.3 22 23.9 29 31.5 25 27.2 19 20.7 28 30.4 16 17.4 35 38
Don't Know
IA that connects 
dissimilar 
TADSS in a 
persistent 
manner
Installation of 
any missing 
LVC TADSS
Upgrade of 
homestation 
facilities (MTC, 
maneuver 
ranges, T.A.s, 
etc.)
Installation of a 
permanent 
simulation 
network that 
connects all 
LVC TADSS
Persistent 
tactical network 
for training that 
prevents cross 
domain spillage
"Off the shelf" 
training 
scenarios that 
meet current 
doctrinal 
requirements
TADSS 
consumable 
databases
Comprehensive 
Training 
Support 
Packages
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Research Question 13 Summary and Analysis  
 Out of 51 training facilitators, 33.3% indicated that they did not know the true role of 
LVC-IA, 58.8% chose the correct role of LVC-IA in their answer, and approximately 16-30% 
included incorrect roles in their answer.  Out of 41 training users, 43.9% indicated that they did 
not know the true role of LVC-IA, 53.7% chose the correct role of LVC-IA in their answer, and 
approximately 20-39% included incorrect roles in their answer.  The large number of 
respondents that indicated “don’t know” or chose incorrect roles for LVC-IA is surprising.  
Especially, since all respondents are trained simulation professionals who will be expected to 
establish the Army ITE when LVC-IA is fielded at their homestations.  This would suggest that a 
significant number of homestation training community members do not understand the role of 
LVC-IA in establishing the ITE.  If the homestation training community does not understand the 
true role of LVC-IA in the Army ITE, it is doubtful they will understand the type and level of 
training infrastructure and framework for training required to establish the ITE at their local 
installations.  
Additional Analysis 
 Based upon recommendations from the thesis committee, additional analysis was 
conducted on data that pertain to Research Questions 1, 2, 12, and 13.  Binomial and Chi-squared 
tests were performed to compliment the Wilcoxon signed-rank and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
tests performed on Research Question 1 and 2 data sets.  Binomial and Chi-squared tests were 
also performed on Research Questions 12 and 13 to supplement descriptive statistics. Chi-
squared tests to investigate differences between population proportions generated two additional 
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research questions.  To prevent this additional analysis from disrupting the numbering of existing 
research questions, these two new research questions are simply labeled Research Question 12a 
and Research Question 13a.   All new research questions and hypothesis generated by this 
additional analysis can be found below. 
Research Question 1.  Does currently available homestation training infrastructure meet the 
requirements of LVC-IA version 1?  (SQ 2-4) 
H0 = For all LVC-IA CDD requirements, the proportion of homestation training community 
members who reported availability is greater than or equal to .80. 
Ha = For any LVC-IA CDD requirements, the proportion of homestation training community 
members who reported availability is less than .80. 
  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine whether or not current 
homestation training infrastructure meets LVC-IA CDD requirements.  The threshold of .80, or 
80% was chosen as this is generally considered an acceptable level of readiness in the Army and 
other branches of the Armed Services.  Survey questions 2 through 4 support the following ten 
sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix C. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (HITS-Homestation Instrumentation Training System): Proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to 
.80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (CCTT-Close Combat Tactical Trainer): Proportion of homestation 
training community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to .80. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 3 (RVTT-Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer): Proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to 
.80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (AVCATT-Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer): Proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to 
.80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (CFFT-Call For Fire Trainer): Proportion of homestation training 
community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to .80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (JLCCTC-ERF-Joint Land Component Constructive Training 
Capability-Entity Resolution Federation): Proportion of homestation training community 
members who reported availability is greater than or equal to .80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (Permanent Simulation Network): Proportion of homestation training 
community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to .80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (Persistent Tactical Networks): Proportion of homestation training 
community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to .80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 9 (MTC Capable of Blending Brigade level LVC Training): Proportion 
of homestation training community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to 
.80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 10 (Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of Battalion LFX): Proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported availability is greater than or equal to 
.80. 
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 A binomial test was conducted on responses for each of the ten training infrastructure 
requirements.    The proportion of homestaion training community responses for all ten LVC-IA 
CDD requirements was compared to a hypothesized proportion of .80.  An alpha of .05 and a 
beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 1.  A medium effect size was desired 
for analysis of data.  The final population sample size of 92 more than meets the estimated 
minimum sample size requirement of 69 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis for a 
medium effect size, alpha of .05, and beta of .2.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on 
observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 42 summarizes the results for the binomial tests and G*Power post hoc power 
analysis for sub-hypotheses 1-10.   The first column lists the ten required homestation training 
infrastructure requirements.  Columns two through five present alpha values, p values, observed 
proportion, observed beta values, and observed power.  The color red infers that a particular 
training infrastructure requirement is not ready (less than 80%) for establishment of an LVC-IA 
delivered ITE. The color amber infers that a particular training infrastructure requirement is less 
than 80% (reject the null) despite a large beta error.  The color green infers that training 
infrastructure is ready.  Any p values or observed beta values that exceed established thresholds 
for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
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Table 42. Does currently available homestation training infrastructure meet the requirements of LVC-IA 
version 1? (RQ 1) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Proportion
Observed β 
Observed  
Power (1-β)
SH 1: HITS p < .001 0.38 0 1
SH 2: CCTT p < .001 0.47 0 1
SH 3: RVTT p = .003 0.67 0.2 0.8
SH 4: AVCATT p < .001 0.61 0.02 0.98
SH 5: CFFT p = .003 0.67 0.2 0.8
SH 6: JLCCTC-ERF p = .095 0.74 0.73 0.267
SH 7: Permanent 
Simulation Network
p < .001 0.57 0.002 0.998
SH 8: Persistent 
Tactical Network p < .001 0.45 0 1
SH 9: MTC capable of 
blending BDE level LVC 
Training
p = .228 0.84 0.843 0.157
SH 10: Combined Arms 
T .A.s capable of BN 
LFX
p = .011 0.7 0.438 0.562
FACILITES
Homestation Training Infrastructure 
Requirement
Entire Sample (N=92)
LVC TADSS
NETWORKS
 
Table Legend
Statistical Inference
Training Infrastructure Not Ready
Reject the Null Despite Large Beta Error
Training Infrastructure Ready
 
Research Question 1 Summary and Analysis 
 Binomial tests suggest that the proportion of homestation training community members 
that reported availability of training infrastructure requirements in sub-hypotheses 6 and 9 was at 
least .80.  As shown in Table 42, the p values for both of these sub-hypotheses were greater than 
.05.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null for sub-hypotheses 6 and 9. 
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 Binomial tests suggest that the proportion of homestation training community members 
that reported availability of training infrastructure requirements in sub-hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 
8, and 10 was less than .80.  Table 42 shows that all eight of these sub-hypotheses had a p value 
less than .05.  Therefore, we reject the null for these eight sub-hypotheses.   
 However, as highlighted in amber above, sub-hypothesis 10 has an observed beta of .438, 
which exceeds the beta error threshold of .2.  This violates previously discussed elements of 
experimental design and theoretical assumptions.  Due to time limitations, observed beta is 
simply reported without further analysis.  However, the observed beta, observed power, sub-
hypothesis 10, and the overall category of “Facilities” in Table 42 will be highlighted in amber to 
indicate that the power which we are utilizing to reject the null may be very weak. 
 We reject the null and accept the alternative for the main hypothesis.  The proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported availability was less than .80 for eight 
out of ten LVC-IA CDD requirements.   
 Binomial test results for Research Questions 1 are similar to the previously conducted 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test results.  Wilcoxon signed-rank tests suggested that none of the 
homestation training infrastructure was ready for the arrival of LVC-IA and establishment of the 
ITE.  The difference between test results may be attributed to the different test constants utilized.  
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test utilized a hypothesized median of 1, while the binomial test 
utilized a hypothesized proportion of .8.   
 It is interesting that the two items of training infrastructure, JLCCTC-ERF and the MTC, 
where binomial testing suggested a proportion of .80 or higher are located at, or are attributed to 
the buildings that comprise the MTC.  All other training infrastructure requirements may be 
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distributed across the installation at various locations, decreasing their visibility to the 
homestation training community population.   Higher proportion of reported availability for these 
two elements of training infrastructure could be associated with the higher visibility of the MTC.    
Research Question 2.  Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training 
user population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure? (SQ 2-4) 
H0 = There is no significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and 
proportion of training users that reported availability of LVC-IA CDD requirements 
Ha = There is a significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and 
proportion of training users that reported availability of LVC-IA CDD requirements 
 Statistical tests were performed on responses to investigate differences between training 
facilitator and training user reporting proportions.  Survey questions 2 through 4 support the 
following ten sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix C. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (HITS-Homestation Instrumentation Training System):  There is no 
significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training 
users that reported availability of HITS. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (CCTT-Close Combat Tactical Trainer): There is no significant 
difference between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training users that 
reported availability of CCTT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (RVTT-Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer): There is no 
significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training 
users that reported availability of RVTT. 
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 Sub-hypothesis 4 (AVCATT-Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer): There is no 
significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training 
users that reported availability of AVCATT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 5 (CFFT-Call For Fire Trainer): There is no significant difference 
between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training users that reported 
availability of CFFT. 
 Sub-hypothesis 6 (JLCCTC-ERF-Joint Land Component Constructive Training 
Capability-Entity Resolution Federation): There is no significant difference between the 
proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training users that reported availability of 
JLCCTC-ERF. 
 Sub-hypothesis 7 (Permanent Simulation Network): There is no significant difference 
between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training users that reported 
availability of permanent simulation networks. 
 Sub-hypothesis 8 (Persistent Tactical Networks): There is no significant difference 
between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training users that reported 
availability of persistent tactical networks. 
 Sub-hypothesis 9 (MTC Capable of Blending Brigade level LVC Training): There is no 
significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training 
users that reported availability of MTCs capable of blending brigade level LVC training. 
 Sub-hypothesis 10 (Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of Battalion LFX): There is no 
significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and proportion of training 
users that reported availability of combined arms T.A.s capable of battalion LFX. 
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 A Chi-squared test was conducted on responses for each of the ten training infrastructure 
requirements.   An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 
2.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  The final population sample size of 92 
did not meet the estimated minimum sample size requirements for the Chi-squared test as 
described by Cohen (1992) for an alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  An alpha of 
.05 and a beta of .2 can only be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this 
research question.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine 
observed beta and power.   
 Table 43 summarizes results for the Chi-squared tests and G*Power post hoc analysis of 
observed data for sub-hypotheses 1-10.  The first column lists the two homestation training 
community population samples.  Columns two through six provide alpha values, p values, 
observed facilitator proportions, observed user proportions, observed beta values, and observed 
power under the heading of each LVC-IA CDD requirement.  The color red indicates that a 
difference was detected between facilitator and user population proportions. The color amber 
infers that a significant difference was detected and we statistically reject the null of no 
difference despite a large beta error.   The color green indicates that no difference was detected.  
Any p values or observed beta values that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error 
are indicated by bold text. 
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Table 43. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user population reporting 
of required homestation training infrastructure? (RQ 2) 
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
SH 9: MTC Capable of Blending BDE Level Trng SH 10: Combined Arms T.A.s Capable of BN LFX
p = .014 0.318 0.682 p = .812 0.94 0.0620.92 0.73 0.71 0.68
SH 7: Permanent Simulation Network SH 8: Persistent Tactical Network
p = .001 0.005 0.945 p = .167 0.734 0.2660.370.510.370.73
SH 5: CFFT SH 6: JLCCTC-ERF
p = .778 0.939 0.061 p < .001 0.061 0.9390.560.880.660.69
SH 3: RVTT SH 4: AVCATT
p = .466 0.871 0.129 p = .089 0.58 0.420.71 0.63 0.69 0.51
SH 1: HITS SH 2: CCTT
p = 0.262 0.813 0.187 p = 0.725 0.933 0.0670.490.450.320.43
 
Table Legend
Level of Community Agreement
See Things Differently
See the World the Same
Reject the Null Despite Large Beta Error  
Research Question 2 Summary and Analysis 
 Of the ten training infrastructure elements required by the LVC-IA CDD:  JLCCT-ERF, 
Permanent Simulation Network, and MTC Capable of Blending BDE Level Training were the 
only elements found to have a statistically significant different population proportions.  The p 
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values did not exceed the .05 threshold for all three of these sub-hypotheses.  Therefore we reject 
the null for these three sub-hypotheses.  The remaining seven sub-hypotheses had alpha and beta 
errors that exceed analysis thresholds.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null for these seven 
remaining sub-hypotheses.   
 However, as highlighted in amber above, sub-hypothesis 9 has an observed beta of .318, 
which exceeds the beta error threshold of .2.  This violates previously discussed elements of 
experimental design and theoretical assumptions.  Due to time limitations, observed beta is 
simply reported without further analysis.  However, the observed beta, observed power, and 
heading for sub-hypothesis 9 will be highlighted in amber to indicate that the power which we 
are utilizing to reject the null may be very weak. 
 Even though we failed to reject the null for seven out of ten sub-hypothesis, we must still 
reject the null for the main hypothesis.  There is a difference between training facilitator 
population and training user population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure.   
 Other than the large observed beta error in sub-hypotheses 9, results of the Chi-squared 
tests matched results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests conducted for Research Question 2.  
Similar to previous analysis of this research question, observed proportions of homestation 
training community members who reported availability of required training infrastructure were 
consistently higher in the facilitator population for the three sub-hypotheses  where differences 
were inferred.  Again, this may be attributed to the fact that JLCCT-ERF, simulation networks, 
and the MTC inherently belong to and are controlled by training facilitators.  Training user 
contact with these three elements would not be as prevalent which may explain lower 
proportions. 
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Research Question 12.  Is the homestation training community aware of emerging resources 
that can be leveraged to develop the framework for training? (SQ 28-31) 
H0 = The proportion of homestation training community members who reported use of emerging 
Framework for Training resources is greater than or equal to .80 for all four emerging resources. 
Ha = The proportion of homestation training community members who reported use of emerging 
Framework for Training resources is less than .80 for any of the emerging resources. 
  Statistical tests were performed on responses to determine current awareness of 
emerging tools and resources that would be useful to homestations in developing training 
product repositories.  The threshold of .80, or 80% was chosen as this is generally considered an 
acceptable level of readiness in the Army and other branches of the Armed Services.  Survey 
questions 28 through 31 support the following ten sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix 
C. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (CFoS-Common Framework of Scenarios): Proportion of homestation 
training community members who reported use of CFoS is greater than or equal to .80. 
 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (DATE-Decisive Action Training Environment): Proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported use of DATE is greater than or equal to 
.80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (TBOC-Training Brain Operations Center): Proportion of homestation 
training community members who reported use of TBOC is greater than or equal to .80. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (JTDS-Joint Training Data Services): Proportion of homestation 
training community members who reported use of JTDS is greater than or equal to .80. 
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 A binomial test was conducted on responses for each of the four emerging resources.    
The proportion of homestaion training community responses for all four emerging resources was 
compared to a hypothesized proportion of .80.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for 
analysis of Research Question 12.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  The 
final population sample size of 92 more than meets the estimated minimum sample size 
requirement of 69 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis for a medium effect size, 
alpha of .05, and beta of .2.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to 
determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 44 summarizes the results for the binomial tests and G*Power post hoc power 
analysis for sub-hypotheses 1-4.   The first column lists the four emerging resources.  Columns 
two through five present alpha values, p values, observed proportion, observed beta values, and 
observed power.  The color red infers that less than 80% of the homestation training community 
is aware of a particular emerging resource. The color amber infers that awareness within the 
community is less than 80% (reject the null) despite a large beta error.  The color green infers at 
least 80% of the community is aware of a particular resource.  Any p values or observed beta 
values that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
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Table 44. Is the homestation training community aware of emerging resources that can be leveraged to 
develop the framework for training? (RQ 12) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
SH 1: CFoS p < .001 0.19 0 1
SH 2: DATE p < .001 0.32 0 1
SH 3: TBOC p < .001 0.25 0 1
SH 4: JTDS p < .001 0.12 0 1
Emerging 
Resource
Entire Sample (N=92)
 
Less Than 80% of Homestaion Training Community has Utilized
At Least 80% of Homestation Training Community has Utilized
Reject the Null Despite Large Beta Error
Statistical Inference
Table Legend
 
Research Question 12 Summary and Analysis 
 Binomial tests suggest that the proportion of homestation training community members 
that indicated awareness of emerging Framework for Training resources was less than .80 for all 
sub-hypotheses.   As shown in Table 44, all p values were less than .05 and all observed beta 
were less than .2 for all sub-hypotheses.  Therefore we reject the null for the main hypothesis.  It 
would appear that the homestation training community is not very aware of these four emerging 
resources.  Binomial test results corresponded with previous analysis, where descriptive statistics 
also indicated that there was a lack of awareness of Framework for Training emerging resources 
within the homestation training community. 
Research Question 12a.  Is there a significant difference between the proportion of training 
facilitators and the proportion of training users who indicated awareness of emerging framework 
for training resources? (SQ 28-31) 
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H0 = There is no significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the 
proportion of training users who indicated awareness of emerging Framework for Training 
resources 
Ha = There is a significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the 
proportion of training users who indicated awareness of emerging Framework for Training 
resources 
 Statistical tests were performed on responses to investigate differences between training 
facilitator and training user reporting proportions.  Survey questions 28 through 31 support the 
following ten sub-hypotheses and can be found in Appendix C. 
 Sub-hypothesis 1 (CFoS-Common Framework of Scenarios): There is no significant 
difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the proportion of training users who 
indicated awareness of CFoS. 
 Sub-hypothesis 2 (DATE-Decisive Action Training Environment): There is no 
significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the proportion of 
training users who indicated awareness of DATE. 
 Sub-hypothesis 3 (TBOC-Training Brain Operations Center): There is no significant 
difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the proportion of training users who 
indicated awareness of TBOC. 
 Sub-hypothesis 4 (JTDS-Joint Training Data Services): There is no significant difference 
between the proportion of training facilitators and the proportion of training users who indicated 
awareness of JTDS. 
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 A Chi-squared test was conducted on responses for each of the four emerging resources.   
An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 12a.  A medium 
effect size was desired for analysis of data.  The final population sample size of 92 did not meet 
the estimated minimum sample size requirements for the Chi-squared test as described by Cohen 
(1992) for an alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 
can only be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this research question.  Post 
hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 45 summarizes results for the Chi-squared tests and G*Power post hoc analysis of 
observed data for sub-hypotheses 1-4.  The first column lists the two homestation training 
community population samples.  Columns two through six provide alpha values, p values, 
observed facilitator proportions, observed user proportions, observed beta values, and observed 
power under the heading of each emerging resource.  The color red indicates that a difference 
was detected between facilitator and user proportions. The color amber infers that a significant 
difference was detected and we reject the null of no difference despite a large beta error.   The 
color green indicates that no difference was detected.  Any p values or observed beta values that 
exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
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Table 45. Is there a significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the proportion of 
training users who indicated awareness of emerging framework for training resources? (RQ 12a) 
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
T.I. Item
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed 
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
0.401 0.14 0.1 0.915 0.085
0.187 0.37 0.24 0.738 0.262
0.131
0.011 0.35 0.12 0.265 0.735
SH 1: CFoS
SH 3: DATE
SH 2: TBOC
SH 4: JTDS
0.394 0.22 0.15 0.869
 
Table Legend
Level of Community Agreement
See Things Differently
See the World the Same
Reject the Null Despite Large Beta Error  
Research Question 12a Summary and Analysis 
 Of the four emerging resources, TBOC was the only one to have significantly different 
population proportions.  The p value did not exceed the .05 threshold for sub-hypothesis 2.  
Therefore, we reject the null for sub-hypothesis 2.   The remaining three sub-hypotheses had p 
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values that exceed analysis thresholds.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null for sub-hypotheses 1, 
3, and 4. 
 However, as highlighted in amber above, sub-hypothesis 2 has an observed beta of .265, 
which exceeds the beta error threshold of .2.  This violates previously discussed elements of 
experimental design and theoretical assumptions.  Due to time limitations, observed beta is 
simply reported without further analysis.  However, the observed beta, observed power, and 
heading for sub-hypothesis 2 will be highlighted in amber to indicate that the power which we 
are utilizing to reject the null may be very weak. 
 Even though we failed to reject the null for three out of four sub-hypothesis, we must still 
reject the null for the main hypothesis.  There is a difference between training facilitator 
population and training user population proportions.   
 An explanation in the difference in population proportions for TBOC might be explained 
by the fact that the TBOC has not been officially established.  At the time of this study’s survey, 
the TBOC’s central repository had not yet been completed or made available to the Army 
homestation training community.  Some homestation training community members were aware 
of the TBOC’s existence, and requested exercise support, but it was not advertised as available to 
the community as a whole.  This could have contributed to differing proportions as some 
members of the community may have known that they could request support from the TBOC and 
others did not.  The other three emerging resources have been established and are readily 
available to all members of the community.  With that said, despite being readily available, it is 
evident that the majority of the homestation training community is unaware of all four of these 
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resources.  This seems to suggest that there is a need for improved advertisement and education 
efforts to increase awareness of these time saving resources.   
Research Question 13. Do each of the homestation training community populations hold an 
accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in the Army ITE? (SQ 32)  
H0 = The proportion of individuals who understand the true role of LVC-IA in establishing the 
Army ITE at homestation is greater than or equal to .80 
Ha = The proportion of individuals who understand the true role of LVC-IA in establishing the 
Army ITE at homestation is less than .80 
 A binomial test was conducted on responses to survey question 32 which can be found in 
Appendix C.  The proportion of homestation training community responses to this survey 
question were compared to a hypothesized proportion of .80.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 
were utilized for analysis of Research Question 12.  A medium effect size was desired for 
analysis of data.  The final population sample size of 92 more than meets the estimated minimum 
sample size requirement of 69 that was generated by a priori G*Power analysis for a medium 
effect size, alpha of .05, and beta of .2.  Post hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed 
data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 46 summarizes the results for the binomial test and G*Power post hoc power 
analysis for Research Question 13.   Columns one through four present alpha values, p values, 
observed proportion, observed beta values, and observed power.  The color red infers that less 
than 80% of the homestation training community has an accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in 
establishing the ITE.  The color amber infers that accurate view within the community is less 
than 80% (reject the null) despite a large beta error.  The color green infers that at least 80% of 
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the community has an accurate view of LVC-IA’s role.  Any p values or observed beta values 
that exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
 Table 46. Do each of the homestation training community populations hold an accurate view of LVC-
IA’s role in the Army ITE? (RQ 13) 
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
p < .001 0.21 0 1
Role of LVC-IA
 
Reject the Null Despite Large Beta Error
Table Legend
Less Than 80% of Homestaion Training Community has Accurate View of LVC-IA's Role
Statistical Inference
At Least 80% of Homestation Training Community has Accurate View of LVc-IA's Role
 
Research Question 13 Summary and Analysis 
 The binomial test suggests that the proportion of homestation training community 
members that possessed an accurate view of LVC-IA’s role was less than .80.   As shown in 
Table 46, the p value was less than .05 and the observed beta was less than .2.  Therefore we 
reject the null.  It would appear that the homestation training community does not have an 
accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in establishing the Army ITE.  Binomial test results 
corresponded with previous analysis, where descriptive statistics also indicated that there was a 
lack of understanding concerning LVC-IA. 
Research Question 13a.  Is there a significant difference between the proportion of training 
facilitators and the proportion of training users who displayed understanding of LVC-IA’s role in 
establishing the Army ITE at homestation? (SQ 32) 
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H0 = There is no significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the 
proportion of training users who displayed understanding of LVC-IA’s role in establishing the 
Army ITE at homestation  
Ha = There is a significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the 
proportion of training users who displayed understanding of LVC-IA’s role in establishing the 
Army ITE at homestation 
 A Chi-squared test was conducted on responses to survey question 32 to determine 
differences between population proportions.  Survey question 32 can be found in Appendix C.   
An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research Question 13a.  A medium 
effect size was desired for analysis of data.  The final population sample size of 92 did not meet 
the estimated minimum sample size requirements for the Chi-squared test as described by Cohen 
(1992) for an alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 
can only be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this research question.  Post 
hoc G*Power analysis was conducted on observed data to determine observed beta and power.   
 Table 47 summarizes results for the Chi-squared test and G*Power post hoc analysis of 
observed data for survey question 32.  The first column lists the two homestation training 
community population samples.  Columns two through six provide alpha values, p values, 
observed facilitator proportions, observed user proportions, observed beta values, and observed 
power under the heading of each emerging resource.  The color red indicates that a difference 
was detected between facilitator and user proportions.  The color amber infers that a significant 
difference was detected and we reject the null of no difference despite a large beta error.   The 
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color green indicates that no difference was detected.  Any p values or observed beta values that 
exceed established thresholds for alpha and beta error are indicated by bold text. 
Table 47. Is there a significant difference between the proportion of training facilitators and the proportion of 
training users who displayed understanding of LVC-IA’s role in establishing the Army ITE at homestation? 
(RQ 13a) 
Sample
α = .05                                                   
p values
Observed 
Facilitator 
Proportion
Observed
User 
Proportion
Observed β
Observed 
Power (1-β)
Facilitator
User
Role of LVC-IA
p = .001 0.33 0.5 0.622 0.378  
Table Legend
Level of Community Agreement
See Things Differently
See the World the Same
Reject the Null Despite Large Beta Error  
Research Question 13a Summary and Analysis 
 The resulting p value did not exceed the .05 threshold.  Therefore, we reject the null.  
There is a significant difference between population proportions.  However, as highlighted in 
amber above, the observed beta of .622 exceeds the beta error threshold of .2.  This violates 
previously discussed elements of experimental design and theoretical assumptions.  Due to time 
limitations, observed beta is simply reported without further analysis.  However, the observed 
beta, observed power, and heading for this single question will be highlighted in amber to 
indicate that the power which we are utilizing to reject the null may be very weak. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY 
Motivation 
 The motivation for this research lies in our nation’s historic tendency to dramatically 
reduce defense budgets and the ground component at the conclusion of every major conflict in 
the 20th century.  Poorly thought out downsizing, devoid of a plan to sustain force readiness, 
most often results in unacceptable losses during the initial combat of the next unforeseen war.  
Task Force Smith serves as a case study for this reoccurring phenomenon in American national 
defense policy, illustrating the true cost of failing to maintain a capable ground component.  The 
hard work and dedication of post Vietnam visionaries and reformers, such as Abrams and 
DePuy, laid the groundwork for political leaders such as President Reagan to produce an Army 
that was capable of winning the first battle of the next war fought years later under President 
Bush.  New doctrine and complementary weapon systems emphasized the importance of the 
combined arms concept.  Yet creation of the modern CTC and use of emerging virtual, 
distributed-simulations preserved and extended collective training opportunities.  These facilities 
in turn enhanced individual and unit learning leading to maximization of the effectiveness of the 
new systems in land combat without ever having to learn the costly lessons through actual 
combat.  This evolution of training methodology maintained force readiness through post 
conflict downsizing.  Despite limited resources of the Cold War drawdown, the pattern of first 
battle losses was broken during the battle of 73 Easting at the beginning of the first Gulf War.  
The Army has been successful in first combat ever since.   
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 As combat operations in Central and Southwest Asia come to a close, the Army is once 
again faced with extreme post-conflict budget cuts and force reductions.  Despite the anticipated 
era of” persistent conflict” sequestration will result in defense budget cuts nearing $1 trillion and 
a ground component force reduction of 72,000 over the next decade.  It would seem that the 
Army is at a decision point.  Will training methodology continue to evolve through application of 
innovative training solutions that ensure Army readiness, or will the painful lessons of Task 
Force Smith be forgotten?   
 An LVC-IA delivered ITE promises to be the next step in the evolution of training.  
Interoperation of live, virtual, and constructive simulations in a persistent and consistent manner 
can collectively train brigade and below units on combined arms tasks in a resource constrained 
environment.  The ITE hopes to simultaneously mitigate resource constraints and sustain 
worthwhile collective training by distributing the training audience across all three LVC training 
environments.  However, LVC-IA in itself is unable to provide an integrated training solution.  
Certain conditions must be set at homestation in order for LVC-IA to deliver a true ITE.  A 
training infrastructure of LVC TADSS, networks, and facilities must exist at homestation prior to 
LVC-IA fielding.  Training infrastructure is the physical means utilized to conduct training for 
which LVC-IA will provide interoperability. As per the 2012 Army Training Strategy, training 
infrastructure should be configured and managed in a manner that allows homestation leadership 
to optimize training resources.  Prior to LVC-IA fielding, homestations must also possess a 
framework for training that consists of doctrinally relevant scenarios, TADSS consumable 
databases, and comprehensive training support packages.  The framework for training drives 
training infrastructure that the LVC-IA has connected.  The scenarios of the framework for 
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training should meet Operational Adaptability requirements of the Army Training Strategy.  
Only scenarios that faithfully replicate a hybrid threat and complex OE are capable of training 
units for Decisive Action and the two core competencies of CAM and WAS.  Misconceptions 
regarding the role of LVC-IA and what is required at homestation to prepare for its fielding will 
only thwart the successful establishment of the ITE.  Therefore, the purpose of this research is to 
understand the current state and ability of training infrastructure and framework for training to 
support an LVC-IA delivered ITE from the homestation training community’s perspective.   
Research Design 
 The homestation training community of the 18 installations scheduled to receive LVC-IA 
over the next four years was the target population of this study.  This community is further 
broken down into “training facilitators” and “training users”.  Training facilitators primarily 
work in the homestation MTC and have gained extensive experience over the last decade 
leveraging local training infrastructure and framework for training to provide blended LVC 
training solutions.  Facilitators are also charged with ensuring that the proper conditions are set at 
their homestation for the successful fielding of LVC-IA and establishment of the ITE.  Training 
users are simulationists assigned to tenant Brigade, Division, and Corps level units.  Training 
users leverage or “use” the training capability provided by the local MTC to ensure that their 
unit’s training objectives are being accomplished.  Training users are exclusively Army 
Simulation Operations Officers (FA 57), while Training Facilitators can be FA 57s, CP 36s, or 
Department of the Army Civilians.    This population was targeted for its extensive experience 
with and knowledge of operations and use of modeling and simulations to conduct collective 
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training. Additionally, this is the population that will be directly involved in establishing the 
LVC-IA delivered ITE.   
 The 37 question survey consisted of two demographic sections (one at the beginning and 
one at the end), a Training Infrastructure section, a Framework for Training section, an Emerging 
Framework for training Resources section, and a Role of LVC-IA section.  Survey questions 
were geared towards brigade and below training.  The Army’s modular concept recognizes the 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as basic deployable unit of maneuver and it is designated as the 
primary training audience for homestation training.  With that said, Training users assigned at the 
division and corps level were solicited as they are directly involved coordinating training for 
subordinate brigades.   
 Survey responses were placed in the context of the LVC-IA version 1 Capability 
Development Document (CDD) (2009), the Draft Army ITE Strategy (2012), and the 2012 Army 
Training Strategy.  The LVC-IA version 1 CDD specifically indicates what training 
infrastructure (LVC TADSS, networks, and facilities) is required for successful establishment of 
the ITE at homestation.  The Draft Army ITE Strategy specifies framework for training 
(scenarios, databases, and training support packages) required for homestation establishment of 
the ITE.  Training guidance is issued in the Army Training Strategy which recommends use of 
training infrastructure to optimize training resources and doctrinally relevant scenarios to ensure 
Operational Adaptability.  The  
 A pilot study was conducted on 26 October, where senior Simulation Operation Officers 
(FA 57) from the Orlando area were administered a paper copy of the survey.  This pilot study 
provided valuable feedback regarding length of survey and format of questions, as well as 
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suggested changes to doctrinal content which was based on recent publication of ADP 3-0 
Unified Land Operations, and the 2012 Army Training Strategy.  All of these suggestions were 
applied to the final draft of the electronic survey.   
Data Collection 
 The U.S. Army Simulation Operations Proponent Office, which manages assignment of 
all Army simulationists, provided contact information for 161 potential respondents (59 
Facilitators and 102 Users) that worked at the 18 targeted homestations.   These 161 potential 
respondents were solicited using a modified Dillman approach (2000) to complete an online 
survey hosted on an Army simulation office site from December 3, 2012 to January 9, 2013.  
Throughout the data collection period no e-mail solicitations were returned by the e-mail system 
as invalid and no potential respondent was identified as deceased or no longer serving in their 
position.  This confirmed the validity of the e-mail contact list and original target population size 
of 161. 
Data Analysis 
  As recommended by Cohen (1992), all analysis was conducted with an alpha value of 
.05, a beta value of .2.  Non-parametric and descriptive statistics, as well as a priori and post hoc 
power analysis were utilized in data analysis.  SPSS v20.0 for Windows GradPack, Microsoft 
Excel, and G*Power v3.1.5 were the tools used for analysis. 
 G*Power software was utilized to conduct a priori power analysis on hypothetical data 
prior to the collection of observed data.  Cohen states that “statistical power analysis exploits 
among the four variables involved in statistical inference” (Cohen, 1992, p. 156).  This is the 
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basis of G*Power a priori power analysis of  significance level alpha, required power, and 
desired effect size to compute estimated minimum required sample sizes (Faul et al., 2007).  The 
authors of G*Power analysis software cite Cohen (1988) for the meaning of effect size estimates, 
which were used in this analysis. The purpose of a priori power analysis is to provide an efficient 
method of controlling statistical power before a study is actually conducted (Faul et al., 2007).   
Experimental statistical inferences of alpha, beta, effect size, and sample size were all based on a 
priori power analysis. 
   Non-parametric tests of significance were conducted on observed ordinal data for 
research questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.  Any test of significance that gave a p value 
which exceeded the threshold of .05 resulted in failure to reject the null.  Descriptive statistics 
were utilized to analyze the observed data pertaining to research questions 5, 12, and 13.      
Additional analysis was conducted after defense on Research Questions 1, 2, 12, and 13.  
Binomial and Chi-squared tests were performed to compliment the Wilcoxon signed-rank and 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests performed on Research Question 1 and 2 data sets.  Binomial and 
Chi-squared tests were also performed on Research Questions 12 and 13 to supplement 
descriptive statistics. 
 G*power software was utilized to conduct post hoc power analysis on observed data 
upon completion of this study’s survey.  Post hoc power analysis considers alpha, the population 
effect size, and the actual sample size to compute observed beta and power (1- β).  Any post hoc 
power analysis that gave a power larger than .80, which would be a beta that exceeds the .2 
threshold, resulted in failure to reject the null.  The G*Power user guide refers to post hoc power 
analysis as “retrospective power analysis”.  It goes on to explain that the effect size is estimated 
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from sample data and used to calculate the “observed power”, which is a sample estimate of the 
true power (Heinrich Heine University, n.d.).  The highly questionable assumption that the 
sample effect size is identical to the effect size in the population from which it is drawn serves as 
the basis for G*Power’s post hoc analysis.  This assumption is likely to be false with smaller 
sample sizes.  Sample effect sizes are usually biased representations of the population (Heinrich 
Heine University, n.d).   
 Unlike the assumed essentially infinite total population that underlies the G*Power 
remarks, in this study, the sample size actually accounts for a large percentage of the total 
population.  The survey closed on 9 January 2013, with the responses of 92 out of 161 potential 
participants being accepted into the data pool for analysis, resulting in 57.1% response rate.  This 
overall response rate of 57.1% is typical of similar e-mail surveys of federal employees, which 
averaged 51.6% and ranged between 37% and 61% (Shih & Fan, 2009).  Since the sample size 
actually approaches total population size, the assumption that the sample effect size is essentially 
identical to effect size in the total population is not without merit.  Further, the use of the post 
hoc power analysis in this study simply supplements the experimental statistical analysis 
thresholds determined by a priori.  Additionally, actual sample sizes far exceed theoretical 
minimums in all but one statistical test.  In the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare 
independent samples, actual sample size did not obtain to theoretical sample size for the 
experimental conditions.  In that case, a priori analysis was performed again to identify the effect 
size appropriate to the sample size available.  The analysis revealed that a large effect size could 
be used with the sample and was subsequently used in all related analysis.   
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 Homogeneity tests determined that the quantity of “e-mail sent” to “e-mail received” 
differed significantly between the training facilitator and training user populations.  The highest 
response rate was found in the training facilitator population with 51 out of 59 responding at a 
rate of 86.4%.  The lowest response rate was found in the training user population with 41 out of 
102 responding at a rate of 40.2%.     
 No reference which could be cited was found to directly explain the lower response rate 
found in the training user population.  However, the speculative explanation of high operational 
tempo may apply.  In addition to leveraging homestation LVC TADSS, networks, and facilities 
to meet their unit’s training objectives, many Army Simulation Operations Officers are assigned 
additional duties.  Most FA 57s also serve as battalion and brigade assistant operations officers 
as it is widely known that they are recruited from the operational realm.  Despite the end of 
operations in Iraq, continuing combat operations in Afghanistan have sustained a high 
operational tempo and abbreviated training timelines for this population.  With short periods 
between deployments, the near continual rotation of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in and out 
of theater is typified by limited training time at home station (Funk & Longo, 2011).  
Additionally, it is known that several of the solicited training users were deployed at the time of 
the survey.  It may be that 61 of the 102 potential respondents were just too busy to participate.  
Conversely, training facilitators are assigned to homestation MTCs where they work within the 
hours of a normal duty day (9:00 am-5:00 pm), and do not deploy.   
 Cronbach’s alpha was utilized to confirm the reliability of population responses for 
survey questions that had been grouped together to answer specific research questions.  Survey 
questions 11-18 were designed to answer Research Questions 3 and 4, which deal with the 
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perceived ability of training infrastructure to optimize training resources.  The resulting alpha for 
survey questions 11-18 (Optimize Training Resources) was .614, indicating that the relationship 
between these eight questions and reliability of responses is questionable (Kline, 1999).  Survey 
questions 20 and 23-27 were designed to answer Research Questions 10 and 11, which deal with 
the perceived ability of scenarios to meet Operational Adaptability training requirements.  The 
resulting alpha for survey questions 20 and 23-27 (Operational Adaptability) was .557, indicating 
that the relationship between these six questions and reliability of responses is poor (Kline, 
1999).  As Research Questions 3, 4, 10, and 11 do not possess the statistical confidence that was 
hoped for, they will not be presented as conclusions.  However, they will be discussed as 
limitations and lessons learned later in this chapter.   
Data and Analysis Summary 
 Table 48 is provided below to summarize the data and analysis presented in Chapter 4.  
This table is intended to be utilized as a reference while considering the remainder of this 
chapter.  The first column of this table presents each of the thirteen research questions and 
corresponding null hypotheses in an abbreviated format.  Column two indicates the conclusion 
for each hypothesis.  A single asterisk following the inference in column two indicates a 
questionable Chronbach’s alpha.  A double asterisk following the inference in column two 
indicates a poor Chronbach’s alpha. There is no null hypothesis or statistical inference for 
research questions 5, 12, or 13 as descriptive statistics were used for analysis.  Column three 
provides response characteristics in the form of response averages, differences in population 
responses, or percentages.  The fourth column specifies were detailed data can be found.  
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 Likewise, Table 49 is provided below to summarize the post defense analysis presented 
in chapter 4.  New hypotheses and results for statistical tests of inference are presented in the 
same manner as they presented in Table 48.  This enables comparison of additional binomial and 
Chi-squared analysis with the initial analysis summarized in Table 48.  Reliability of responses 
and questionable Chronbach’s alpha were not issues in the additional analysis summarized in 
Table 49. 
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Table 48. Data and analysis summary 
Abbreviated Research Question & Null 
Statistical 
Inference 
Response Level Reference 
1. Training infrastructure meet LVC-IA CDD requirements?                                                                    
H0:  Median number of each LVC-IA CDD requirement reported 
by 92 the homestation training community population = 1 
Reject Null 
Median number of all LVC-
IA CDD requirements 
reported by 92 respondents 
was less than 1 
Tables 12, 13 
2. Difference between Facilitator population and User population 
reporting of required training infrastructure?                                 
 H0: No difference between Facilitator and User reporting 
Reject Null 
Difference in reporting for 
JLCCTC-ERF, Simulation 
Network & MTC  
Table 14, 15 
3. Perceived ability of training infrastructure to “Optimize 
Training Resources” different from “Undecided” for any given 
Optimize Training Resources question?                                                                                                          
H0: For each population, perceived ability of training 
infrastructure = “Undecided” for any given Optimize Training 
Resources question 
Reject Null
* 
Responses ranged from  
“Somewhat Disagree” to 
“Strongly Disagree” for 2 of 8 
questions and  “Somewhat 
Agree” to “Agree” for 4 of 8 
questions  
Tables 17, 18 
4. Difference between Facilitator and User population 
perceptions regarding the ability of training infrastructure to 
“optimize training resources”?                                                                                          
H0: No difference between Facilitator and User perceptions 
Fail to 
Reject Null 
* 
No significant difference 
between population responses 
Table 20 
5. Homestations possess training product (training support 
packages, databases, scenarios) repositories?                                                    
H0: N/A, Descriptive Statistics Utilized for Analysis 
N/A 
78.4% of Facilitators & 
73.2% of Users responded 
“Yes” 
Table 21 
6. Perceived existence of TADSS consumable databases within 
homestation training product repositories different from 
“Undecided?                                                                                  
H0: For each population, perceived existence of TADSS 
consumable databases = “Undecided” 
Reject Null 
Response average for both 
populations was closest to 
“Somewhat Agree” 
Tables 23, 24 
7. Difference between Facilitator and User population 
perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable 
databases within homestation training product repositories?                                                                                  
H0: No difference between Facilitator and User perceptions 
Fail to 
Reject Null
No significant difference 
between population responses 
Table 26 
8. Perceived existence of comprehensive training support 
packages within homestation training product repositories 
different from “Undecided”?                                                                               
H0: Perceived existence of comprehensive training support 
packages = “Undecided”. 
Reject Null 
Response average for both 
populations was closest to 
“Somewhat Agree” 
Tables 28, 29 
9. Difference between Facilitator and User perceptions regarding 
the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories?                                                                   
H0: No difference between Facilitator and User perceptions 
Fail to 
Reject Null
No significant difference 
between population responses 
Table 31 
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Abbreviated Research Question & Null 
Statistical 
Inference 
Response Level Reference 
10. Perceived ability of training repository scenarios to meet 
Operational Adaptability requirements different from 
“Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question?                                                 
H0: Perceived ability of training repository scenarios = 
“Undecided” for any given Operational Adaptability question. 
Reject Null 
** 
Both populations responded 
“Somewhat Disagree” for 1 of 
6 questions and “Somewhat 
Agree” to “Agree” for 5 of 6 
questions  
Tables 33, 34 
11. Difference between Facilitator and User perceptions 
regarding the ability of training repository scenarios to meet the 
Operational Adaptability requirements?                                                      
H0: No difference between Facilitator and User perceptions 
Fail to 
Reject Null 
** 
No significant difference 
between population responses 
Table 36 
12. Aware of emerging resources that can be leveraged to 
develop the framework for training?                                                                           
H0: N/A, Descriptive Statistics Utilized for Analysis 
N/A
No more than 31.5% of 92 
respondents indicated known 
use of any of the emerging 
resources 
Tables 37, 38, 
39, 40 
13. Accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in the Army ITE? 
H0: N/A, Descriptive Statistics Utilized for Analysis 
N/A 
58.8% of Facilitators & 
53.7% of Users indicated an 
accurate role of LVC-IA 
Table 41 
* Chronbach’s alpha considered questionable 
** Chronbach’s alpha considered poor 
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Table 49. Additional analysis Summary 
Abbreviated Research Question & Null 
Statistical 
Inference 
Response Level Reference 
1. Training infrastructure meet LVC-IA CDD requirements?                                                                    
H0:  For all LVC-IA CDD requirements, the proportion of 
homestation training community members who reported 
availability is greater than or equal to .80 
Reject Null 
Proportion of at least .80 
reported that JLCCT-ERF & 
MTC were available at 
homestation 
Table 42 
2. Difference between Facilitator population and User population 
reporting of required training infrastructure?                                 
 H0: There is no significant difference between the proportion of 
training facilitators and proportion of training users that reported 
availability of LVC-IA CDD requirements 
Reject Null 
Difference in population 
proportions for JLCCTC-
ERF, Simulation Network & 
MTC  
Table 43 
12. Aware of emerging resources that can be leveraged to 
develop the framework for training?                                                                           
H0: The proportion of homestation training community members 
who reported use of emerging Framework for Training resources 
is greater than or equal to .80 for all four emerging resources 
Reject Null 
All four resources had 
proportions less than .80 
Table 44 
12a. Is there a significant difference between the proportion of 
training facilitators and the proportion of training users who 
indicated awareness of emerging framework for training 
resources? 
H0: There is no significant difference between the proportion of 
training facilitators and the proportion of training users who 
indicated awareness of emerging Framework for Training 
resources 
Reject Null 
Difference in population 
proportions for TBOC 
Table 45 
13. Accurate view of LVC-IA’s role in the Army ITE? 
H0: The proportion of individuals who understand the true role 
of LVC-IA in establishing the Army ITE at homestation is 
greater than or equal to .80 
Reject Null 
Proportion of those who 
expressed an accurate view 
was less than .80 
Table 46 
13a. Is there a significant difference between the proportion of 
training facilitators and the proportion of training users who 
displayed understanding of LVC-IA’s role in establishing the 
Army ITE at homestation? 
H0: There is no significant difference between the proportion of 
training facilitators and the proportion of training users who 
displayed understanding of LVC-IA’s role in establishing the 
Army ITE at homestation 
Reject Null 
No difference in population 
proportions 
Table 47 
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Conclusions 
1. Does currently available homestation training infrastructure meet the 
requirements of LVC-IA version 1?  From the homestation training community 
perspective, this research found that training infrastructure does not currently meet 
LVC-IA CDD version 1 requirements.  Both Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and 
Binomial tests arrived at this same conclusion. 
a. Wilcoxon signed-rank test:  One sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were 
utilized to compare median responses with a constant of 1 for all ten LVC-IA 
CDD version 1 requirements.  A median response equal to 1 would suggest 
that the homestation training community population reported possession of a 
particular LVC-IA CDD requirement.  Analysis of this research question 
involved the entire sample of 92 homestation training community members.  
A medium effect size of .5 was assumed. Analysis was conducted with a 
threshold alpha value of .05, a threshold beta value of .2.   The training 
facilitator and training user data utilized for analysis are not homogeneous.    
b. Wilcoxon signed-rank test results:  Resulting p values for the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test were all less than .05.  Post hoc power analysis indicated 
acceptable beta error, which was less than .2, for all sub-hypotheses.  The 
actual mean quantity reported for all LVC-IA CDD requirements was less 
than 1.  The data supports the alternative hypothesis, median number of each 
LVC-IA CDD version 1 training infrastructure requirement reported by the 
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homestation training community population ≠ 1, we can reject the null.  Table 
48 summarizes these results and indicates where detailed data can be found.   
c. Binomial test:  A binomial test was conducted on responses for each of the 
ten training infrastructure requirements.    The proportion of homestaion 
training community responses for all ten LVC-IA CDD requirements was 
compared to a hypothesized proportion of .80.  A medium effect size was 
assumed.  Analysis was conducted with a threshold alpha value of .05, a 
threshold beta value of .2. The training facilitator and training user data 
utilized for analysis are not homogeneous. 
d. Binomial test results:  Resulting p values for the binomial test were less than 
.05 for all sub-hypotheses, except SH 6 (JLCCTC-ERF), and SH 9 (MTC).  
Post hoc power analysis indicated acceptable beta error, which was less than 
.2, for all sub-hypotheses, except SH 6 (JLCCTC-ERF), SH 9 (MTC), and SH 
10 (Combined Arms T.A.s).  The data supports the alternative hypothesis that 
states “ for any LVC-IA CDD requirements, the proportion of homestation 
training community members who reported availability is less than .80”.  We 
can reject the null.  Table 49 summarizes these results and indicates where 
detailed data can be found.   
e. Impact of high visibility on training infrastructure awareness and 
reporting:  JLCCT-ERF had the highest mean quantities reported for the 
LVC TADSS category, Simulation Networks had the highest mean quantity 
reported for Networks category, and MTCs Capable of Blending BDE Level 
LVC Training had the highest mean quantity reported for Facilities category.   
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It is interesting that the training infrastructure with the highest mean quantity 
reported is located at, or emanates from the MTC.  All other training 
infrastructure requirements, with lower mean quantities reported, may be 
distributed across the installation at various locations, decreasing their 
visibility to the homestation training community population.   Higher mean 
quantity reported for these three elements of training infrastructure could be 
associated with the higher visibility afforded by collocation with the MTC.   
Awareness of these training enablers could be improved within the user 
population through MTC provided capability briefs.  Presentations at key 
training user forums, such as brigade training meetings or G3 training 
conferences, would inform users on the existence, availability, and usefulness 
of these capabilities.  
f. Potential impact of Army acquisition on LVC-IA CDD required LVC 
TADSS:  It should be noted that even though many respondents reported the 
absence of LVC TADSS at their homestation, this does not mean that they 
will not receive them prior to their LVC-IA fielding.  The TADSS of each 
LVC environment have their own TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) as 
well as a Program Executive Office for simulation, Training, & 
Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) Project Manager (PM).  The Live, Virtual, and 
Constructive TCMs “plan manage and integrate training enablers [TADSS] to 
support current and future force operational systems and develop the future 
LVC training environments to support the Army ITE” (U.S. Army Combined 
Arms Center, n.d.).  TCMs define the required capabilities for the TADSS of 
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their training environment.  For example, TCM Virtual plans, manages, and 
integrates all of the ITE’s virtual TADSS which include: CCTT, RVTT, 
AVCATT, and CFFT.  The PEO-STRI PMs “acquire, field, and sustain” the 
LVC TADSS for their particular training environment (U.S. Army Program 
Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, n.d.).  PEO-
STRI PMs serve as material providers who fulfill the capability requirements 
as specified by the TCMs.  The acquisition and fielding process accomplished 
by these two entities is loosely synchronized with the LVC-IA fielding plan 
which has its own TCM and PEO-STRI PM.  No reference could be found 
which could be cited, but in the author’s experience, disruption of training due 
to asynchronous fielding of training system subcomponents is not an 
uncommon occurrence.  With that said, homestations that are proactive in the 
fielding process have a higher probability of receiving LVC-IA CDD required 
LVC TADSS prior to LVC-IA fielding.  Required networks and facilities are 
the responsibility of individual homestations. 
2. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user 
population reporting of required homestation training infrastructure?  This 
research found significant differences between facilitator and user population 
responses for the training infrastructure elements of:  JLCCT-ERF, Permanent 
Simulation Network, and MTC Capable of Blending BDE Level Training.  Both 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests and Chi-squared tests arrived at the same conclusion 
for the same three training infrastructure elements. 
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a. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test:  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests were utilized 
to detect significant differences between Facilitator and User responses.  
Analysis of this research question involved the entire population of 92 
homestation training community members. The minimum required sample 
size of 136 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, given by a priori power 
analysis, exceeds this research question’s final sample size of 92.  This 
limitation indicates that we can no longer assume a medium effect size and 
should expect a large effect size for analysis of this research question. 
Analysis was conducted with a threshold alpha value of .05, a threshold beta 
value of .2.   The training facilitator and training user data utilized for analysis 
are not homogeneous.    
b. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test results:  Alpha and beta error exceeded 
established thresholds for all infrastructure elements except for the three listed 
above.  This statistical difference in reporting between populations is evident 
in the mean quantity reported for these three training infrastructure 
requirements.  JLCCTC-ERF had a facilitator mean quantity reported of .8824 
and a user mean quantity reported of .5610.  Permanent Simulation Network 
had a facilitator mean quantity reported of .7255 and a user mean quantity 
reported of .3659.  MTC Capable of Blending BDE Level Training had a 
facilitator mean quantity reported of .9216 and a user mean quantity reported 
of .7317.  Table 48 summarizes these results and indicates where detailed data 
can be found.   
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c. Chi-squared test:  Chi-squared tests were utilized to detect significant 
differences between Facilitator and User population reporting  proportions.   .   
An alpha of .05 and a beta of .2 were utilized for analysis of Research 
Question 2.  A medium effect size was desired for analysis of data.  The final 
population sample size of 92 did not meet the estimated minimum sample size 
requirements for the Chi-squared test as described by Cohen (1992) for an 
alpha of .05, beta of .2, and medium effect size.  An alpha of .05 and a beta of 
.2 can only be maintained if a large effect size is present for analysis of this 
research question.  The training facilitator and training user data utilized for 
analysis are not homogeneous.    
d. Chi-squared test results:  Similar to the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test, the chi-squared test produced alpha and beta error that exceeded 
established thresholds for all infrastructure elements except JLCCTC-ERF, 
Permanent Simulation Network, and MTC.  The two tests only differed in that 
a large observed beta error was produced during post hoc power analysis for 
SH 9 (MTC).  This suggests that the chi-squared test may have utilized low 
statistical power to reject the null for SH 9.  Table 49 summarizes these results 
and indicates where detailed data can be found.   
e.  Lack of exposure impacts awareness of training enablers:  It is interesting 
that the mean quantity reported by training facilitators is consistently higher 
than that of training users for these three elements.  This may be attributed to 
the fact that all three of these elements of training infrastructure inherently 
belong to and are controlled by training facilitators.   Training user contact 
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with these three elements would not be as prevalent which may explain the 
lower mean quantity reported.  As suggested above in previous findings, MTC 
capability briefs to tenant unit organizations may improve awareness of these 
training enablers within the training user population.  
3. Do homestations possess training product (training support packages, databases, 
scenarios) repositories?  Descriptive statistics were utilized to indicate what 
percentage of the surveyed homestation training community has access to a local 
training product repository.  Analysis of this research question involved the entire 
population of 92 homestation training community members.  Power analysis was not 
required to analyze this question as descriptive statistics were utilized.   
a. Descriptive analysis:  Just over 75% of the 92 homestation training 
community members that were surveyed have a training product repository at 
their disposal.  Of the 51 training facilitators who responded, 78.4% indicated 
“yes”, their homestation possesses a training product repository.  Of the 41 
training users who responded, 73.2% indicated “yes”, their homestation 
possesses a training product repository. Only respondents who answered “yes” 
to survey question 19 were presented with survey questions 20-27.  This 
reduces the sample population from 51 training facilitators and 41 training 
users (total of 92) to 40 training users and 30 training users (total of 70) for 
Research Questions 6-11.  Table 48 summarizes these results and indicates 
where detailed data can be found. 
b. Descriptive analysis results:  Local training product repositories embody the 
homestation framework for training.  The repository is the logical place to 
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compile, and make available to the entire local training community, the 
scenarios, databases, and training support packages required to drive a 
blended or integrated LVC exercise.  Analysis shows that slightly less than 
one fourth of the 92 surveyed homestation training community members are 
lacking this means to drive training.  This 25% must develop a framework for 
training prior to the fielding of LVC-IA at their homestaion.  Developing a 
local repository at this point may require more time and resources that current 
fiscal realities will permit.  Table 48 summarizes these results and indicates 
where detailed data can be found. 
4. Are training facilitator population and training user population perceptions 
regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases within homestation 
training product repositories different from “Undecided”?  The perceived 
existence of TADSS consumable databases was different from “Undecided” for both 
the facilitator population and the user population.  We reject the null hypothesis 
which states that there is no difference between perceived existence of TADSS 
consumable databases and “Undecided”.  
a. Wilcoxon signed-rank test:  The one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was 
utilized to compare median responses to a hypothesized median of 
ambivalence, or “Undecided”.  Analysis of this research question only 
involved 70 out of 92 surveyed homestation training community members. A 
medium effect size of .5 was assumed. Analysis was conducted with a 
threshold alpha value of .05, a threshold beta value of .2.   The training 
facilitator and training user data utilized for analysis are not homogeneous.    
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b.  Wilcoxon signed-rank test results:  Resulting p values were all less than 
.05.  We reject the null.   The overwhelmingly positive response for this single 
question suggests that all existing training product repositories reported by the 
study population contain databases of a format that is recognizable and usable 
by all LVC TADSS and mission control systems.  However, post hoc power 
analysis gave a beta error that exceeded the established threshold of .2 within 
the facilitator population.  This suggests that low statistical power may have 
been used to reject the null.  Table 48 summarizes these results and indicates 
where detailed data can be found. 
5. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user 
population perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS consumable databases 
within homestation training product repositories? There is no significant 
difference between population perceptions.   
a. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test:  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was 
utilized to detect significant differences between Facilitator and User 
responses.  Analysis of this research question only involved 70 out of 92 
surveyed homestation training community members. The minimum required 
sample size of 136 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, given by a priori 
power analysis, exceeds this research question’s final sample size of 70.  This 
limitation indicates that we can no longer assume a medium effect size and 
should expect a large effect size for analysis of this research question. 
Analysis was conducted with a threshold alpha value of .05, a threshold beta 
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value of .2.   The training facilitator and training user data utilized for analysis 
are not homogeneous.    
b. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test results:  We accept the null hypothesis which 
states that there is no difference between training facilitator population and 
training user population perceptions regarding the existence of TADSS 
consumable databases within homestation training product repositories. Table 
48 summarizes these results and indicates where detailed data can be found. 
6. Are training facilitator population and training user population perceptions 
regarding the existence of comprehensive training support packages within 
homestation training product repositories different from “Undecided”?  The 
perceived existence of comprehensive training support packages was different from 
“Undecided” for the facilitator and user populations.  We reject the null hypothesis 
which states that there is no difference between perceived existence of comprehensive 
training support packages and “Undecided”.  
a. Wilcoxon signed-rank test:  The one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was 
utilized to compare median responses to a hypothesized median of 
ambivalence, or “Undecided”.  Analysis of this research question only 
involved 70 out of 92 surveyed homestation training community members.  A 
medium effect size of .5 was assumed. Analysis was conducted with a 
threshold alpha value of .05, a threshold beta value of .2.   The training 
facilitator and training user data utilized for analysis are not homogeneous.    
b. Wilcoxon signed-rank test results:  Resulting p values were all less than .05.  
We reject the null.   The overwhelmingly positive response for this single 
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question suggests that all existing training product repositories reported by the 
study population contain comprehensive training support packages.  However, 
post hoc power analysis gave a beta error that exceeded the established 
threshold of .2 within the user population.  A large beta error suggests that low 
statistical power was utilized to reject the null.  Table 48 summarizes these 
results and indicates where detailed data can be found. 
7. Is there a difference between training facilitator population and training user 
population perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive training 
support packages within homestation training product repositories?  There is no 
significant difference between population perceptions.   
a. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test:  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was 
utilized to detect significant differences between Facilitator and User 
responses.  Analysis of this research question only involved 70 out of 92 
surveyed homestation training community members.   The minimum required 
sample size of 136 for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, given by a priori 
power analysis, exceeds this research question’s final sample size of 70.  This 
limitation indicates that we can no longer assume a medium effect size and 
should expect a large effect size for analysis of this research question. 
Analysis was conducted with a threshold alpha value of .05, a threshold beta 
value of .2.   The training facilitator and training user data utilized for analysis 
are not homogeneous.    
b. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test results:  We accept the null hypothesis which 
states that there is no difference between training facilitator population and 
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training user population perceptions regarding the existence of comprehensive 
training support packages within homestation training product repositories. 
Table 48 summarizes these results and indicates where detailed data can be 
found. 
8. Is the homestation training community aware of emerging resources that can be 
leveraged to develop the framework for training?  Both descriptive statistics and 
the binomial test indicated that awareness of emerging resources useful in developing 
a Framework for Training is low within the homestation training population.    
a. Descriptive analysis:  Of 92 respondents, 37.3% of facilitators and 24.4% of 
users indicated that their unit or MTC had utilized DATE (Decisive Action 
Training Environment) to replicate the conditions of the operational 
environment or structure of the opposing force.  Of 92 respondents, 35.3% of 
facilitators and 12.2% of users indicated that their unit or MTC had utilized 
TRADOC G2's TBOC (Training Brain Operations Center) to resource training 
support packages (orders, graphics, event lists, etc.).  Of 92 respondents, 
13.7% of facilitators and 9.8% of users indicated that their unit or MTC had 
utilized JTDS (Joint Training Data Services) to generate TADSS consumable 
databases.   
b. Binomial test:  A binomial test was conducted on responses for each of the 
four emerging resources of CFoS, DATE, TBOC, and JTDS.  The proportion 
of homestaion training community responses for all four emerging resources 
was compared to a hypothesized proportion of .80.  A medium effect size was 
assumed.  Analysis was conducted with a threshold alpha value of .05, a 
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threshold beta value of .2. The training facilitator and training user data 
utilized for analysis are not homogeneous. 
c. Binomial test results:  Resulting p values for the binomial test were less than 
.05 for all sub-hypotheses.  We can reject the null.  Table 49 summarizes these 
results and indicates where detailed data can be found.   
d. Implied need to educate homestation training community:  Limited 
homestation training community awareness of these emerging resources is 
interesting, considering their value in “optimizing training resources”.  Much 
time and effort could be saved by utilizing any one of these resources to 
develop the contents of local training product repositories.  Increased effort to 
educate the homestation training community on existence and location of 
these assets may help to streamline the exercise design process.  This is 
especially true of the training user population, which consistently displayed a 
lower level of awareness for all four emerging resources.  These tools would 
be extremely useful to that approximate one fourth of the surveyed 
homestation training community that indicated lack of a local training product 
repository. 
9. Do each of the homestation training community populations hold an accurate 
view of LVC-IA’s role in the Army ITE?  Both descriptive statistics and the 
binomial test indicated that the majority of the homestation training community does 
not hold an accurate view of  LVC-IA’s role in establishing the Army ITE.  
a. Descriptive analysis:  Out of 51 training facilitators, 33.3% indicated that 
they did not know the true role of LVC-IA, 58.8% chose the correct role of 
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LVC-IA in their answer, and approximately 16-30% included incorrect roles 
in their answer.  Out of 41 training facilitators, 43.9% indicated that they did 
not know the true role of LVC-IA, 53.7% chose the correct role of LVC-IA in 
their answer, and approximately 20-39% included incorrect roles in their 
answer.   
b. Binomial test:  A binomial test was conducted on responses to this single 
question.  The proportion of homestaion training community responses for 
this question was compared to a hypothesized proportion of .80.  A medium 
effect size was assumed.  Analysis was conducted with a threshold alpha 
value of .05, a threshold beta value of .2. The training facilitator and training 
user data utilized for analysis are not homogeneous. 
c. Binomial test results:  The resulting p value for the binomial test was less 
than .05 for this question.  We can reject the null.  Table 49 summarizes these 
results and indicates where detailed data can be found.   
d. Implied need to educate homestation training community:  The large 
number of respondents that indicated “don’t know” or chose incorrect roles 
for LVC-IA is surprising.  Especially, since all respondents are trained 
simulation professionals who will be expected to establish the Army ITE 
when LVC-IA is fielded at their homestations.   The lack of understanding 
seems to primarily exist in the less experienced portion of the homestation 
training community.  Demographic data indicates that all 18 MTC directors 
and the majority of their deputies displayed an accurate understanding of 
LVC-IA’s role.  This would suggest the need to educate junior members of the 
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user population on the true role of LVC-IA in establishing the Army ITE.  If 
the homestation training community does not understand the true role of 
LVC-IA in the Army ITE, it is doubtful they will understand the type and 
level of training infrastructure and framework for training required to establish 
the ITE at their local installations.  
Limitations 
 This cross-sectional study provided a “snap shot” of local training infrastructure and 
framework for training, from the homestation training community’s perspective, just as LVC-IA 
fielding was beginning.  The current study cannot determine the outcome of LVC-IA fielding 
and whether or not the Army ITE will in fact be the next step in the evolution of training 
methodology.  This study can only comment on what conditions have been set to ensure the 
success of an LVC-IA delivered ITE. 
 Time and resources available to conduct this study limited the primary instrument for 
data collection to an electronic survey.  A physical audit at each of the 18 installations would 
have provided a detailed snapshot of homestation training infrastructure and framework for 
training.  However, this would have exceeded the timeframe allotted for this plan of study and 
required an unacceptable level of funding for travel.  The e-mail survey permitted collection of 
data over a relatively short period of time and negated the need to conduct travel.   
 The strong survey response rate of 57.1% was typical of similar e-mail surveys of federal 
employees (Shih & Fan, 2009) and it provided viable set of data to analyze.  With that said, self-
selection surveys can be limited by bias and result in a sample that is not representative of the 
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larger population.  The impact that self-selection bias may have had on this study will be 
discussed as a lesson learned later in this chapter. 
 The original intent was to analyze the current state of training infrastructure and 
framework for training at each of the 18 homestations scheduled for LVC-IA fielding.  However, 
members of the homestation training community are not evenly distributed across the 18 
installations scheduled to receive LVC-IA.  As an example, the MTC in Germany has 30 
simulation professionals working at it, while the Fort Knox MTC only has one.  Additionally, 
demographic data was lacking in the “homestation location” category and it is not possible to 
conduct analysis on the current disposition of LVC TADSS, networks and facilities at the 
installation level.  Small homestation cell sizes in combination with incomplete “homestation 
location” demographic data limited analysis to the training facilitator and training user 
populations.   
 The final number of respondents, whose data was accepted into the analysis pool, was 92. 
51 of the respondents were identified as facilitators and 41 respondents were identified as users. 
This final number of 92 did not meet the minimum sample size requirements estimated by a 
priori power analysis for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  This sample size limitation 
indicated that we could no longer assume a medium effect size and should expect a large effect 
size for analysis of research questions where differences between the two populations were 
sought.   
Lessons Learned 
 Research Questions 3, 4, 10, and 11 were excluded as conclusions due to low reliability 
of responses.  Chronbach’s alpha levels were less than .7 for all data sets that supported these 
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research questions.  While it is unfortunate that these four research questions had to be discarded, 
a few lessons learned, which may be useful to future research, were captured.   
 Several survey questions were not worded as elegantly as intended, which may have 
created response reliability issues. Due to their reverse-wording, survey question 12 (AWAY 
FROM HOMESTATION TRAINING REQUIRED) and survey question 27 (LIMITED TO 
COIN-CENTRIC THEMES) required negative responses to answer in the positive.  Response 
averages for these two questions appeared in the “Disagree” range.  Respondents “Disagreed” to 
some level that off post travel was required to conduct training and that currently available 
scenarios are limited to COIN-centric themes of the last decade.  However, disagreement with 
the question indicated a positive perception.  This anomaly may have contributed to the low 
response reliability alphas and the exclusion of research questions.  Avoidance of reverse-
worded questions in future research may increase response reliability.   
 Use of Chronbach’s alpha to test for response reliability of pilot survey data would be 
useful in early detection of reverse-worded questions.  The pilot survey for this study only 
included three individuals, as three qualified participants were all that could be found in the local 
area.  Due to the small sample size, it is doubtful that analysis of this study’s pilot would have 
revealed response reliability problems.  However, pilot analysis is recommended for all future 
research.  Pilot size is a limitation of this study and belongs in the previous section, but it 
facilitated understanding to discuss it here.  
 Self-selection bias that is found in e-mail surveys can also affect response reliability.  
Respondents choose to participate in self-selected surveys for a multitude of reasons, each of 
which is accompanied by a certain amount of bias.   It was hoped that those who chose to 
participate in this study did so out of a sense of professional pride and the desire to improve 
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Army training methodology.  Two events that took place during data collection would suggest 
alternative motives to participate.    
  A week after the survey had been released; very few responses had been received.  To 
increase the participation level, the Director of the National Simulation Center, sent out a 
reminder e-mail to all those had had not yet participated.  It should be noted that the tone of the 
NSC Director’s reminder was cordial and the voluntary nature of participation was reiterated.  
This single e-mail from a highly respected and recognized member of the Army simulation 
operations community increased the response rate considerably.  Were the people who responded 
after this e-mail reminder still doing so out of a sense of professional pride?  It is possible that 
they were responding because a senior ranking Army officer asked them to do so.  It is also 
possible that their responses were no longer objective, but influenced by the perception that they 
were being ordered to do something.   
 Halfway through the data collection process, the Army Simulations Operations Proponent 
Office announced that the author of this thesis would become the next FA 57 Assignments 
Officer.  It should be noted that this announcement was made without the author’s knowledge.  
This meant that the future assignments of the majority of the potential respondents would be 
determined by the individual soliciting them to participate.  A second significant increase in 
response rate occurred after this announcement.  Were respondents motivated to respond out of 
professional pride, or out of fear of getting an undesirable assignment?   
 Both of these events may have introduced bias and influenced response reliability.  This 
may have contributed to low reliability alphas.  When at all possible, any events with the 
potential to impact response objectivity and reliability should be avoided.  If the author had 
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known, he would have asked that the announcement of his next duty assignment be postponed 
until after closure of the survey.   
Suggested Future Research 
 This research hoped to provide an installation level accounting of the current state and 
ability of training infrastructure and framework for training to establish an LVC-IA delivered 
ITE.  It was discovered that use of an electronic survey limited the scope of this accounting to 
the training facilitator and training user populations.  A physical audit, in which the investigator 
visited all 18 installations, may provide the installation level detail desired. Of course research of 
this sort would require a level of time and resources that were not available for the conduct of 
this study.   
 The current study investigates the homestation training environment as it exists just prior 
to fielding of LVC-IA and the establishment of the ITE.  A study conducted post LVC-IA 
fielding, that associates level of local training infrastructure and framework for training with 
successful establishment of the ITE and satisfaction of Army Training Strategy guidance may be 
the next logical cross-section to investigate. Such a study has potential to indicate if findings of 
the current study have been recognized and addressed by the homestation training community. 
 Subsequent versions of LVC-IA, still in development, will attempt to establish the Army 
ITE to entire regions and eventually across the entire force.  A future study of follow-on versions 
of LVC-IA that possess an expanded footprint and larger training audience might provide 
valuable insights regarding the potential impact of capability to conduct distributed training at a 
higher echelon on force readiness.  
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 For some homestations, establishment of the ITE may depend on the coordinated efforts 
of TCMs and PEO-STRI PMs to deliver LVC TADSS required by the LVC-IA CDD prior to 
fielding of LVC-IA.  A future study of the extent to which establishment of the ITE is dependent 
on the synchronized fielding of LVC TADSS may be informative.  This study might provide 
valuable insight on the impact of the Army acquisition process on establishment of the LVC-IA 
delivered ITE at homestation.    
 
  
255 
 
APPENDIX A – IRB APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX B – INFORMED CONSENT 
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Authority:  The Department of the Army may collect the information requested in this survey 
under the authority of 10 United States Code, Section 2358, “Research and Development 
Projects.”  In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), this notice informs 
you of the purpose, use, risks, benefits, and confidentiality of this survey.    
 
Purpose of the Study:  The purpose of this study is to investigate the current state and ability of 
homestation training infrastructure (TADSS, facilities, and networks) and framework for training 
(scenarios, databases, and training support packages) to support a LVC-IA delivered ITE. 
 Responses are sought from the Training Facilitator and Training User points of view.    
 
Personal Benefits of this Study:  There is no personal compensation or benefit of any kind 
associated with participation in this study.    
 
Risks or Discomforts:  Whenever one works with the Internet there is always the risk of 
compromising privacy, confidentiality, and/or anonymity.  Despite this possibility, the risks to 
your physical, emotional, social, professional, or financial well-being are considered to be 
minimal.  No risks or discomforts are anticipated from taking part in this study.  If you feel 
uncomfortable with a question, you can skip that question or withdraw from the study altogether. 
 If you decide to quit at any time before you have finished the questionnaire, your answers will 
NOT be recorded.    
 
Confidentiality:   Participation is voluntary and responses will be kept anonymous and 
confidential. Only the researcher will see your individual survey responses.  You will not be 
asked to provide your name or any personally identifiable information that could link your 
identity with your responses.    
 
We cannot provide "confidentiality" or "non-attribution," to a participant regarding comments 
involving criminal activity/behavior, or statements that pose a threat to yourself or others.  Do 
NOT discuss or comment on classified or operationally sensitive information during this 
survey.    
 
How the findings will be used: The results of the study will be used for scholarly purposes only. 
The results from the study may be presented in educational settings, and the results might be 
published in a professional journal in the field of Simulations for Training.  Additionally, study 
data may be utilized by the Army to inform future decisions related to implementation of the 
ITE.    
 
Contact information: If you have concerns or questions about this study, please contact MAJ 
Edward B. Lerz at edward.lerz@us.army.mil or Michael D. Proctor, Ph.D., LTC (Retired) at 
michael.proctor@ucf.edu      
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APPENDIX C – FINAL SURVEY QUESTIONS 
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Demographics (Part 1) 
 
1. Which of the following best describes you and your assigned place of duty? 
 
 Code 1: CP 36 assigned to a MTC (Mission Training Center), Simulation Center, or COE 
 (Center of Excellence) 
 
 Code 2: DAC (Department of the Army Civilian) assigned to a MTC, Simulation Center, 
 or COE 
 
    Code 3: FA 57 assigned to a MTC, Simulation Center, or COE 
 
    Code 4: FA 57 assigned to a Brigade, Division, or Corps 
 
    Code 5: Newly designated FA 57 still working in your basic branch 
 
Homestation Training Infrastructure 
 
2. Which of the following LVC TADSS does your homestation possess?  Check all that apply. 
 
    Code 1: I-HITS (Initial-Homestation Instrumentation Training System), or HITS 
 (Homestation  Instrumentation Training System) 
 
    Code 2: CCTT (Close Combat Tactical Trainer) 
 
    Code 3: RVTT (Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer) 
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    Code 4: AVCATT (Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer) 
 
    Code 5: CFFT (Call For Fire Trainer) 
 
    Code 6: JLCCTC-ERF (Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability-Entity  
 Resolution Federation) 
 
3. Which of the following networks does your homestation possess?  Check all that apply. 
 
    Code 1: Permanent fiber simulation network that connects LVC TADSS and the MTC 
 
    Code 2: Persistent tactical network for training that prevents cross-domain (classified to 
 unclassified) spillage during exercise execution 
 
4. Which of the following facilities does your homestation possess?  Check all that apply. 
 
    Code 1: MTC capable of blending LVC training 
 
    Code 2: Ranges and training areas capable of supporting live-fire combined arms 
 maneuver 
 
5. How large of a unit can HITS or I-HITS instrumented training areas of your homestation 
support in the live training environment at one time?  Choose the highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None, homestation does not have I-HITS or HITS 
 
    Code 2: Platoon 
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    Code 3: Company/Troop 
 
    Code 4: Battalion/Squadron 
 
    Code 5: Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 6: More than a Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 7: I don't know 
 
6. How large of a unit can the CCTT at your homestation support in the virtual training 
environment at one time?  Choose the highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None, homestation does not have CCTT 
 
    Code 2: Platoon 
 
    Code 3: Company/Troop 
 
    Code 4: Battalion/Squadron 
 
    Code 5: Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 6: More than a Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 7: I don't know 
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7. How large of a training audience can the RVTT at your homestation support in the virtual 
training environment at one time?  Choose the highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None, homestation does not have RVTT 
 
    Code 2: One vehicle crew 
 
    Code 3: Two vehicle crews 
 
    Code 4: Three vehicle crews 
 
   Code 5: Four vehicle crews 
 
    Code 6: More than four vehicle crews 
 
    Code 7: I don't know 
 
8. How large of a training audience can the AVCATT at your homestation support in the virtual 
training environment at one time?  Choose the highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None, homestation does not have AVCATT 
 
    Code 2: One helicopter crew 
 
    Code 3: Two helicopter crews 
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    Code 4: Three helicopter crews 
 
    Code 5: Four helicopter crews 
 
    Code 6: Five helicopter crews 
 
    Code 7: Six helicopter crews 
 
    Code 8: More than six helicopter crews 
 
    Code 9: I don't know 
 
9. How large of a unit can the JLCCTC-ERF at your homestation support in the constructive 
training environment at one time?  Choose the highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None, homestation does not have JLCCTC-ERF 
 
    Code 2: Platoon 
 
    Code 3: Company/Troop 
 
    Code 4: Battalion/Squadron 
 
    Code 5: Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 6: More than a Brigade/Regiment 
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    Code 7: I don't know 
 
10. How large of a unit can your MTC support in an exercise that blends all three LVC 
environments?  Choose the highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None, homestation does not have a MTC 
 
    Code 2: Platoon 
 
    Code 3: Company/Troop 
 
    Code 4: Battalion/Squadron 
 
    Code 5: Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 6: More than a Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 7: I don't know 
 
11. Tenant units are provided with a flexible menu of TADSS, networks, and facilities that can 
be tailored to meet specific training objectives within a blended training environment. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
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   Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
12. Due to lack of on-site training areas and facilities, tenant units must conduct troop movement 
away from homestation to conduct combined arms training at the brigade echelon. 
  
*Please exclude Maneuver Combat Training Center (MCTC) rotations or separate training 
areas commonly associated with your installation when considering your response to this 
question. Examples of separate training areas commonly associated with installations include 
but are not limited to: Joint Base Lewis-McChord/Yakima Training Center; Fort Carson/Pinion 
Canyon; Fort Bliss/White Sands Missile Range; Schofield Barracks/Pohakuloa Training Area; 
USAEUR/JMTC Grafenwoehr. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
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    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
13. Current level of homestation TADSS, facilities, and networks cannot support blended 
LVC training without the supplemental lease, purchase, or installation of temporary training 
infrastructure. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
14. Homestation training infrastructure (TADSS, facilities, and networks) is capable of 
mitigating training resource constraints by spreading the training audience across all three LVC 
environments. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
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    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
15. Use of homestation TADSS, facilities, and networks to conduct brigade and below blended 
training requires minimal lead time, coordination, and resources. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
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16. At the completion of a blended exercise, training infrastructure is not dismantled and residual 
capability remains, making it easier for the next unit to set up and conduct blended training. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
17. A clear and concise system to schedule and coordinate homestation TADSS, facilities, and 
networks in support of blended training has been made known to all tenant units. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
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    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
18. G3 conferences or similar forums exist at my homestation where all training stakeholders 
(tenant units, MTC, range control, facilities managers, etc.) are able to coordinate and de-conflict 
training infrastructure requirements. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
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Homestation Framework for Training 
19. Does your MTC or another homestation training entity possess a training product repository 
of "off the shelf" scenarios, databases, and training support packages that are readily available 
for the design of blended training? 
 
    Code 1: Yes 
 
    Code 2: No 
 
    Code 3: I don't know 
 
20. Scenarios in your training product repository replicate the complex/uncertain operational 
environment and hybrid threat that are required for the training of Decisive Action (formerly Full 
Spectrum Operations). 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
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    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
21. Your training product repository includes databases typically required for blended training 
exercises, in a format that is compatible with all LVC TADSS and tenant unit mission command 
systems. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
22. Your training product repository includes comprehensive Training Support Packages (orders, 
graphics, event list, etc.) that can be utilized with minimal refinement. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
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    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
23. Scenarios from your training product repository are comprehensive enough to fulfill the 
highly specific training objectives of Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF) as well as the 
more generalized training objectives of Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF). 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
24. Scenarios from your training product repository exercise the entire combined arms team, to 
include support and logistics elements. 
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    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
25. Scenarios from your training product repository are flexible enough to accommodate 
common Decisive Action dynamics such as: "plug and play" task organization, varying 
combinations of offense/defense/stability operations, lethal to non-lethal transitions, and 
changing human terrain. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
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    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
26. Scenarios from your training product repository cover the full spectrum of conflict, allowing 
units to train both Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
 
    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
 
27. The scope of available repository scenarios is limited to the COIN-centric operations of the 
last decade. 
 
    Code 1: Strongly Disagree 
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    Code 2: Disagree 
 
    Code 3: Somewhat Disagree 
 
    Code 4: Undecided 
 
    Code 5: Somewhat Agree 
 
    Code 6: Agree 
 
    Code 7: Strongly Agree 
Emerging Framework for Training Resources 
28. Has your MTC ever utilized TRADOC's CFoS (Common Framework of Scenarios) to design 
an exercise? 
 
    Code 1: Yes 
 
    Code 2: No 
 
    Code 3: I don't know 
 
29. Has your MTC ever utilized DATE (Decisive Action Training Environment) to replicate the 
conditions of the operational environment or structure of the opposing force? 
 
    Code 1: Yes 
 
    Code 2: No 
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    Code 3: I don't know 
 
30. Has TRADOC G2's TBOC (Training Brain Operations Center) ever provided your MTC or 
a tenant training unit with training support packages (orders, graphics, event lists, etc.)? 
 
    Code 1: Yes 
 
    Code 2: No 
 
    Code 3: I don't know 
 
31. Has your MTC ever utilized JTDS (Joint Training Data Services) to generate TADSS 
consumable exercise databases? 
 
    Code 1: Yes 
 
    Code 2: No 
 
    Code 3: I don't know 
Role of LVC-IA in Establishing Homestation ITE 
32. When fielded, which of the following components of the Army ITE will LVC-IA provide?  
Check all that apply. 
 
    Code 1: Integrating Architecture that connects dissimilar LVC TADSS in a persistent and 
 accredited fashion 
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    Code 2: Installation of any missing LVC TADSS (HITS, CCTT, AVCATT, RVTT, 
 CFFT,  JLCCTC-ERF) 
 
    Code 3: Upgrade of homestation facilities (MTC, live maneuver ranges, etc.) 
 
    Code 4: Installation of a permanent simulation network that connects all homestation 
 LVC TADSS 
 
    Code 5: Persistent tactical network for training that prevents cross-domain (classified to 
 unclassified) spillage during exercise execution 
 
    Code 6: "Off the shelf" exercise scenarios that meet current doctrinal requirements for 
 training of Decisive Action (formerly Full Spectrum Operations) 
 
    Code 7: Scenario databases that are recognizable and usable by all LVC TADSS and 
 Army mission command systems 
 
    Code 8: Comprehensive training support packages that include orders, graphics and event 
 lists 
 
    Code 9: I don't know 
Demographics (Part 2) 
33. What is your current duty position? 
 
    Code 1: MTC Director 
 
    Code 2: MTC Deputy Director 
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    Code 3: Plans Chief 
 
    Code 4: Operations Chief 
 
    Code 5: LVC Coordinator 
 
    Code 6: Simulations Chief 
 
    Code 7: FA 57, CP 36, or DAC assigned to a MTC, serving in a position that is not listed 
 above 
 
    Code 8: FA 57, CP 36, or DAC assigned to a COE (Center of Excellence) 
 
    Code 9: FA 57 assigned to a Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 10: FA 57 assigned to a Division 
 
    Code 11: FA 57 assigned to a Corps 
 
    Code 12: Recently designated FA 57 still working in my basic branch 
 
34. What is your current homestation? 
 
    Code 1: Alaska (Fort Wainright/Fort Richardson) 
 
    Code 2: Fort Benning 
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    Code 3: Fort Bliss 
 
    Code 4: Fort Bragg 
 
    Code 5: Fort Campbell 
 
    Code 6: Fort Carson 
 
    Code 7: Fort Drum 
 
    Code 8: Fort Hood 
 
    Code 9: Fort Knox 
 
    Code 10: Joint Base Lewis-McChord 
 
    Code 11: Fort Polk 
 
    Code 12: Fort Riley 
 
    Code 13: Fort Rucker 
 
    Code 14: Schofield Barracks 
 
    Code 15: Fort Sill 
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    Code 16: Fort Stewart 
 
    Code 17: USAREUR (JMTC/JMSC) 
 
    Code 18: Korea (KBSC) 
 
35. What is your level of operational experience?  Choose highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None 
 
    Code 2: Team/Squad 
 
    Code 3: Platoon 
 
    Code 4: Company/Troop 
 
    Code 5: Battalion/Squadron 
 
    Code 6: Brigade/Regiment 
 
    Code 7: Division and above 
 
36. What is your level of Simulation Operations experience? Choose highest level. 
 
    Code 1: None 
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    Code 2: 1-2 years 
 
    Code 3: 3-4 years 
 
    Code 4: 5-6 years 
 
    Code 5: 7-8 years 
 
    Code 6: 9-10 years 
 
    Code 7: Over 10 years 
 
37. What is your highest level of simulation operations training/education?  Choose highest 
level. 
 
    Code 1: No formal simulations training/education 
 
    Code 2: Introductory Army Simulation Operations Training (U.S. Army Simulations 
 Operations  
 Course or U.S. Army Battle Command Officer Integration Course) 
 
    Code 3: Advanced Army Simulation Operations Training (U.S. Army Advanced 
 Simulation Operations Course) 
 
    Code 4: B.S. in Computer Science, Engineering, Information Technology, or other 
 technical field  related  to M&S 
 
    Code 5: CP 36 Internship 
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    Code 6: M.S. in M&S, Computer Science, Engineering, Information Technology, or 
 other technical field related to M&S 
 
    Code 7: PhD in M&S, Computer Science, Engineering, Information Technology, or other 
 technical field related to M&S  
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APPENDIX D – DATA 
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Participant ID Response Participant ID Response Participant ID Response
1 1 32 1 63 4
2 3 33 1 64 4
3 3 34 3 65 4
4 2 35 3 66 5
5 2 36 1 67 5
6 3 37 3 68 5
7 3 38 3 69 4
8 1 39 1 70 4
9 2 40 2 71 5
10 3 41 3 72 5
11 2 42 3 73 4
12 1 43 2 74 5
13 2 44 3 75 4
14 1 45 2 76 4
15 3 46 3 77 4
16 1 47 1 78 4
17 1 48 1 79 4
18 3 49 3 80 5
19 2 50 2 81 4
20 1 51 1 82 5
21 2 52 5 83 4
22 2 53 5 84 4
23 1 54 4 85 4
24 3 55 4 86 4
25 2 56 4 87 4
26 1 57 4 88 4
27 1 58 4 89 4
28 1 59 4 90 4
29 2 60 4 91 4
30 1 61 4 92 4
31 1 62 4
Survey Question 1
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Participant ID: Participant ID: Participant ID:
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 32 5 6 63 2 3 5 6
2 6 33 1 3 4 6 64 1 2 3 5 6
3 3 4 5 6 34 3 4 5 6 65 6
4 2 3 5 6 35 1 2 5 6 66 7
5 4 5 36 1 2 4 6 67 7
6 2 3 4 5 6 37 1 2 3 4 5 6 68 7
7 1 2 3 4 5 6 38 1 2 3 4 6 69 2 3 4 5
8 1 3 5 6 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 70 7
9 1 3 4 5 6 40 3 5 6 71 1 2 3 4 5 6
10 3 4 5 6 41 7 72 2 5
11 3 4 5 6 42 1 2 3 4 5 6 73 3 4 5 6
12 2 3 4 6 43 1 2 3 4 5 74 2 3 5
13 3 5 6 44 6 75 1 3 4 5 6
14 3 4 6 45 1 3 4 5 6 76 6
15 2 3 4 5 6 46 1 3 4 5 6 77 1 2 3 4 5 6
16 4 5 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 78 1 2 4 6
17 3 5 6 48 2 3 4 6 79 2 3 4 5
18 4 5 49 7 80 2 3 5 6
19 6 50 1 2 3 4 5 6 81 3 5 6
20 1 2 3 4 5 6 51 1 3 4 5 6 82 2 3 5
21 6 52 2 3 4 5 83 7
22 1 2 3 4 5 6 53 2 84 2 3 6
23 1 2 3 4 5 6 54 4 5 6 85 1 3 4 5
24 6 55 2 3 4 5 86
25 2 3 4 5 6 56 1 2 3 4 5 6 87 2 3 4 5 6
26 2 3 4 5 6 57 3 4 6 88 7
27 1 3 4 5 6 58 1 3 4 5 6 89 2 3 5 6
28 2 3 4 5 6 59 1 3 4 5 6 90 7
29 1 2 3 4 5 6 60 1 2 3 4 5 6 91 4 5 6
30 6 61 1 2 3 4 5 6 92 1 3 4 5 6
31 6 62 1 3 4 5
Response Response Response
Survey Question 2
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Participant ID: Participant ID: Participant ID:
1 1 32 1 63 1 2
2 3 33 1 2 64 3
3 1 2 34 3 65 1 2
4 1 35 3 66 3
5 1 2 36 1 2 67 3
6 1 37 3 68 3
7 1 2 38 3 69 1
8 2 39 1 70 2
9 1 2 40 1 71 1 2
10 1 2 41 1 72 3
11 1 2 42 2 73 2
12 1 43 1 2 74 3
13 2 44 1 75
14 2 45 1 76 3
15 1 2 46 1 2 77 1 2
16 1 47 1 78 1
17 1 48 2 79 3
18 2 49 2 80 3
19 1 2 50 1 2 81 2
20 1 51 1 2 82 1
21 2 52 3 83 2
22 1 2 53 3 84 1 2
23 1 2 54 3 85 1 2
24 1 55 1 86
25 1 56 3 87
26 1 2 57 3 88 1
27 1 2 58 1 2 89 2
28 59 2 90 3
29 1 60 1 91 3
30 1 61 1 2 92 2
31 1 62 1
Response Response Response
Survey Question 3
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Participant ID: Participant ID: Participant ID:
1 1 2 32 1 2 63 1 2
2 1 33 1 2 64 1 2
3 1 2 34 1 65 1
4 1 2 35 2 66 3
5 1 36 3 67 1 2
6 1 2 37 1 2 68 2
7 1 2 38 1 2 69 1 2
8 1 39 1 2 70 1
9 1 2 40 1 71 1 2
10 1 2 41 1 2 72 3
11 1 2 42 1 2 73 1 2
12 1 2 43 1 2 74 2
13 1 2 44 1 75 1 2
14 1 2 45 1 2 76 1
15 1 2 46 1 2 77 1 2
16 1 47 1 2 78 1 2
17 1 48 1 2 79 1 2
18 2 49 1 2 80 3
19 1 2 50 1 2 81 1 2
20 1 2 51 1 2 82 1
21 1 52 2 83 1
22 1 53 3 84 1 2
23 1 2 54 1 2 85 1 2
24 1 55 3 86
25 1 2 56 1 2 87 1 2
26 1 2 57 1 88 1 2
27 1 2 58 1 2 89 2
28 1 59 1 2 90 2
29 1 2 60 1 2 91 1 2
30 1 61 1 2 92 1 2
31 3 62 1
Response ResponseResponse
Survey Question 4
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 4 32 7 63 4
2 1 33 3 64 5
3 5 34 1 65 1
4 1 35 7 66 7
5 1 36 7 67 7
6 7 37 4 68 7
7 7 38 4 69 7
8 3 39 4 70 4
9 4 40 1 71 2
10 1 41 6 72 7
11 1 42 7 73 1
12 7 43 4 74 7
13 1 44 2 75 5
14 5 45 4 76 6
15 1 46 4 77 5
16 1 47 4 78 4
17 5 48 7 79 7
18 1 49 5 80 7
19 1 50 4 81 1
20 4 51 2 82 6
21 1 52 7 83 7
22 5 53 7 84 7
23 4 54 7 85 3
24 1 55 1 86 1
25 1 56 4 87 3
26 5 57 1 88 7
27 3 58 7 89 1
28 1 59 4 90 7
29 6 60 4 91 7
30 6 61 4 92 7
31 7 62 1
Survey Question 5
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 3 32 1 63 3
2 1 33 1 64 7
3 4 34 1 65 1
4 1 35 4 66 7
5 1 36 7 67 7
6 4 37 1 68 3
7 4 38 3 69 3
8 1 39 4 70 1
9 1 40 1 71 2
10 1 41 6 72 2
11 1 42 7 73 1
12 7 43 2 74 4
13 1 44 1 75 1
14 5 45 1 76 7
15 2 46 1 77 4
16 1 47 3 78 3
17 7 48 4 79 2
18 1 49 5 80 7
19 1 50 4 81 1
20 3 51 1 82 6
21 1 52 5 83 5
22 4 53 7 84 2
23 3 54 1 85 1
24 1 55 2 86 1
25 3 56 3 87 4
26 3 57 7 88 6
27 1 58 1 89 4
28 4 59 1 90 7
29 3 60 3 91 7
30 1 61 3 92 1
31 1 62 1
Survey Question 6
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 5 32 7 63 6
2 1 33 5 64 7
3 7 34 6 65 1
4 3 35 1 66 7
5 1 36 1 67 7
6 7 37 4 68 7
7 7 38 7 69 5
8 5 39 5 70 1
9 5 40 5 71 5
10 3 41 6 72 7
11 5 42 7 73 3
12 5 43 5 74 5
13 5 44 1 75 3
14 3 45 6 76 7
15 5 46 5 77 7
16 1 47 3 78 1
17 7 48 5 79 3
18 1 49 7 80 7
19 7 50 5 81 6
20 5 51 5 82 7
21 1 52 5 83 5
22 5 53 6 84 5
23 5 54 1 85 4
24 1 55 6 86 1
25 5 56 7 87 5
26 5 57 7 88 7
27 4 58 7 89 5
28 5 59 4 90 7
29 4 60 5 91 7
30 1 61 3 92 5
31 1 62 5
Survey Question 7
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 5 32 1 63 9
2 1 33 7 64 9
3 9 34 5 65 1
4 1 35 1 66 9
5 7 36 9 67 9
6 9 37 9 68 9
7 7 38 5 69 9
8 1 39 7 70 1
9 7 40 1 71 3
10 5 41 9 72 9
11 7 42 9 73 7
12 7 43 7 74 9
13 1 44 1 75 7
14 9 45 8 76 9
15 5 46 7 77 9
16 7 47 3 78 7
17 1 48 9 79 3
18 7 49 8 80 9
19 7 50 5 81 9
20 5 51 7 82 9
21 9 52 9 83 9
22 3 53 9 84 9
23 7 54 9 85 4
24 1 55 9 86 1
25 5 56 7 87 9
26 5 57 9 88 9
27 3 58 7 89 1
28 5 59 2 90 1
29 5 60 9 91 8
30 1 61 3 92 9
31 1 62 3
Survey Question 8
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 2 63 6
2 6 33 6 64 6
3 6 34 6 65 5
4 5 35 4 66 7
5 1 36 7 67 7
6 6 37 5 68 7
7 5 38 7 69 7
8 5 39 6 70 1
9 5 40 5 71 6
10 5 41 6 72 7
11 5 42 6 73 6
12 5 43 7 74 7
13 5 44 6 75 5
14 5 45 6 76 6
15 6 46 5 77 5
16 6 47 6 78 6
17 5 48 6 79 7
18 1 49 5 80 7
19 6 50 6 81 6
20 5 51 5 82 7
21 6 52 7 83 7
22 6 53 7 84 6
23 5 54 7 85 1
24 3 55 1 86 1
25 5 56 6 87 6
26 5 57 6 88 6
27 5 58 7 89 6
28 5 59 5 90 5
29 5 60 6 91 5
30 6 61 6 92 5
31 6 62 7
Survey Question 9
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 7 63 6
2 7 33 5 64 6
3 6 34 6 65 4
4 5 35 1 66 7
5 5 36 6 67 7
6 5 37 5 68 5
7 5 38 4 69 6
8 5 39 5 70 1
9 5 40 5 71 6
10 5 41 6 72 7
11 6 42 6 73 6
12 6 43 7 74 7
13 5 44 6 75 5
14 5 45 5 76 5
15 6 46 5 77 6
16 6 47 4 78 5
17 5 48 6 79 4
18 5 49 5 80 7
19 5 50 5 81 6
20 5 51 5 82 7
21 6 52 1 83 5
22 6 53 7 84 5
23 7 54 5 85 5
24 1 55 7 86 1
25 6 56 6 87 5
26 5 57 7 88 6
27 5 58 5 89 7
28 5 59 5 90 1
29 5 60 6 91 3
30 6 61 4 92 5
31 6 62 4
Survey Question 10
 
 
  
295 
 
Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 7 32 2 63 7
2 5 33 6 64 6
3 7 34 2 65 6
4 7 35 2 66 4
5 3 36 6 67 4
6 4 37 6 68 6
7 6 38 4 69 7
8 5 39 4 70 6
9 7 40 3 71 6
10 7 41 6 72 4
11 6 42 6 73 6
12 6 43 7 74 5
13 6 44 5 75 5
14 6 45 6 76 6
15 7 46 6 77 6
16 6 47 7 78 6
17 4 48 7 79 5
18 6 49 6 80 3
19 7 50 6 81 6
20 7 51 6 82 2
21 6 52 6 83 6
22 6 53 7 84 5
23 2 54 5 85 6
24 5 55 3 86 4
25 7 56 7 87 6
26 7 57 1 88 6
27 6 58 6 89 5
28 5 59 5 90 6
29 7 60 6 91 6
30 6 61 5 92 3
31 4 62 6
Survey Question 11
 
 
  
296 
 
Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 1 32 3 63 1
2 7 33 6 64 3
3 7 34 5 65 7
4 3 35 1 66 1
5 1 36 1 67 4
6 4 37 4 68 2
7 2 38 5 69 1
8 6 39 1 70 1
9 3 40 2 71 4
10 4 41 2 72 7
11 4 42 4 73 5
12 4 43 4 74 1
13 2 44 4 75 3
14 1 45 5 76 2
15 2 46 4 77 2
16 5 47 1 78 3
17 4 48 2 79 2
18 1 49 4 80 1
19 1 50 2 81 4
20 3 51 1 82 7
21 3 52 1 83 1
22 1 53 4 84 1
23 2 54 5 85 3
24 1 55 2 86 7
25 4 56 3 87 3
26 1 57 7 88 5
27 2 58 3 89 2
28 2 59 5 90 4
29 1 60 4 91 2
30 3 61 5 92 2
31 3 62 5
Survey Question 12
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 5 63 2
2 6 33 6 64 6
3 2 34 7 65 4
4 5 35 7 66 4
5 3 36 2 67 4
6 4 37 4 68 6
7 2 38 7 69 2
8 3 39 5 70 6
9 2 40 3 71 2
10 2 41 1 72 4
11 2 42 4 73 4
12 2 43 2 74 4
13 3 44 3 75 2
14 2 45 3 76 5
15 1 46 2 77 4
16 6 47 2 78 5
17 4 48 3 79 3
18 7 49 6 80 4
19 7 50 3 81 5
20 1 51 2 82 5
21 6 52 3 83 6
22 2 53 4 84 2
23 3 54 4 85 3
24 6 55 3 86 4
25 2 56 2 87 5
26 1 57 2 88 4
27 2 58 4 89 7
28 2 59 5 90 4
29 5 60 2 91 2
30 5 61 3 92 2
31 4 62 6
Survey Question 13
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 4 63 6
2 6 33 6 64 6
3 7 34 1 65 3
4 5 35 1 66 5
5 5 36 2 67 4
6 2 37 4 68 4
7 6 38 4 69 3
8 6 39 6 70 6
9 7 40 2 71 6
10 7 41 6 72 4
11 5 42 5 73 6
12 5 43 7 74 4
13 6 44 5 75 6
14 2 45 6 76 5
15 7 46 6 77 6
16 6 47 6 78 7
17 5 48 6 79 6
18 6 49 6 80 3
19 5 50 5 81 5
20 6 51 6 82 5
21 5 52 6 83 6
22 6 53 4 84 6
23 4 54 3 85 6
24 3 55 3 86 4
25 6 56 6 87 5
26 7 57 6 88 4
27 6 58 5 89 1
28 5 59 5 90 4
29 5 60 6 91 6
30 5 61 5 92 3
31 4 62 6
Survey Question 14
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 4 63 6
2 2 33 2 64 3
3 2 34 1 65 5
4 5 35 5 66 4
5 1 36 2 67 4
6 1 37 1 68 4
7 6 38 6 69 4
8 2 39 2 70 6
9 5 40 3 71 2
10 3 41 6 72 4
11 4 42 4 73 3
12 4 43 1 74 5
13 3 44 5 75 3
14 2 45 5 76 4
15 3 46 2 77 1
16 6 47 3 78 1
17 3 48 2 79 5
18 6 49 6 80 2
19 4 50 3 81 2
20 5 51 5 82 2
21 6 52 2 83 6
22 5 53 4 84 4
23 2 54 1 85 5
24 2 55 3 86 2
25 1 56 3 87 3
26 5 57 1 88 3
27 3 58 1 89 2
28 5 59 3 90 5
29 3 60 5 91 2
30 4 61 3 92 3
31 3 62 3
Survey Question 15
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 5 32 2 63 6
2 2 33 2 64 4
3 3 34 1 65 6
4 2 35 4 66 5
5 3 36 2 67 4
6 2 37 3 68 4
7 2 38 6 69 3
8 2 39 6 70 4
9 6 40 3 71 6
10 3 41 6 72 4
11 5 42 6 73 2
12 5 43 2 74 4
13 2 44 5 75 2
14 2 45 3 76 3
15 3 46 5 77 2
16 6 47 6 78 1
17 6 48 6 79 5
18 6 49 2 80 3
19 4 50 3 81 5
20 5 51 6 82 6
21 3 52 5 83 6
22 3 53 4 84 3
23 5 54 3 85 4
24 2 55 3 86 4
25 2 56 7 87 3
26 7 57 5 88 4
27 6 58 2 89 5
28 3 59 5 90 4
29 3 60 5 91 6
30 5 61 2 92 3
31 3 62 6
Survey Question 16
 
 
  
301 
 
Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 4 63 6
2 1 33 6 64 6
3 7 34 1 65 6
4 6 35 4 66 5
5 2 36 5 67 4
6 2 37 5 68 4
7 5 38 6 69 7
8 5 39 6 70 4
9 5 40 6 71 6
10 7 41 6 72 4
11 4 42 4 73 4
12 4 43 7 74 3
13 6 44 5 75 4
14 6 45 2 76 4
15 5 46 3 77 6
16 4 47 3 78 1
17 2 48 6 79 6
18 5 49 6 80 2
19 4 50 5 81 7
20 6 51 4 82 5
21 6 52 2 83 6
22 3 53 4 84 4
23 3 54 5 85 3
24 4 55 2 86 4
25 6 56 6 87 6
26 7 57 6 88 4
27 6 58 7 89 7
28 6 59 6 90 5
29 6 60 4 91 2
30 4 61 6 92 2
31 3 62 6
Survey Question 17
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 6 63 7
2 1 33 6 64 5
3 7 34 1 65 6
4 6 35 5 66 5
5 2 36 4 67 6
6 6 37 6 68 6
7 6 38 6 69 6
8 5 39 6 70 7
9 3 40 5 71 6
10 7 41 6 72 4
11 6 42 6 73 5
12 6 43 6 74 4
13 3 44 4 75 6
14 2 45 6 76 5
15 6 46 5 77 6
16 2 47 6 78 5
17 2 48 6 79 6
18 5 49 6 80 6
19 7 50 7 81 5
20 7 51 5 82 5
21 7 52 6 83 6
22 7 53 4 84 7
23 6 54 6 85 6
24 4 55 2 86 6
25 6 56 6 87 6
26 7 57 7 88 7
27 6 58 7 89 7
28 6 59 6 90 6
29 6 60 7 91 6
30 3 61 6 92 7
31 4 62 4
Survey Question 18
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 1 32 3 63 1
2 2 33 1 64 1
3 1 34 2 65 1
4 1 35 1 66 3
5 1 36 2 67 1
6 3 37 1 68 3
7 1 38 1 69 1
8 1 39 2 70 1
9 1 40 1 71 1
10 1 41 1 72 3
11 1 42 1 73 1
12 1 43 3 74 3
13 1 44 1 75 1
14 2 45 1 76 2
15 1 46 1 77 3
16 1 47 1 78 2
17 1 48 1 79 1
18 1 49 1 80 3
19 1 50 1 81 1
20 1 51 1 82 1
21 1 52 1 83 1
22 1 53 3 84 1
23 2 54 1 85 1
24 3 55 2 86 1
25 1 56 1 87 1
26 1 57 1 88 1
27 1 58 1 89 1
28 1 59 1 90 1
29 1 60 1 91 1
30 1 61 1 92 2
31 3 62 1
Survey Question 19
 
 
  
304 
 
Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 6
3 7 34 65 5
4 6 35 6 66
5 5 36 67 6
6 37 5 68
7 6 38 6 69 6
8 5 39 70 6
9 5 40 6 71 6
10 7 41 6 72
11 6 42 6 73 5
12 6 43 74
13 7 44 6 75 6
14 45 6 76
15 6 46 2 77
16 6 47 4 78
17 6 48 6 79 5
18 5 49 6 80
19 2 50 5 81 7
20 6 51 7 82 6
21 6 52 6 83 6
22 7 53 84 6
23 54 5 85 5
24 55 86 4
25 6 56 7 87 5
26 7 57 4 88 5
27 6 58 7 89 7
28 6 59 6 90 4
29 5 60 6 91 6
30 6 61 5 92
31 62 6
Survey Question 20
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 5 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 6
3 6 34 65 6
4 6 35 2 66
5 1 36 67 4
6 37 4 68
7 6 38 4 69 4
8 2 39 70 2
9 2 40 6 71 5
10 6 41 6 72
11 5 42 6 73 5
12 5 43 74
13 3 44 6 75 4
14 45 5 76
15 5 46 2 77
16 6 47 4 78
17 6 48 3 79 5
18 3 49 6 80
19 4 50 3 81 7
20 5 51 5 82 6
21 6 52 6 83 6
22 4 53 84 6
23 54 4 85 3
24 55 86 4
25 2 56 7 87 5
26 7 57 4 88 4
27 5 58 4 89 2
28 6 59 5 90 4
29 3 60 6 91 6
30 6 61 5 92
31 62 4
Survey Question 21
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 3 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 3
3 6 34 65 5
4 5 35 1 66
5 3 36 67 4
6 37 5 68
7 5 38 4 69 5
8 6 39 70 6
9 4 40 5 71 6
10 6 41 6 72
11 5 42 6 73 4
12 5 43 74
13 7 44 6 75 3
14 45 3 76
15 5 46 2 77
16 6 47 6 78
17 5 48 3 79 5
18 5 49 7 80
19 4 50 3 81 6
20 5 51 6 82 5
21 6 52 2 83 6
22 6 53 84 5
23 54 3 85 2
24 55 86 4
25 3 56 7 87 5
26 7 57 3 88 4
27 6 58 4 89 6
28 6 59 5 90 5
29 5 60 5 91 6
30 6 61 3 92
31 62 4
Survey Question 22
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 4
3 7 34 65 5
4 5 35 2 66
5 4 36 67 4
6 37 5 68
7 5 38 4 69 5
8 2 39 70 6
9 6 40 6 71 5
10 7 41 6 72
11 4 42 4 73 5
12 4 43 74
13 6 44 6 75 3
14 45 6 76
15 5 46 2 77
16 6 47 4 78
17 6 48 6 79 5
18 7 49 7 80
19 4 50 4 81 6
20 5 51 5 82 5
21 6 52 4 83 5
22 5 53 84 5
23 54 3 85 3
24 55 86 4
25 3 56 6 87 5
26 5 57 4 88 4
27 2 58 4 89 6
28 4 59 5 90 4
29 5 60 6 91 3
30 5 61 2 92
31 62 4
Survey Question 23
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 5 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 5
3 7 34 65 5
4 5 35 4 66
5 3 36 67 4
6 37 5 68
7 3 38 4 69 4
8 5 39 70 6
9 6 40 5 71 6
10 7 41 6 72
11 5 42 6 73 3
12 5 43 74
13 7 44 6 75 6
14 45 6 76
15 5 46 2 77
16 5 47 4 78
17 5 48 6 79 5
18 3 49 5 80
19 5 50 3 81 6
20 5 51 5 82 6
21 6 52 4 83 5
22 5 53 84 5
23 54 3 85 2
24 55 86 4
25 6 56 7 87 3
26 6 57 4 88 3
27 6 58 4 89 7
28 5 59 3 90 4
29 6 60 3 91 6
30 6 61 3 92
31 62 4
Survey Question 24
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 3 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 3
3 7 34 65 5
4 2 35 2 66
5 2 36 67 4
6 37 5 68
7 5 38 4 69 5
8 3 39 70 6
9 6 40 5 71 5
10 7 41 6 72
11 5 42 4 73 4
12 5 43 74
13 6 44 6 75 6
14 45 5 76
15 5 46 2 77
16 6 47 4 78
17 5 48 6 79 5
18 3 49 6 80
19 5 50 2 81 7
20 5 51 4 82 6
21 6 52 4 83 6
22 4 53 84 6
23 54 4 85 3
24 55 86 4
25 2 56 6 87 3
26 6 57 4 88 5
27 6 58 4 89 6
28 6 59 5 90 5
29 5 60 5 91 6
30 5 61 5 92
31 62 4
Survey Question 25
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 6 32 63 6
2 33 6 64 6
3 7 34 65 5
4 4 35 2 66
5 2 36 67 4
6 37 5 68
7 5 38 4 69 5
8 3 39 70 6
9 6 40 5 71 6
10 7 41 6 72
11 4 42 6 73 5
12 4 43 74
13 2 44 6 75 6
14 45 6 76
15 5 46 2 77
16 6 47 4 78
17 6 48 6 79 5
18 5 49 5 80
19 4 50 5 81 6
20 5 51 5 82 6
21 6 52 5 83 5
22 4 53 84 5
23 54 5 85 6
24 55 86 4
25 6 56 6 87 5
26 6 57 4 88 4
27 6 58 4 89 6
28 3 59 5 90 4
29 5 60 6 91 6
30 6 61 5 92
31 62 4
Survey Question 26
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 63 2
2 33 2 64 3
3 2 34 65 2
4 5 35 4 66
5 5 36 67 4
6 37 3 68
7 3 38 4 69 2
8 5 39 70 3
9 2 40 4 71 3
10 1 41 2 72
11 2 42 2 73 5
12 2 43 74
13 2 44 3 75 2
14 45 2 76
15 3 46 3 77
16 2 47 4 78
17 2 48 3 79 5
18 2 49 7 80
19 7 50 2 81 2
20 2 51 2 82 2
21 3 52 5 83 5
22 2 53 84 2
23 54 3 85 6
24 55 86 4
25 2 56 1 87 3
26 2 57 3 88 4
27 2 58 4 89 1
28 2 59 6 90 3
29 3 60 4 91 5
30 4 61 3 92
31 62 6
Survey Question 27
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 3 63 3
2 2 33 2 64 3
3 3 34 2 65 3
4 2 35 1 66 3
5 3 36 1 67 1
6 3 37 3 68 3
7 3 38 3 69 3
8 3 39 2 70 2
9 2 40 1 71 2
10 1 41 3 72 3
11 3 42 3 73 3
12 3 43 3 74 3
13 1 44 3 75 3
14 2 45 2 76 2
15 2 46 2 77 3
16 2 47 2 78 2
17 2 48 2 79 3
18 2 49 3 80 2
19 2 50 2 81 1
20 2 51 1 82 3
21 2 52 3 83 3
22 2 53 1 84 3
23 2 54 1 85 2
24 3 55 1 86 2
25 1 56 3 87 2
26 1 57 1 88 3
27 1 58 3 89 3
28 1 59 2 90 3
29 1 60 3 91 3
30 3 61 3 92 2
31 3 62 3
Survey Question 28
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 3 63 1
2 2 33 1 64 1
3 1 34 2 65 3
4 2 35 1 66 3
5 1 36 3 67 3
6 2 37 1 68 3
7 3 38 3 69 3
8 2 39 2 70 2
9 2 40 1 71 1
10 1 41 1 72 3
11 3 42 1 73 3
12 3 43 3 74 3
13 1 44 3 75 3
14 2 45 2 76 2
15 1 46 3 77 1
16 1 47 2 78 2
17 2 48 3 79 3
18 1 49 3 80 2
19 2 50 1 81 1
20 3 51 1 82 3
21 1 52 3 83 1
22 2 53 3 84 1
23 3 54 3 85 2
24 3 55 3 86 3
25 1 56 3 87 3
26 1 57 1 88 3
27 1 58 3 89 1
28 3 59 2 90 3
29 3 60 3 91 1
30 2 61 2 92 2
31 3 62 3
Survey Question 29
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 3 63 3
2 2 33 2 64 3
3 1 34 2 65 3
4 1 35 1 66 3
5 1 36 3 67 3
6 1 37 3 68 3
7 1 38 1 69 3
8 2 39 2 70 2
9 2 40 2 71 2
10 1 41 3 72 3
11 1 42 1 73 1
12 1 43 3 74 3
13 2 44 3 75 3
14 2 45 1 76 2
15 2 46 2 77 3
16 2 47 2 78 2
17 2 48 1 79 3
18 1 49 3 80 2
19 1 50 2 81 1
20 2 51 2 82 3
21 2 52 3 83 3
22 2 53 1 84 3
23 3 54 3 85 2
24 3 55 1 86 3
25 1 56 3 87 3
26 1 57 2 88 3
27 2 58 2 89 1
28 1 59 2 90 2
29 2 60 3 91 3
30 2 61 2 92 2
31 3 62 3
Survey Question 30
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 2 63 3
2 2 33 2 64 3
3 1 34 2 65 3
4 2 35 3 66 3
5 3 36 2 67 3
6 2 37 3 68 3
7 3 38 3 69 3
8 3 39 2 70 1
9 2 40 2 71 1
10 1 41 3 72 3
11 3 42 3 73 3
12 3 43 3 74 3
13 2 44 3 75 2
14 2 45 1 76 2
15 2 46 3 77 3
16 2 47 2 78 2
17 2 48 3 79 3
18 2 49 3 80 2
19 1 50 2 81 2
20 2 51 1 82 3
21 2 52 3 83 2
22 2 53 1 84 2
23 3 54 3 85 2
24 3 55 3 86 3
25 1 56 3 87 1
26 1 57 3 88 3
27 3 58 2 89 3
28 3 59 2 90 3
29 2 60 3 91 3
30 2 61 3 92 3
31 3 62 3
Survey Question 31
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Participant ID: Participant ID: Participant ID:
1 1 5 32 1 3 8 63 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 9 33 9 64 1 2 4 6 7
3 1 7 34 1 7 65 1 4 6 7 8
4 1 2 3 35 9 66 9
5 1 4 5 36 1 7 67 9
6 1 37 1 5 68 9
7 1 2 3 4 5 38 9 69 9
8 9 39 1 70 9
9 9 40 6 7 71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10 1 2 41 9 72 9
11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 42 9 73 1 2 3 4 5 7
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 43 1 2 3 74 1 4 6
13 9 44 2 3 6 8 75 1
14 9 45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 76 1 3 7
15 1 2 46 1 4 5 77 1 4 5 6 7 8
16 1 4 5 7 47 1 2 78 1
17 9 48 1 2 4 5 7 79 1 2 3
18 1 3 4 5 49 2 3 6 7 8 80 9
19 9 50 1 81 1 2 3 4 7
20 1 7 51 1 82 9
21 2 3 4 5 8 52 9 83 1 6 7 8
22 9 53 9 84 1 7
23 1 54 9 85 9
24 9 55 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 86 9
25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 56 1 4 5 87 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 57 9 88 9
27 1 58 9 89 1 2 4 7
28 9 59 1 2 4 5 90 9
29 1 4 5 7 60 2 3 4 6 8 91 1 5
30 9 61 1 2 4 5 6 7 92 1 4
31 9 62 9
Response Response Response
Survey Question 32
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 1 32 8 63 11
2 2 33 1 64 9
3 2 34 1 65 11
4 1 35 8 66 12
5 2 36 7 67 12
6 4 37 8 68 12
7 7 38 8 69 9
8 1 39 1 70 11
9 1 40 1 71 12
10 4 41 4 72 12
11 5 42 7 73 9
12 3 43 74 12
13 4 44 8 75 9
14 1 45 5 76 11
15 1 46 2 77 11
16 8 47 1 78 9
17 1 48 3 79 10
18 8 49 8 80 12
19 1 50 2 81 9
20 1 51 1 82 12
21 3 52 12 83 9
22 1 53 12 84 11
23 7 54 11 85 9
24 7 55 10 86 10
25 1 56 10 87 10
26 5 57 9 88
27 2 58 9 89 10
28 4 59 9 90 10
29 8 60 10 91 11
30 7 61 11 92 10
31 8 62 9
Survey Question 33
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 18 32 15 63 17
2 18 33 14 64 17
3 17 34 4 65 17
4 9 35 2 66 18
5 13 36 67 3
6 3 37 5 68 12
7 3 38 14 69 8
8 1 39 18 70 14
9 1 40 15 71 8
10 10 41 17 72 2
11 7 42 17 73 5
12 7 43 74 6
13 15 44 75 14
14 45 5 76 18
15 17 46 14 77 8
16 13 47 8 78 8
17 15 48 16 79 3
18 13 49 13 80 2
19 7 50 8 81 4
20 3 51 10 82 18
21 11 52 2 83
22 8 53 18 84 17
23 3 54 10 85 5
24 55 7 86
25 6 56 8 87 12
26 6 57 10 88
27 10 58 5 89 6
28 6 59 1 90 6
29 1 60 16 91 4
30 61 14 92 7
31 62 14
Survey Question 34
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 7 32 7 63 7
2 7 33 7 64 6
3 7 34 7 65 4
4 6 35 6 66 1
5 7 36 7 67 5
6 7 37 6 68 5
7 7 38 5 69 5
8 6 39 7 70 7
9 5 40 6 71 6
10 7 41 7 72 4
11 7 42 7 73 7
12 7 43 74 4
13 7 44 6 75 6
14 45 6 76 6
15 7 46 6 77 6
16 7 47 1 78 6
17 1 48 6 79 6
18 7 49 6 80 4
19 7 50 7 81 6
20 1 51 7 82 7
21 6 52 4 83 7
22 1 53 1 84 7
23 7 54 7 85 6
24 6 55 7 86 7
25 6 56 7 87 5
26 6 57 6 88 7
27 7 58 6 89 5
28 6 59 6 90 7
29 7 60 6 91 7
30 7 61 7 92 7
31 62 4
Survey Question 35
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 7 32 6 63 3
2 3 33 7 64 2
3 7 34 5 65 3
4 7 35 2 66 1
5 6 36 4 67 1
6 4 37 4 68 2
7 5 38 2 69 2
8 6 39 7 70 4
9 6 40 4 71 1
10 7 41 4 72 1
11 4 42 2 73 7
12 3 43 74 1
13 6 44 4 75 4
14 45 5 76 2
15 5 46 3 77 3
16 7 47 7 78 5
17 7 48 4 79 3
18 7 49 3 80 1
19 7 50 7 81 4
20 7 51 4 82 1
21 7 52 1 83 7
22 7 53 1 84 3
23 7 54 6 85 2
24 4 55 2 86 6
25 7 56 3 87 4
26 5 57 2 88 5
27 7 58 5 89 2
28 6 59 5 90 1
29 7 60 4 91 4
30 7 61 5 92 5
31 7 62 2
Survey Question 36
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Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response Participant ID: Response
1 2 32 2 63 2
2 6 33 1 64 2
3 3 34 3 65 2
4 6 35 2 66 1
5 1 36 2 67 1
6 6 37 2 68 1
7 2 38 1 69 1
8 1 39 1 70 2
9 5 40 1 71 2
10 3 41 2 72 1
11 1 42 2 73 3
12 1 43 1 74 1
13 2 44 2 75 2
14 1 45 6 76 2
15 3 46 3 77 2
16 1 47 1 78 2
17 2 48 2 79 2
18 4 49 2 80 1
19 4 50 1 81 6
20 4 51 3 82 1
21 3 52 1 83 2
22 1 53 1 84 2
23 4 54 6 85 2
24 2 55 2 86 6
25 6 56 6 87 2
26 6 57 2 88 6
27 6 58 2 89 2
28 1 59 3 90 2
29 1 60 2 91 2
30 5 61 2 92 2
31 1 62 2
Survey Question 37
 
  
322 
 
APPENDIX E – HOMESTATION TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE 
CAPACITY 
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HITS can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 16 31.4 31.4 31.4
Platoon 2 3.9 3.9 35.3
Company/Troop 3 5.9 5.9 41.2
Battalion/Squadron 12 23.5 23.5 64.7
Brigade/Regiment 6 11.8 11.8 76.5
More than a Brigade/Regiment 3 5.9 5.9 82.4
Don't Know 9 17.6 17.6 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
HITS can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 8 19.5 19.5 19.5
Platoon 1 2.4 2.4 22.0
Company/Troop 2 4.9 4.9 26.8
Battalion/Squadron 7 17.1 17.1 43.9
Brigade/Regiment 3 7.3 7.3 51.2
More than a Brigade/Regiment 2 4.9 4.9 56.1
Don't Know 18 43.9 43.9 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
HITS can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 24 26.1 26.1 26.1
Platoon 3 3.3 3.3 29.3
Company/Troop 5 5.4 5.4 34.8
Battalion/Squadron 19 29.7 29.7 55.4
Brigade/Regiment 9 9.8 9.8 65.2
More than a Brigade/Regiment 5 5.4 5.4 70.7
Don't Know 27 29.3 29.3 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0
Capacity of homestation HITS as reported by Training Facilitators
Capacity of homestation HITS as reported by Training Users
Capacity of homestation HITS as reported by Combined Populations
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Capacity of homestation CCTT as reported by training facilitators 
CCTT can accommodate: 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
None 25 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Platoon 2 3.9 3.9 52.9 
Company/Troop 8 15.7 15.7 68.6 
Battalion/Squadron 9 17.6 17.6 86.3 
Brigade/Regiment 2 3.9 3.9 90.2 
More than a Brigade/Regiment 1 2.0 2.0 92.2 
Don't Know 4 7.8 7.8 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0 
 Capacity of homestation CCTT as reported by training users 
CCTT can accommodate: 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
None 12 29.3 29.3 29.3 
Platoon 5 12.2 12.2 41.5 
Company/Troop 7 17.1 17.1 58.5 
Battalion/Squadron 4 9.8 9.8 68.3 
Brigade/Regiment 2 4.9 4.9 73.2 
More than a Brigade/Regiment 2 4.9 4.9 78.0 
Don't Know 9 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 41 100.0 100.0 
 Capacity of homestation CCTT as reported by Combined Populations 
CCTT can accommodate: 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative Percent 
None 37 40.2 40.2 40.2 
Platoon 7 7.6 7.6 47.8 
Company/Troop 15 16.3 16.3 64.1 
Battalion/Squadron 13 14.1 14.1 78.3 
Brigade/Regiment 4 4.3 4.3 82.6 
More than a Brigade/Regiment 3 3.3 3.3 85.9 
Don't Know 13 14.1 14.1 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 100.0 
  
 
  
325 
 
RVTT can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 11 21.6 21.6 21.6
One Crew 0 0.0 0.0 21.6
Two Crews 4 7.8 7.8 29.4
Three Crews 3 5.9 5.9 35.3
Four Crews 21 41.2 41.2 76.5
More than Four Crews 3 5.9 5.9 82.4
Don't Know 9 17.6 17.6 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
RVTT can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 5 12.2 12.2 12.2
One Crew 0 0.0 0.0 12.2
Two Crews 4 9.8 9.8 22.0
Three Crews 2 4.9 4.9 26.8
Four Crews 11 26.8 26.8 53.7
More than Four Crews 4 9.8 9.8 63.4
Don't Know 15 36.6 36.6 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
RVTT can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 16 17.4 17.4 17.4
One Crew 0 0.0 0.0 17.4
Two Crews 8 8.7 8.7 26.1
Three Crews 5 5.4 5.4 31.5
Four Crews 32 34.8 34.8 66.3
More than Four Crews 7 7.6 7.6 73.9
Don't Know 24 26.1 26.1 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0
Capacity of homestation RVTT as reported by Training Facilitators
Capacity of homestation RVTT as reported by Training Users
Capacity of homestation RVTT as reported by Combined Populations
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Capacity of homestation AVCATT as reported by training facilitators 
AVCATT can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
None 12 23.5 23.5 23.5 
One Crew 0 0.0 0.0 23.5 
Two Crews 3 5.9 5.9 29.4 
Three Crews 0 0.0 0.0 29.4 
Four Crews 11 21.6 21.6 51.0 
Five Crews 0 0.0 0.0 51.0 
Six Crews 14 27.5 27.5 78.4 
More than Six Crews 2 3.9 3.9 82.4 
Don't Know 9 17.6 17.6 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0   
Capacity of homestation AVCATT as reported by training users 
AVCATT can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
None 5 12.2 12.2 12.2 
One Crew 1 2.4 2.4 14.6 
Two Crews 4 9.8 9.8 24.4 
Three Crews 1 2.4 2.4 26.8 
Four Crews 0 0.0 0.0 26.8 
Five Crews 0 0.0 0.0 26.8 
Six Crews 5 12.2 12.2 39.0 
More than Six Crews 1 2.4 2.4 41.5 
Don't Know 24 58.5 58.5 100.0 
Total 41 100.0 100.0   
Capacity of homestation AVCATT as reported by Combined Populations 
AVCATT can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
None 17 18.5 18.5 18.5 
One Crew 1 1.1 1.1 19.6 
Two Crews 7 7.6 7.6 27.2 
Three Crews 1 1.1 1.1 28.3 
Four Crews 11 12.0 12.0 40.2 
Five Crews 0 0.0 0.0 40.2 
Six Crews 19 20.7 20.7 60.9 
More than Six Crews 3 3.3 3.3 64.1 
Don't Know 33 35.9 35.9 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 100.0   
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JLCCTC-ERF can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 2 3.9 3.9 3.9
Platoon 1 2.0 2.0 5.9
Company/Troop 1 2.0 2.0 7.8
Battalion/Squadron 1 2.0 2.0 9.8
Brigade/Regiment 22 43.1 43.1 52.9
More than a Brigade/Regiment 21 41.2 41.2 94.1
Don't Know 3 5.9 5.9 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
JLCCTC ERF can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 4 9.8 9.8 9.8
Platoon 0 0.0 0.0 9.8
Company/Troop 0 0.0 0.0 9.8
Battalion/Squadron 0 0.0 0.0 9.8
Brigade/Regiment 7 17.7 17.7 26.8
More than a Brigade/Regiment 15 36.6 36.6 63.4
Don't Know 15 36.6 36.6 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
JLCCTC-ERF can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 6 6.5 6.5 6.5
Platoon 1 1.1 1.1 7.6
Company/Troop 1 1.1 1.1 8.7
Battalion/Squadron 1 1.1 1.1 9.8
Brigade/Regiment 29 31.5 31.5 41.3
More than a Brigade/Regiment 36 39.1 39.1 80.4
Don't Know 18 19.6 19.6 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0
Capacity of homestation JLCCTC-ERF as reported by Training Facilitators
Capacity of homestation JLCCTC-ERF as reported by Training Users
Capacity of homestation JLCCTC-ERF as reported by Combined Populations
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MTC can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 2 3.9 3.9 3.9
Platoon 0 0.0 0.0 3.9
Company/Troop 0 0.0 0.0 3.9
Battalion/Squadron 2 3.9 3.9 7.8
Brigade/Regiment 26 51.0 51.0 58.8
More than a Brigade/Regiment 17 33.3 33.3 92.2
Don't Know 4 7.8 7.8 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
MTC can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 4 9.8 9.8 9.8
Platoon 0 0.0 0.0 9.8
Company/Troop 1 2.4 2.4 12.2
Battalion/Squadron 4 9.8 9.8 22.0
Brigade/Regiment 12 29.3 29.3 51.2
More than a Brigade/Regiment 10 24.4 24.4 75.6
Don't Know 10 24.4 24.4 100.0
Total 41 100.0 100.0
MTC can accommodate: Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
None 6 6.5 6.5 6.5
Platoon 0 0.0 0.0 6.5
Company/Troop 1 1.1 1.1 7.6
Battalion/Squadron 6 6.5 6.5 14.1
Brigade/Regiment 38 41.3 41.3 55.4
More than a Brigade/Regiment 37 29.3 29.3 84.8
Don't Know 14 15.2 15.2 100.0
Total 92 100.0 100.0
Capacity of homestation MTC as reported by Training Facilitators
Capacity of homestation MTC as reported by Training Users
Capacity of homestation MTC as reported by Combined Populations
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APPENDIX F – OPTIMIZE TRAINING RESOURCES RESPONSE 
FREQUENCIES 
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APPENDIX G – SURVEY QUESTION 21 (TADSS COMSUMABLE 
DATABASES) RESPONSE FREQUENCIES 
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APPENDIX H – SURVEY QUESTION 22 (COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING 
SUPPORT PACKAGES) RESPONSE FREQUENCIES 
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APPENDIX I – OPERATIONAL ADAPTABILITY RESPONSE 
FREQUENCIES 
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